Policy based roles for distributed systems security

Distributed systems are increasingly being used in commercial environments necessitating the development of trustworthy and reliable security mechanisms. There is often no clear informal or formal specification of enterprise authorisation policies and no tools to translate policy specifications to access control implementation mechanisms such as capabilities or Access Control Lists. It is thus difficult to analyse the policy to detect conflicts or flaws and it is difficult to verify that the implementation corresponds to the policy specification. We present in this paper a framework for the specification of management policies. We are concerned with two types of policies: obligations which specify what activities a manager or agent must or must not perform on a set of target objects and authorisations which specify what activities a subject (manager or agent) can or can not perform on the set of target objects. Management policies are then grouped into roles reflecting the organisation..

Towards defining semantic foundations for purpose-based privacy policies

We define a semantic model for purpose, based on which purpose-based privacy policies can be meaningfully expressed and enforced in a business system. The model is based on the intuition that the purpose of an action is determined by its situation among other inter-related actions. Actions and their relationships can be modeled in the form of an action graph which is based on the business processes in a system. Accordingly, a modal logic and the corresponding model checking algorithm are developed for formal expression of purpose-based policies and verifying whether a particular system complies with them. It is also shown through various examples, how various typical purpose-based policies as well as some new policy types can be expressed and checked using our model

Compliance of Semantic Constraints - A Requirements Analysis for Process Management Systems

Key to the use of process management systems (PrMS) in practice is their ability to facilitate the implementation, execution, and adaptation of business processes while still being able to ensure error-free process executions. Mechanisms have been developed to prevent errors at the syntactic level such as deadlocks. In many application domains, processes often have to comply with business level rules and policies (i.e., semantic constraints). Hence, in order to ensure error-free executions at the semantic level, PrMS need certain control mechanisms for validating and ensuring the compliance with semantic constraints throughout the process lifecycle. In this paper, we discuss fundamental requirements for a comprehensive support of semantic constraints in PrMS. Moreover, we provide a survey on existing approaches and discuss to what extent they meet the requirements and which challenges still have to be tackled. Finally, we show how the challenge of life time compliance can be dealt with by integrating design time and runtime process validation

Service-oriented coordination platform for technology-enhanced learning

It is currently difficult to coordinate learning processes, not only because multiple stakeholders are involved (such as students, teachers, administrative staff, technical staff), but also because these processes are driven by sophisticated rules (such as rules on how to provide learning material, rules on how to assess students’ progress, rules on how to share educational responsibilities). This is one of the reasons for the slow progress in technology-enhanced learning. Consequently, there is a clear demand for technological facilitation of the coordination of learning processes. In this work, we suggest some solution directions that are based on SOA (Service-Oriented Architecture). In particular, we propose a coordination service pattern consistent with SOA and based on requirements that follow from an analysis of both learning processes and potentially useful support technologies. We present the service pattern considering both functional and non-functional issues, and we address policy enforcement as well. Finally, we complement our proposed architecture-level solution directions with an example. The example illustrates our ideas and is also used to identify: (i) a short list of educational IT services; (ii) related non-functional concerns; they will be considered in future work

Required Information Release

Many computer systems have a functional requirement to release information. Such requirements are an important part of a system's information security requirements. Current information-flow control techniques are able to reason about permitted information flows, but not required information flows. In this paper, we introduce and explore the specification and enforcement of required information release in a language-based setting. We define semantic security conditions that express both what information a program is required to release, and how an observer is able to learn this information. We also consider the relationship between permitted and required information release, and define bounded release, which provides upper- and lower-bounds on the information a program releases. We show that both required information release and bounded release can be enforced using a security-type system.Engineering and Applied Science