Distributed formation control of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles over time-varying graphs using population games

© 2016 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.This paper presents a control technique based on distributed population dynamics under time-varying communication graphs for a multi-agent system structured in a leader-follower fashion. Here, the leader agent follows a particular trajectory and the follower agents should track it in a certain organized formation manner. The tracking of the leader can be performed in the position coordinates x; y; and z, and in the yaw angle phi. Additional features are performed with this method: each agent has only partial knowledge of the position of other agents and not necessarily all agents should communicate to the leader. Moreover, it is possible to integrate a new agent into the formation (or for an agent to leave the formation task) in a dynamical manner. In addition, the formation configuration can be changed along the time, and the distributed population-games-based controller achieves the new organization goal accommodating conveniently the information-sharing graph in function of the communication range capabilities of each UAV. Finally, several simulations are presented to illustrate different scenarios, e.g., formation with time-varying communication network, and time-varying formationPeer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Networks of Relations

We model networks of relational (or implicit) contracts, exploring how sanctioning power and equilibrium conditions change under different network configurations and information transmission technologies. In our model, relations are the links, and the value of the network lies in its ability to enforce cooperative agreements that could not be sustained if agents had no access to other network members’ sanctioning power and information. We identify conditions for network stability and in-network information transmission as well as conditions under which stable subnetworks inhibit more valuable larger networks

Approximate Equilibrium and Incentivizing Social Coordination

We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic preferences but they stand to gain if others choose the same strategy as them. For non-trivial versions of our game, stable solutions like Nash Equilibrium may not exist, or may be socially inefficient even when they do exist. This motivates us to focus on designing efficient algorithms to compute (almost) stable solutions like Approximate Equilibrium that can be realized if agents are provided some additional incentives. Our results apply in many settings like adoption of new products, project selection, and group formation, where a central authority can direct agents towards a strategy but agents may defect if they have better alternatives. We show that for any given instance, we can either compute a high quality approximate equilibrium or a near-optimal solution that can be stabilized by providing small payments to some players. We then generalize our model to encompass situations where player relationships may exhibit complementarities and present an algorithm to compute an Approximate Equilibrium whose stability factor is linear in the degree of complementarity. Our results imply that a little influence is necessary in order to ensure that selfish players coordinate and form socially efficient solutions.Comment: A preliminary version of this work will appear in AAAI-14: Twenty-Eighth Conference on Artificial Intelligenc

Time-varying partitioning for predictive control design: density-games approach

The design of distributed optimization-based controllers for large-scale systems (LSSs) implies every time new challenges. The fact that LSSs are generally located throughout large geographical areas makes dicult the recollection of measurements and their transmission. In this regard, the communication network that is required for a centralized control approach might have high associated economic costs. Furthermore, the computation of a large amount of data implies a high computational burden to manage, process and use them in order to make decisions over the system operation. A plausible solution to mitigate the aforementioned issues associated with the control of LSSs consists in dividing this type of systems into smaller sub-systems able to be handled by independent local controllers. This paper studies two fundamental components of the design of distributed optimization-based controllers for LSSs, i.e., the system partitioning and distributed optimization algorithms. The design of distributed model predictive control (DMPC) strategies with a system partitioning and by using density-dependent population games (DDPG) is presented.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Non-centralized Control for Flow-based Distribution Networks: A Game-theoretical Insight

This paper solves a data-driven control problem for a flow-based distribution network with two objectives: a resource allocation and a fair distribution of costs. These objectives represent both cooperation and competition directions. It is proposed a solution that combines either a centralized or distributed cooperative game approach using the Shapley value to determine a proper partitioning of the system and a fair communication cost distribution. On the other hand, a decentralized noncooperative game approach computing the Nash equilibrium is used to achieve the control objective of the resource allocation under a non-complete information topology. Furthermore, an invariant-set property is presented and the closed-loop system stability is analyzed for the non cooperative game approach. Another contribution regarding the cooperative game approach is an alternative way to compute the Shapley value for the proposed specific characteristic function. Unlike the classical cooperative-games approach, which has a limited application due to the combinatorial explosion issues, the alternative method allows calculating the Shapley value in polynomial time and hence can be applied to large-scale problems.Generalitat de Catalunya FI 2014Ministerio de Ciencia y Educación DPI2016-76493-C3-3-RMinisterio de Ciencia y Educación DPI2008-05818Proyecto europeo FP7-ICT DYMASO