Privacy-Preserving Public Information for Sequential Games

In settings with incomplete information, players can find it difficult to coordinate to find states with good social welfare. For example, in financial settings, if a collection of financial firms have limited information about each other's strategies, some large number of them may choose the same high-risk investment in hopes of high returns. While this might be acceptable in some cases, the economy can be hurt badly if many firms make investments in the same risky market segment and it fails. One reason why many firms might end up choosing the same segment is that they do not have information about other firms' investments (imperfect information may lead to `bad' game states). Directly reporting all players' investments, however, raises confidentiality concerns for both individuals and institutions. In this paper, we explore whether information about the game-state can be publicly announced in a manner that maintains the privacy of the actions of the players, and still suffices to deter players from reaching bad game-states. We show that in many games of interest, it is possible for players to avoid these bad states with the help of privacy-preserving, publicly-announced information. We model behavior of players in this imperfect information setting in two ways -- greedy and undominated strategic behaviours, and we prove guarantees on social welfare that certain kinds of privacy-preserving information can help attain. Furthermore, we design a counter with improved privacy guarantees under continual observation

Why continue sharing: determinants of behavior in collaborative economy services

La economía colaborativa está revolucionando la forma en que los consumidores utilizan los bienes y servicios. En nuestro estudio modificamos y ampliamos el modelo de confirmación de expectativas para determinar los factores motivacionales que impulsan la satisfacción y la intención de continuar usando los servicios de viajes colaborativos. Más importante aún, agregamos el valor social como un factor adicional. En este estudio fueron encuestados usuarios españoles experimentados de BlaBlaCar. La calidad del servicio, la utilidad percibida, la confianza y el valor social son determinantes de la satisfacción de los usuarios experimentados y, a través de ella, de la intención de continuar usando; mientras que no es el caso para el impacto ambiental ni para los beneficios económicos. Además, la confianza afecta directamente a la intención de continuar. Estos resultados tienen implicaciones gerenciales relevantes, mostrando que los usuarios de algunos servicios colaborativos están motivados por otros factores además de los económicos.The sharing economy is revolutionizing the way consumers use goods and services. In our study we modify and extend the expectation confirmation model to determine the motivational factors which drive the satisfaction and continue intention to use ridesharing services. Most importantly, we add social value as an additional factor to those previously studied in the literature. We apply our model in a survey among experienced Spanish users of BlaBlaCar. Service quality, perceived usefulness, trust and social value are determinants of satisfaction of experienced users and through it, of intention to continuance; while it is the case neither for environmental impact nor for economic benefits. Additionally, trust affects directly continuance. These results have relevant managerial implications, showing that users of some sharing services are motivated by other factors than purely economic

Social Media Strategic Plan For Under Armour

This thesis is a study of the effects of social media on an organization’s integrated marketing communications strategy in general and provides a proposal of how the sports apparel company Under Armour could use social media to enhance its promotional strategies. It is a discussion of the implications that social media has on consumer behavior with focus on how social media has changed the way today’s consumers interact with brands. This thesis provides an analysis of the growing importance of social media being implemented within a business. Benefits discussed include the appeal of social media over traditional media, increased customer satisfaction, increased loyalty, and brand awareness. A list of essential social media networking sites is discussed under the different platforms of networking, promoting and sharing, highlighting their importance to a business. Under Armour’s current social media presence is discussed and how social media has become a new component of the Integrated Marketing Communications (IMC) mix. An illustration of how Homeland/Embassy strategy uses social media is provided as an example of how Under Armour could use social media in its IMC mix

Voluntary disclosure under imperfect competition: Experimental evidence

This study investigates disclosure behavior when a manager has incentives to influence the actions of a product market competitor in a Cournot duopoly. Theoretical research suggests that under various conditions the manager has incentives to withhold some signals and disclose others. Using an experimental economics method, we find support for partial information disclosure. Our results suggest that when the manager receives private information about industrywide cost, unfavorable (favorable) information is disclosed (withheld) and the competitor adjusts production accordingly. In contrast, when the manager receives private information about firm-specific cost, disclosure behavior is not affected by the favorableness of the information and the competitor's production decision is invariant to the disclosure choice.Information theory ; Microeconomics

