A Stackelberg Analysis of the Potential for Cooperation in Straddling Stock Fisheries

To ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks, the 1995 United Nations Fish Stock Agreement calls for the establishment of regional fisheries management organizations to manage them. This article studies the potential for cooperation in straddling stock fisheries when the cooperative coalition of countries acts as a Stackelberg leader against the remaining singleton countries. Within the Stackelberg fishing game with several interested parties, the result shows that an increase in the cooperation level leads to an increase not only in the steady-state fish stock, but also in the total rent of the fishery. Further, the outlook for cooperation is better within the Stackelberg game, where the cooperative coalition acts as a leader, than in the Cournot game. At the stable equilibrium of a Stackelberg game, not only is the steady-state fish stock higher, but also the total resource rent, participants’ rent, and non-participants’ rent are higher than those of the Cournot-Nash stable equilibrium. The new-entrant issue is a problem for the conservation of fish stock in the Stackelberg game. Self-financed transfers with commitments of the initial stable coalition will increase the level of cooperation. The theoretical findings are illustrated by a numerical example of how to reach stable full cooperation and used to indicate possible ways forward for the South China Sea fisheries.IUU fishing, non-cooperative game, regional fisheries management organization, straddling stock fisheries, stable coalition, Stackelberg game, South China Sea, Environmental Economics and Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Productivity Analysis, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, Q22, Q27, R13, R58,

Spectrum Sharing in RF-Powered Cognitive Radio Networks using Game Theory

We investigate the spectrum sharing problem of a radio frequency (RF)-powered cognitive radio network, where a multi-antenna secondary user (SU) harvests energy from RF signals radiated by a primary user (PU) to boost its available energy before information transmission. In this paper, we consider that both the PU and SU are rational and self-interested. Based on whether the SU helps forward the PU's information, we develop two different operation modes for the considered network, termed as non-cooperative and cooperative modes. In the non-cooperative mode, the SU harvests energy from the PU and then use its available energy to transmit its own information without generating any interference to the primary link. In the cooperative mode, the PU employs the SU to relay its information by providing monetary incentives and the SU splits its energy for forwarding the PU's information as well as transmitting its own information. Optimization problems are respectively formulated for both operation modes, which constitute a Stackelberg game with the PU as a leader and the SU as a follower. We analyze the Stackelberg game by deriving solutions to the optimization problems and the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) is subsequently obtained. Simulation results show that the performance of the Stackelberg game can approach that of the centralized optimization scheme when the distance between the SU and its receiver is large enough.Comment: Presented at PIMRC'1

Integrated game-theory modelling for multi enterprise-wide coordination and collaboration under uncertain competitive environment

In this work, an integrated Game Theory (GT) approach is developed for the coordination of multi-enterprise Supply Chains (SCs) in a competitive uncertain environment. The conflicting goals of the different participants are solved through coordination contracts using a non-cooperative non-zero-sum Stackelberg game under the leadership of the manufacturer. The Stackelberg payoff matrix is built under the nominal conditions, and then evaluated under different probable uncertain scenarios using a Monte-Carlo simulation. The competition between the Stackelberg game players and the third parties is solved through a Nash Equilibrium game. A novel way to analyze the game outcome is proposed based on a win–win Stackelberg set of “Pareto-frontiers”. The benefits of the resulting MINLP tactical models are illustrated by a case study with different vendors around a client SC. The results show that the coordinated decisions lead to higher expected payoffs compared to the standalone case, while also leading to uncertainty reduction.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft