Strategic Responsibility Under Imperfect Information

A central issue in the specification and verification of autonomous agents and multiagent systems is the ascription of responsibility to individual agents and groups of agents. When designing a (multi)agent system, we must specify which agents or groups of agents are responsible for bringing about a particular state of affairs. Similarly, when verifying a multiagent system, we may wish to determine the responsibility of agents or groups of agents for a particular state of affairs, and the contribution of each agent to bringing about that state of affairs. In this paper, we discuss several aspects of responsibility, including strategic ability of agents, their epistemic properties, and their relationship to the evolution of the system behavior. We introduce a formal framework for reasoning about the responsibility of individual agents and agent groups in terms of the agents' strategies and epistemic properties, and state some properties of the framework

Responsibility and verification: Importance value in temporal logics

We aim at measuring the influence of the nondeterministic choices of a part of a system on its ability to satisfy a specification. For this purpose, we apply the concept of Shapley values to verification as a means to evaluate how important a part of a system is. The importance of a component is measured by giving its control to an adversary, alone or along with other components, and testing whether the system can still fulfill the specification. We study this idea in the framework of model-checking with various classical types of linear-time specification, and propose several ways to transpose it to branching ones. We also provide tight complexity bounds in almost every case.Comment: 22 pages, 12 figure

Strategic Responsibility Under Imperfect Information

A central issue in the specification and verification of autonomous agents and multiagent systems is the ascription of responsibility to individual agents and groups of agents. When designing a (multi)agent system, we must specify which agents or groups of agents are responsible for bringing about a particular state of affairs. Similarly, when verifying a multiagent system, we may wish to determine the responsibility of agents or groups of agents for a particular state of affairs, and the contribution of each agent to bringing about that state of affairs. In this paper, we discuss several aspects of responsibility, including strategic ability of agents, their epistemic properties, and their relationship to the evolution of the system behavior. We introduce a formal framework for reasoning about the responsibility of individual agents and agent groups in terms of the agents' strategies and epistemic properties, and state some properties of the framework

Strategic Responsibility Under Imperfect Information

A central issue in the specification and verification of autonomous agents and multiagent systems is the ascription of responsibility to individual agents and groups of agents. When designing a (multi)agent system, we must specify which agents or groups of agents are responsible for bringing about a particular state of affairs. Similarly, when verifying a multiagent system, we may wish to determine the responsibility of agents or groups of agents for a particular state of affairs, and the contribution of each agent to bringing about that state of affairs. In this paper, we discuss several aspects of responsibility, including strategic ability of agents, their epistemic properties, and their relationship to the evolution of the system behavior. We introduce a formal framework for reasoning about the responsibility of individual agents and agent groups in terms of the agents' strategies and epistemic properties, and state some properties of the framework

Strategic responsibility under imperfect information

A central issue in the specification and verification of autonomous agents and multiagent systems is the ascription of responsibility to individual agents and groups of agents When designing a (multi)agent system, we must specify which agents or groups of agents are responsible for bringing about a particular state of affairs Similarly, when verifying a multiagent system, we may wish to determine the responsibility of agents or groups of agents for a particular state of affairs, and the contribution of each agent to bringing about that state of affairs In this paper, we discuss several aspects of responsibility, including strategic ability of agents, their epistemic properties, and their relationship to the evolution of the system behavior We introduce a formal framework for reasoning about the responsibility of individual agents and agent groups in terms of the agents' strategies and epistemic properties, and state some properties of the framework.</p