Crossroads II: Marshall Report 996

Lake County, Illinois is already experiencing a traffic congestion problem. By the year 2020, when its population is projected to increase by at least 250,000, traffic congestion will likely be significantly worse. This report is the second installment in a study called "Crossroads: Smart Transportation Options for Lake County", which is commissioned by the Environmental Law and Policy Center and Citizens Organized for Sound Transportation. The study is carried out by Resource Systems Group, Inc. and the University of Illinois at Chicago. It uses advanced transportation modeling to examine the impact of various possible transportation improvements on traffic congestion levels in Lake County.The first installment of Crossroads, released in 1997, demonstrated that the State could relieve traffic congestion levels in the year 2020 14% more by simply carrying out the existing plan to upgrade local roads in Lake County than by building the proposed new $1.2 billion Route 53 tollroad. In other words, building a 25-mile, six-lane extension to Route 53 would increase traffic congestion by 14%.In this second installment, we now examine the impact of proposed transit improvements on Lake County traffic congestion levels. We tested a package of transit improvements that are, again, included in the State's official transportation plan. They include installing a second track on the Wisconsin North Central commuter rail line, building a portion of the Elgin Joliet and Eastern circumferential commuter rail line, and increasing bus service

The interaction between tolls and capacity investment in serial and parallel transport networks.

Investment; Serial; Transport; Networks; Working;

The interaction between tolls and capacity investment in serial and parallel transport networks

The purpose of this paper is to compare the interaction between pricing and capacity decisions on simple serial and parallel transport networks. When individual links of the network are operated by different regional or national authorities, toll and capacity competition is likely to result. Moreover, the problem is potentially complicated by the presence of both local and transit demand on each link of the network. We bring together and extend the recent literature on the topic and, using both theory and numerical simulation techniques, provide a careful comparison of toll and capacity interaction on serial and parallel network structures. First, we show that there is more tax exporting in serial transport corridors than on competing parallel road networks. Second, the inability to toll transit has quite dramatic negative welfare effects on parallel networks. On the contrary, in serial transport corridors it may actually be undesirable to allow the tolling of transit at all. Third, if the links are exclusively used by transit transport, toll and capacity decisions are independent in serial networks. This does not generally hold in the presence of local transport. Moreover, it contrasts with a parallel setting where regional authorities compete for transit; in that case, regional investment in capacity leads to lower Nash equilibrium tolls.congestion pricing, transport investment, transit traffic

The interactin between tolls and capacity investment in serial and parallel transport networks

The purpose of this paper is to compare the interaction between pricing and capacity decisions on simple serial and parallel transport networks. When individual links of the network are operated by different regional or national authorities, toll and capacity competition is likely to result. Moreover, the problem is potentially complicated by the presence of both local and transit demand on each link of the network. We bring together and extend the recent literature on the topic and, using both theory and numerical simulation techniques, provide a careful comparison of toll and capacity interaction on serial and parallel network structures. First, we show that there is more tax exporting in serial transport corridors than on competing parallel road networks. Second, the inability to toll transit has quite dramatic negative welfare effects on parallel networks. On the contrary, in serial transport corridors it may actually be undesirable to allow the tolling of transit at all. Third, if the links are exclusively used by transit transport, toll and capacity decisions are independent in serial networks. This does not generally hold in the presence of local transport. Moreover, it contrasts with a parallel setting where regional authorities compete for transit; in that case, regional investment in capacity leads to lower Nash equilibrium tolls.congestion pricing, transport investment, transit traffic

The interaction between tolls and capacity investment in serial and parallel transport networks.

The purpose of this paper is to compare the interaction between pricing and capacity decisions on simple serial and parallel transport networks. When individual links of the network are operated by different regional or national authorities, toll and capacity competition is likely to result. Moreover, the problem is potentially complicated by the presence of both local and transit demand on each link of the network. We bring together and extend the recent literature on the topic and, using both theory and numerical simulation techniques, provide a careful comparison of toll and capacity interaction on serial and parallel network structures. First, we show that there is more tax exporting in serial transport corridors than on competing parallel road networks. Second, the inability to toll transit has quite dramatic negative welfare effects on parallel networks. On the contrary, in serial transport corridors it may actually be undesirable to allow the tolling of transit at all. Third, if the links are exclusively used by transit transport, toll and capacity decisions are independent in serial networks. This does not generally hold in the presence of local transport. Moreover, it contrasts with a parallel setting where regional authorities compete for transit; in that case, regional investment in capacity leads to lower Nash equilibrium tolls.Congestion pricing; Transport investment; Transit traffic;

Let\u27s Ride the Bus: Reverse-Commute Challenges Facing Low-Income Inner City Residents of Onondaga County (2009 Report)

This is the second and final phase of our investigation into the reverse-commute challenges facing low-income inner-city residents in Onondaga County. With lower-wage jobs proliferating outside the city core, our findings confirm that transportation remains one of the greatest obstacles to landing and keeping entry-level work. The current transit system does not meet the needs of low-income workers living in the city or employers based in outlying neighborhoods or the suburbs. Although a majority of manufacturing employers contacted for this study said transportation shortfalls do not affect their ability to hire and retain workers, other stakeholders jobseekers, job developers, service providers, county planners, and transit professionals—insist the problem is real: Jobseekers with few skills and limited access to transportation struggle to find employment while employers in other key sectors, notably hospitality and health services, contend with the consequences in the form of high turnover, tardiness, absences, and vacancies, as noted in our 2008 report, Catch That Bus... Inadequacies in the local transit system will affect the county\u27s longer-term economic vitality. Current concerns about air pollution, environmental conservation, energy costs, and strained municipal budgets add to the urgency of addressing the interrelated issues of employment, transportation, economic development, and sprawl. Collaboration among key stakeholders—the County, Centro, employers, private transit operators, service providers, and town boards--is necessary to advance the parties\u27 mutual interests

Assessing gas transit risks: Russia vs. the EU

This paper proposes a Transit Risk Index (TRI) designed to assess the riskiness of pipeline gas imports and to study the effect of introducing new gas routes. TRI controls for gas dependency, transit route diversification, political risks of transit, pipeline rupture probability, and the balance of power between supplying and consuming countries along the transit route. Evaluating TRI for the EU-Russia gas trade, we show that the introduction of the Nord Stream pipeline would further widen already large disparities in gas risk exposure across the EU Member States. The gas risk exposure of the Member States served by Nord Stream would decline. In contrast, EU countries not connected to Nord Stream, but sharing other Russian gas transit routes with the Nord Stream countries, would face greater gas risk exposure. We discuss the implications of our analysis for the design of the common energy policy in the EU.Gas transit risk; Index; Security of supply; Nord Stream; Common Energy Policy