Union Power and Product Market Competition: Evidence from the Airline Industry

In this paper we specify and estimate a structural model which links product market competition and union power. The model has a two-stage setting in which wages are determined through bargaining between management and unions in the first stage, with a price-setting market game to follow in the second stage. Using data for eight European airlines from 1976-1994, we provide evidence on price-cost margins and the measurement of market power in a model of rent sharing. In particular, we find that the welfare effects of rent sharing work mainly through reducing firms’ profits, rather than consumers surplus. As a consequence the static impact of unions is more on equity rather than efficiency. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Gewerkschaftsmacht und Produktmarkt-Wettbewerb: Evidenz aus der Luftfahrtindustrie) In diesem Beitrag wird ein strukturiertes Modell spezifiziert und geschätzt, das den Zusammenhang zwischen Produktmarkt-Wettbewerb und Gewerkschaftsmacht abbildet. Das Modell ist zweistufig. In der ersten Stufe werden im Rahmen von Verhandlungen zwischen Management und Gewerkschaften die Löhne bestimmt und auf der zweiten Stufe folgt ein Preissetzungsspiel. Anhand von Daten für acht europäische Fluggesellschaftenfür die Zeit von 1976 bis 1994 läßt sich empirisch ein Zusammenhang zwischen Preis-Kostenspanne und der Messung der Marktmacht in einem Modell des "rent sharing" feststellen. Dabei wird deutlich, daß sich Wohlfahrtseffekte des "rent sharing" hauptsächlich durch eine Verringerung der Unternehmensgewinne ergeben und nicht so sehr aus der Konsumentenrente. Daraus ergibt sich, daß der statische Einfluß der Gewerkschaften auch mehr auf Gleichheit als auf mehr Effizienz abzielt.efficiency; union power; market power; rent sharing; airline industry

Borrower Poaching and Information Display in Credit Markets

The Riegle-Neal Act in the US and the Economic and Monetary Union in Europe are recent initiatives to stimulate financial integration.These initiatives allow new entrants to "poach" the incumbents' clients by offering them attractive loan offers.We show that these deregulations may be insuficient since asymmetric information seriously hampers the integration of credit markets.This asymmetry stems from the informational advantage incumbent banks have about their current clients vis-a-vis potential entrants.More-over, banks may strategically display some information hindering entry when asymmetric information is moderate.We also show that voluntary information sharing emerges only when asymmetric information is low.credit markets;economic integration;information;banking;competition;access to market

Union Power and Product Market Competition: Evidence from the Airline Industry

In this paper we specify and estimate a structural model which links product market competition and union power. The model has a two-stage setting in which wages are determined through bargaining between management and unions in the first stage, with a price-setting market game to follow in the second stage. Using data for eight European airlines from 1976-1994, we provide evidence on price-cost margins and the measurement of market power in a model of rent sharing. In particular, we provide evidence on the amount of rent being shifted and its impact on prices, wages, and consumer surplus. According to our estimates, the inefficiency resulting from rent-shifting is only 1.2 cents for every dollar of rent shifting. In this sense, the static impact of unions is largely on equity and less on efficiency: the winners are the unions and the losers the consumer, while economic efficiency is relatively unaffected. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Gewerkschaftsmacht und Produktmarkt-Wettbewerb: Evidenz aus der Luftfahrtindustrie) In diesem Beitrag wird ein strukturiertes Modell spezifiziert und geschätzt, das den Zusammenhang zwischen Produktmarkt-Wettbewerb und Gewerkschaftsmacht abbildet. Das Modell ist zweistufig. In der ersten Stufe werden im Rahmen von Verhandlungen zwischen Management und Gewerkschaften die Löhne bestimmt und auf der zweiten Stufe folgt ein Preissetzungsspiel. Anhand von Daten für acht europäische Fluggesellschaften für die Zeit von 1976 bis 1994 läßt sich empirisch ein Zusammenhang zwischen Preis-Kostenspanne und der Messung der Marktmacht in einem Modell des "rent sharing" feststellen. Dabei wird speziell das Maß an Verlagerungen ökonomischer Renten untersucht und deren Einfluß auf Preise, Löhne und Konsumentenrente. Den Berechnungen folgend, beträgt die Ineffizienz, die aus dem "rent-shifting" resultiert, nur 1,2 Cent je Dollar. Somit betrifft die statische Wirkung der Gewerkschaften eher die Gleichheit als die Effizienz: die Gewinner sind die Gewerkschaften und die Verlierer die Konsumenten, während die Effizienz relativ unberührt bleibt.

Knowledge-based banking: The bankers’ experience on OKS (Online Knowledge Sharing)

This paper outlines the results from a web-based survey of first time users of a bankers online knowledge sharing. Palmer´s web metrics were used to investigate the effects of key website characteristics on intention to return, satisfaction and self-efficacy. Partial least squares estimation was used to estimate both the measurement and structural parameters in our structural equation model. Statistical significance of the main relationships provided strong empirical support for author conceptual framework