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Strategic Behaviour under Regulation Benchmarking
Liberalisation of generation and supply activities in the electricity sectors is often followed by regulatory reform of distribution networks. In order to improve the efficiency of distribution utilities, some regulators have adopted incentive regulation schemes that rely on performance benchmarking. Although regulation benchmarking can influence the �regulation game�, the subject has received limited attention. This paper discusses how strategic behaviour can result in inefficient behaviour by firms. We also present a survey of issues encountered by electricity regulators. We then use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method with US utility data to examine implications of selected cases of strategic behaviour. The results show that gaming can have significant effects on the measured performance and profitability of firms
Micro-economic Analysis of the Physical Constrained Markets: Game Theory Application to Competitive Electricity Markets
Competition has been introduced in the electricity markets with the goal of
reducing prices and improving efficiency. The basic idea which stays behind
this choice is that, in competitive markets, a greater quantity of the good is
exchanged at a lower and a lower price, leading to higher market efficiency.
Electricity markets are pretty different from other commodities mainly due to
the physical constraints related to the network structure that may impact the
market performance. The network structure of the system on which the economic
transactions need to be undertaken poses strict physical and operational
constraints. Strategic interactions among producers that game the market with
the objective of maximizing their producer surplus must be taken into account
when modeling competitive electricity markets. The physical constraints,
specific of the electricity markets, provide additional opportunity of gaming
to the market players. Game theory provides a tool to model such a context.
This paper discussed the application of game theory to physical constrained
electricity markets with the goal of providing tools for assessing the market
performance and pinpointing the critical network constraints that may impact
the market efficiency. The basic models of game theory specifically designed to
represent the electricity markets will be presented. IEEE30 bus test system of
the constrained electricity market will be discussed to show the network
impacts on the market performances in presence of strategic bidding behavior of
the producers.Comment: Accepted for publication in the European Journal of Physics B.
Presented at the Int. Conf. NEXT-SigmaPhi, 13-18 August 2005, Cret
Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma for California and Beyond
Any belief that a shift from uniform to as-bid pricing would provide power purchasers substantial relief from soaring prices is simply mistaken. The immediate consequence of its introduction would be a radical change in bidding behavior that would introduce new inefficiencies, weaken competition in new generation, and impede expansion of capacity.Auctions, Electricity Auctions, Multiple Item Auctions
The More Cooperation, the More Competition? A Cournot Analysis of the Benefits of Electric Market Coupling
Market coupling in Belgian and Dutch markets would permit more efficient use of intercountry transmission, 1) by counting only net flows against transmission limits, 2) by improving access to the Belgian market, and 3) by eliminating the mismatch in timing between interface auctions and the energy spot market. A Cournot market model that accounts for the region’s transmission pricing rules and limitations is used to simulate market outcomes with and without market coupling. This accounts for 1) and 2). Market coupling improves social surplus in the order of 108 €/year, unless it encourages the largest producer in the region to switch from a price-taking strategy in Belgium to a Cournot strategy due to a perceived diminishment of the threat of regulatory intervention. Benefit to Dutch consumers depends on the behavior of this company. The results illustrate how large-scale oligopoly models can be useful for assessing market integration
Auction Basics for Wholesale Power Markets: Objectives and Pricing Rules
Power systems have distinctive features that greatly complicate the development of auction designs. This study reviews the theory and practice of auction design as it relates specifically to U.S. restructured wholesale power markets, i.e., centrally-administered wholesale power markets with congestion managed by locational marginal prices. Basic auction concepts such as reservation value, net seller surplus, net buyer surplus, competitive market clearing, market efficiency, market pricing rules, supply offers, demand bids, strategic capacity withholding, and market power are explained and illustrated. Complicating factors specific to wholesale power markets are clarified, and recent advances in computational tools designed to address these complications are briefly noted.market power; Auction markets; power systems; design; efficency; pricing rules; agent-based test beds
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