A Survey on Compiler Autotuning using Machine Learning

Since the mid-1990s, researchers have been trying to use machine-learning based approaches to solve a number of different compiler optimization problems. These techniques primarily enhance the quality of the obtained results and, more importantly, make it feasible to tackle two main compiler optimization problems: optimization selection (choosing which optimizations to apply) and phase-ordering (choosing the order of applying optimizations). The compiler optimization space continues to grow due to the advancement of applications, increasing number of compiler optimizations, and new target architectures. Generic optimization passes in compilers cannot fully leverage newly introduced optimizations and, therefore, cannot keep up with the pace of increasing options. This survey summarizes and classifies the recent advances in using machine learning for the compiler optimization field, particularly on the two major problems of (1) selecting the best optimizations and (2) the phase-ordering of optimizations. The survey highlights the approaches taken so far, the obtained results, the fine-grain classification among different approaches and finally, the influential papers of the field.Comment: version 5.0 (updated on September 2018)- Preprint Version For our Accepted Journal @ ACM CSUR 2018 (42 pages) - This survey will be updated quarterly here (Send me your new published papers to be added in the subsequent version) History: Received November 2016; Revised August 2017; Revised February 2018; Accepted March 2018

Q-Strategy: A Bidding Strategy for Market-Based Allocation of Grid Services

The application of autonomous agents by the provisioning and usage of computational services is an attractive research field. Various methods and technologies in the area of artificial intelligence, statistics and economics are playing together to achieve i) autonomic service provisioning and usage of Grid services, to invent ii) competitive bidding strategies for widely used market mechanisms and to iii) incentivize consumers and providers to use such market-based systems. The contributions of the paper are threefold. First, we present a bidding agent framework for implementing artificial bidding agents, supporting consumers and providers in technical and economic preference elicitation as well as automated bid generation by the requesting and provisioning of Grid services. Secondly, we introduce a novel consumer-side bidding strategy, which enables a goal-oriented and strategic behavior by the generation and submission of consumer service requests and selection of provider offers. Thirdly, we evaluate and compare the Q-strategy, implemented within the presented framework, against the Truth-Telling bidding strategy in three mechanisms – a centralized CDA, a decentralized on-line machine scheduling and a FIFO-scheduling mechanisms

Exploiting Cognitive Structure for Adaptive Learning

Adaptive learning, also known as adaptive teaching, relies on learning path recommendation, which sequentially recommends personalized learning items (e.g., lectures, exercises) to satisfy the unique needs of each learner. Although it is well known that modeling the cognitive structure including knowledge level of learners and knowledge structure (e.g., the prerequisite relations) of learning items is important for learning path recommendation, existing methods for adaptive learning often separately focus on either knowledge levels of learners or knowledge structure of learning items. To fully exploit the multifaceted cognitive structure for learning path recommendation, we propose a Cognitive Structure Enhanced framework for Adaptive Learning, named CSEAL. By viewing path recommendation as a Markov Decision Process and applying an actor-critic algorithm, CSEAL can sequentially identify the right learning items to different learners. Specifically, we first utilize a recurrent neural network to trace the evolving knowledge levels of learners at each learning step. Then, we design a navigation algorithm on the knowledge structure to ensure the logicality of learning paths, which reduces the search space in the decision process. Finally, the actor-critic algorithm is used to determine what to learn next and whose parameters are dynamically updated along the learning path. Extensive experiments on real-world data demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of CSEAL.Comment: Accepted by KDD 2019 Research Track. In Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining (KDD'19

End-to-end deep reinforcement learning in computer systems

Abstract The growing complexity of data processing systems has long led systems designers to imagine systems (e.g. databases, schedulers) which can self-configure and adapt based on environmental cues. In this context, reinforcement learning (RL) methods have since their inception appealed to systems developers. They promise to acquire complex decision policies from raw feedback signals. Despite their conceptual popularity, RL methods are scarcely found in real-world data processing systems. Recently, RL has seen explosive growth in interest due to high profile successes when utilising large neural networks (deep reinforcement learning). Newly emerging machine learning frameworks and powerful hardware accelerators have given rise to a plethora of new potential applications. In this dissertation, I first argue that in order to design and execute deep RL algorithms efficiently, novel software abstractions are required which can accommodate the distinct computational patterns of communication-intensive and fast-evolving algorithms. I propose an architecture which decouples logical algorithm construction from local and distributed execution semantics. I further present RLgraph, my proof-of-concept implementation of this architecture. In RLgraph, algorithm developers can explore novel designs by constructing a high-level data flow graph through combination of logical components. This dataflow graph is independent of specific backend frameworks or notions of execution, and is only later mapped to execution semantics via a staged build process. RLgraph enables high-performing algorithm implementations while maintaining flexibility for rapid prototyping. Second, I investigate reasons for the scarcity of RL applications in systems themselves. I argue that progress in applied RL is hindered by a lack of tools for task model design which bridge the gap between systems and algorithms, and also by missing shared standards for evaluation of model capabilities. I introduce Wield, a first-of-its-kind tool for incremental model design in applied RL. Wield provides a small set of primitives which decouple systems interfaces and deployment-specific configuration from representation. Core to Wield is a novel instructive experiment protocol called progressive randomisation which helps practitioners to incrementally evaluate different dimensions of non-determinism. I demonstrate how Wield and progressive randomisation can be used to reproduce and assess prior work, and to guide implementation of novel RL applications

Rational bidding using reinforcement learning: an application in automated resource allocation

The application of autonomous agents by the provisioning and usage of computational resources is an attractive research field. Various methods and technologies in the area of artificial intelligence, statistics and economics are playing together to achieve i) autonomic resource provisioning and usage of computational resources, to invent ii) competitive bidding strategies for widely used market mechanisms and to iii) incentivize consumers and providers to use such market-based systems. The contributions of the paper are threefold. First, we present a framework for supporting consumers and providers in technical and economic preference elicitation and the generation of bids. Secondly, we introduce a consumer-side reinforcement learning bidding strategy which enables rational behavior by the generation and selection of bids. Thirdly, we evaluate and compare this bidding strategy against a truth-telling bidding strategy for two kinds of market mechanisms – one centralized and one decentralized