200 research outputs found

    Abusing Commodity DRAMs in IoT Devices to Remotely Spy on Temperature

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    The ubiquity and pervasiveness of modern Internet of Things (IoT) devices opens up vast possibilities for novel applications, but simultaneously also allows spying on, and collecting data from, unsuspecting users to a previously unseen extent. This paper details a new attack form in this vein, in which the decay properties of widespread, off-the-shelf DRAM modules are exploited to accurately sense the temperature in the vicinity of the DRAM-carrying device. Among others, this enables adversaries to remotely and purely digitally spy on personal behavior in users' private homes, or to collect security-critical data in server farms, cloud storage centers, or commercial production lines. We demonstrate that our attack can be performed by merely compromising the software of an IoT device and does not require hardware modifications or physical access at attack time. It can achieve temperature resolutions of up to 0.5{\deg}C over a range of 0{\deg}C to 70{\deg}C in practice. Perhaps most interestingly, it even works in devices that do not have a dedicated temperature sensor on board. To complete our work, we discuss practical attack scenarios as well as possible countermeasures against our temperature espionage attacks.Comment: Submitted to IEEE TIFS and currently under revie

    SpyHammer: Using RowHammer to Remotely Spy on Temperature

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    RowHammer is a DRAM vulnerability that can cause bit errors in a victim DRAM row by just accessing its neighboring DRAM rows at a high-enough rate. Recent studies demonstrate that new DRAM devices are becoming increasingly more vulnerable to RowHammer, and many works demonstrate system-level attacks for privilege escalation or information leakage. In this work, we leverage two key observations about RowHammer characteristics to spy on DRAM temperature: 1) RowHammer-induced bit error rate consistently increases (or decreases) as the temperature increases, and 2) some DRAM cells that are vulnerable to RowHammer cause bit errors only at a particular temperature. Based on these observations, we propose a new RowHammer attack, called SpyHammer, that spies on the temperature of critical systems such as industrial production lines, vehicles, and medical systems. SpyHammer is the first practical attack that can spy on DRAM temperature. SpyHammer can spy on absolute temperature with an error of less than 2.5 {\deg}C at the 90th percentile of tested temperature points, for 12 real DRAM modules from 4 main manufacturers

    The Ledger and Times, March 24, 1966

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    Practical Lightweight Security: Physical Unclonable Functions and the Internet of Things

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    In this work, we examine whether Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) can act as lightweight security mechanisms for practical applications in the context of the Internet of Things (IoT). In order to do so, we first discuss what PUFs are, and note that memory-based PUFs seem to fit the best to the framework of the IoT. Then, we consider a number of relevant memory-based PUF designs and their properties, and evaluate their ability to provide security in nominal and adverse conditions. Finally, we present and assess a number of practical PUF-based security protocols for IoT devices and networks, in order to confirm that memory-based PUFs can indeed constitute adequate security mechanisms for the IoT, in a practical and lightweight fashion. More specifically, we first consider what may constitute a PUF, and we redefine PUFs as inanimate physical objects whose characteristics can be exploited in order to obtain a behaviour similar to a highly distinguishable (i.e., “(quite) unique”) mathematical function. We note that PUFs share many characteristics with biometrics, with the main difference being that PUFs are based on the characteristics of inanimate objects, while biometrics are based on the characteristics of humans and other living creatures. We also note that it cannot really be proven that PUFs are unique per instance, but they should be considered to be so, insofar as (human) biometrics are also considered to be unique per instance. We, then, proceed to discuss the role of PUFs as security mechanisms for the IoT, and we determine that memory-based PUFs are particularly suited for this function. We observe that the IoT nowadays consists of heterogeneous devices connected over diverse networks, which include both high-end and resource-constrained devices. Therefore, it is essential that a security solution for the IoT is not only effective, but also highly scalable, flexible, lightweight, and cost-efficient, in order to be considered as practical. To this end, we note that PUFs have been proposed as security mechanisms for the IoT in the related work, but the practicality of the relevant security mechanisms has not been sufficiently studied. We, therefore, examine a number of memory-based PUFs that are implemented using Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components, and assess their potential to serve as acceptable security mechanisms in the context of the IoT, not only in terms of effectiveness and cost, but also under both nominal and adverse conditions, such as ambient temperature and supply voltage variations, as well as in the presence of (ionising) radiation. In this way, we can determine whether memory-based PUFs are truly suitable to be used in the various application areas of the IoT, which may even involve particularly adverse environments, e.g., in IoT applications involving space modules and operations. Finally, we also explore the potential of memory-based PUFs to serve as adequate security mechanisms for the IoT in practice, by presenting and analysing a number of cryptographic protocols based on these PUFs. In particular, we study how memory-based PUFs can be used for key generation, as well as device identification, and authentication, their role as security mechanisms for current and next-generation IoT devices and networks, and their potential for applications in the space segment of the IoT and in other adverse environments. Additionally, this work also discusses how memory-based PUFs can be utilised for the implementation of lightweight reconfigurable PUFs that allow for advanced security applications. In this way, we are able to confirm that memory-based PUFs can indeed provide flexible, scalable, and efficient security solutions for the IoT, in a practical, lightweight, and inexpensive manner

