3 research outputs found
Strategic Payments in Financial Networks
In their seminal work on systemic risk in financial markets, Eisenberg and Noe [Larry Eisenberg and Thomas Noe, 2001] proposed and studied a model with n firms embedded into a network of debt relations. We analyze this model from a game-theoretic point of view. Every firm is a rational agent in a directed graph that has an incentive to allocate payments in order to clear as much of its debt as possible. Each edge is weighted and describes a liability between the firms. We consider several variants of the game that differ in the permissible payment strategies. We study the existence and computational complexity of pure Nash and strong equilibria, and we provide bounds on the (strong) prices of anarchy and stability for a natural notion of social welfare. Our results highlight the power of financial regulation - if payments of insolvent firms can be centrally assigned, a socially optimal strong equilibrium can be found in polynomial time. In contrast, worst-case strong equilibria can be a factor of ?(n) away from optimal, and, in general, computing a best response is an NP-hard problem. For less permissible sets of strategies, we show that pure equilibria might not exist, and deciding their existence as well as computing them if they exist constitute NP-hard problems
Sequential Defaulting in Financial Networks
We consider financial networks, where banks are connected by contracts such
as debts or credit default swaps. We study the clearing problem in these
systems: we want to know which banks end up in a default, and what portion of
their liabilities can these defaulting banks fulfill. We analyze these networks
in a sequential model where banks announce their default one at a time, and the
system evolves in a step-by-step manner.
We first consider the reversible model of these systems, where banks may
return from a default. We show that the stabilization time in this model can
heavily depend on the ordering of announcements. However, we also show that
there are systems where for any choice of ordering, the process lasts for an
exponential number of steps before an eventual stabilization. We also show that
finding the ordering with the smallest (or largest) number of banks ending up
in default is an NP-hard problem. Furthermore, we prove that defaulting early
can be an advantageous strategy for banks in some cases, and in general,
finding the best time for a default announcement is NP-hard. Finally, we
discuss how changing some properties of this setting affects the stabilization
time of the process, and then use these techniques to devise a monotone model
of the systems, which ensures that every network stabilizes eventually
Financial network games
We study financial systems from a game-theoretic standpoint. A financial system is represented by a network, where nodes cor- respond to firms, and directed labeled edges correspond to debt contracts between them. The existence of cycles in the network indicates that a payment of a firm to one of its lenders might result to some incoming payment. So, if a firm cannot fully repay its debt, then the exact (partial) payments it makes to each of its creditors can affect the cash inflow back to itself. We naturally assume that the firms are interested in their financial well-being (utility) which is aligned with the amount of incoming payments they receive from the network. This defines a game among the firms, that can be seen as utility-maximizing agents who can strategize over their payments.
We are the first to study financial network games that arise under a natural set of payment strategies called priority-proportional payments. We investigate both the existence and the (in)efficiency of equilibrium strategies, under different assumptions on how the firms’ utility is defined, on the types of debt contracts allowed between the firms, and on the presence of other financial features that commonly arise in practice. Surprisingly, even if all firms’ strategies are fixed, the existence of a unique payment profile is not guaranteed. So, we also investigate the existence and computation of valid payment profiles for fixed payment strategies