    Investigating Emerging Security Threats in Clouds and Data Centers

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    Data centers have been growing rapidly in recent years to meet the surging demand of cloud services. However, the expanding scale of a data center also brings new security threats. This dissertation studies emerging security issues in clouds and data centers from different aspects, including low-level cooling infrastructures and different virtualization techniques such as container and virtual machine (VM). We first unveil a new vulnerability called reduced cooling redundancy that might be exploited to launch thermal attacks, resulting in severely worsened thermal conditions in a data center. Such a vulnerability is caused by the wide adoption of aggressive cooling energy saving policies. We conduct thermal measurements and uncover effective thermal attack vectors at the server, rack, and data center levels. We also present damage assessments of thermal attacks. Our results demonstrate that thermal attacks can negatively impact the thermal conditions and reliability of victim servers, significantly raise the cooling cost, and even lead to cooling failures. Finally, we propose effective defenses to mitigate thermal attacks. We then perform a systematic study to understand the security implications of the information leakage in multi-tenancy container cloud services. Due to the incomplete implementation of system resource isolation mechanisms in the Linux kernel, a spectrum of system-wide host information is exposed to the containers, including host-system state information and individual process execution information. By exploiting such leaked host information, malicious adversaries can easily launch advanced attacks that can seriously affect the reliability of cloud services. Additionally, we discuss the root causes of the containers\u27 information leakage and propose a two-stage defense approach. The experimental results show that our defense is effective and incurs trivial performance overhead. Finally, we investigate security issues in the existing VM live migration approaches, especially the post-copy approach. While the entire live migration process relies upon reliable TCP connectivity for the transfer of the VM state, we demonstrate that the loss of TCP reliability leads to VM live migration failure. By intentionally aborting the TCP connection, attackers can cause unrecoverable memory inconsistency for post-copy, significantly increase service downtime, and degrade the running VM\u27s performance. From the offensive side, we present detailed techniques to reset the migration connection under heavy networking traffic. From the defensive side, we also propose effective protection to secure the live migration procedure

    Towards trustworthy computing on untrustworthy hardware

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    Historically, hardware was thought to be inherently secure and trusted due to its obscurity and the isolated nature of its design and manufacturing. In the last two decades, however, hardware trust and security have emerged as pressing issues. Modern day hardware is surrounded by threats manifested mainly in undesired modifications by untrusted parties in its supply chain, unauthorized and pirated selling, injected faults, and system and microarchitectural level attacks. These threats, if realized, are expected to push hardware to abnormal and unexpected behaviour causing real-life damage and significantly undermining our trust in the electronic and computing systems we use in our daily lives and in safety critical applications. A large number of detective and preventive countermeasures have been proposed in literature. It is a fact, however, that our knowledge of potential consequences to real-life threats to hardware trust is lacking given the limited number of real-life reports and the plethora of ways in which hardware trust could be undermined. With this in mind, run-time monitoring of hardware combined with active mitigation of attacks, referred to as trustworthy computing on untrustworthy hardware, is proposed as the last line of defence. This last line of defence allows us to face the issue of live hardware mistrust rather than turning a blind eye to it or being helpless once it occurs. This thesis proposes three different frameworks towards trustworthy computing on untrustworthy hardware. The presented frameworks are adaptable to different applications, independent of the design of the monitored elements, based on autonomous security elements, and are computationally lightweight. The first framework is concerned with explicit violations and breaches of trust at run-time, with an untrustworthy on-chip communication interconnect presented as a potential offender. The framework is based on the guiding principles of component guarding, data tagging, and event verification. The second framework targets hardware elements with inherently variable and unpredictable operational latency and proposes a machine-learning based characterization of these latencies to infer undesired latency extensions or denial of service attacks. The framework is implemented on a DDR3 DRAM after showing its vulnerability to obscured latency extension attacks. The third framework studies the possibility of the deployment of untrustworthy hardware elements in the analog front end, and the consequent integrity issues that might arise at the analog-digital boundary of system on chips. The framework uses machine learning methods and the unique temporal and arithmetic features of signals at this boundary to monitor their integrity and assess their trust level

    The Ledger and Times, March 24, 1966

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