169,919 research outputs found
The role of space in the security and defence policy of Turkey. A change in outlook: Security in space versus security from space
Space and security domains are strongly related with each other. Nowadays, space is an indispensable part of security and defence policy, and it is increasingly becoming a critical infrastructure for strategic Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. However, space is vulnerable itself to the new space threats. This study reviews the current and near future space role in Turkey's security and defence policy and aims to address the threats against space based capabilities. To provide security from space, space based systems shall themselves need to be secure in space to warrant the security. The concept of security from space starts with space security, in other words the security in space. This paper also highlights the emerging technological opportunities for these space threats to be secure in space in order to provide the security from space. According to the relevant taxonomy, a categorized opportunity proposal for more robust and resilient space/satellite projects' architecture is proposed for Turkey
The role of space in the security and defence policy of Turkey. A change in outlook: Security in space versus security from space
Space and security domains are strongly related with each other. Nowadays, space is an indispensable part of security and defence policy, and it is increasingly becoming a critical infrastructure for strategic Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. However, space is vulnerable itself to the new space threats. This study reviews the current and near future space role in Turkey's security and defence policy and aims to address the threats against space based capabilities. To provide security from space, space based systems shall themselves need to be secure in space to warrant the security. The concept of security from space starts with space security, in other words the security in space. This paper also highlights the emerging technological opportunities for these space threats to be secure in space in order to provide the security from space. According to the relevant taxonomy, a categorized opportunity proposal for more robust and resilient space/satellite projects' architecture is proposed for Turkey
European Policies and the Space Industry Value Chain (Note 1)
The economics of contracting have received rather limited attention insofar as the implications for efficiency from the selection of types of contracts employed in the aerospace and defence sector are involved. The paper analyzes the challenges confronting the cost-plus/cost-reimbursement type of contracts of European Commission and intergovernmental organizations like the European Space Agency (ESA), who are involved in security and defence projects with significant multiplier effects within defence and security networks. The analysis indicates how institutional limitations result in contractual choice inefficiencies and anti-competitive practices that may affect the whole of the aerospace industrial base, including subcontractors. The paper concludes with policy implications and further research recommendation
Prospects and Current Status of Defence Information Security in Ukraine
Relevance of the article - security has always been one of the priority issues of state policy. Considering that the defence forces are an inseparable part of state security, studying their information security is essential. The feasibility of this study is confirmed by the fact that in the current conditions of development of the information society, the information technology of the Ukrainian defence forces must adapt to the current challenges and threats, to ensure proper protection of information of strategic importance to the state and collected, consolidated and stored by the defence forces. This article aims to identify problems of information security of defense forces in Ukraine to find ways of their elimination. Formal logical, systemic structural, comparative and legal methods were used to conduct the research. It is stated that by dividing the information space and cyber space, the legislator has laid down legal regulation of protection of the state's information space. It is understood that the Lithuanian and Latvian forces for combating threats to the information space were consolidated within the structure of the Ministry of Defence. Consequently, the authorities argue that the system of entities responsible for protecting the information space needs to be optimized, creating conditions for state-private cooperation in this area, as in the case of Germany, and providing these entities with qualified employees. The results obtained are important for research, law-making and law enforcement activities
Navigating the Unknown: Barriers to Evidence-Based Defence and Security Policy in the EU
At a time when Europe faces numerous crises, there is a real need for rigorous evidence to underpin effective policymaking. However, a gap between academia and policy creates clear obstacles in the use of evidence in policymaking. Many of these enduring obstacles are manifest in the inherent differences between separate communities: academics have difficulty communicating research in an applicable manner, and policymakers, in turn, tend to focus on operational motivations. The gap widens considerably when foreign, security and defence policy within the complex institutional structures of the European Union is considered. In addition to these well known barriers to evidence-based policy, there are two more obstacles in the defence and security space: sovereignty and dispersed decision-making. A dialogue of best practices must be opened up to broker knowledge in the EU context
Sarkozy’s Defence Policy: An Early Look
The election of Nicolas Sarkozy as the new French President and the potential changes in the French security and defence policy.
As the French prepare for the changes in domestic policy promised by Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s allies and the international strategic community are watching for any sign of a repositioning in defence and security matters. On the other side of the Atlantic, expectations are high, but Sarkozy might not be the Atlanticist that some people suppose. Most of the changes are likely to be more of style and personality rather than fundamental shifts in policy. During their first weeks in power, Sarkozy and his new government have focused mainly on European Union (EU) policy and the Middle East. France, for example, has remained surprisingly discreet on the issue of missile defence, perhaps a sign of a more business-like approach and of less grandstanding. One of Sarkozy’s priorities will be to reposition his country as a European player. His challenge will be to consolidate a more independent European defence effort, while not distancing France from the US and NATO. The new spirit of renovation might also emerge as a more pragmatic and flexible approach to strategic doctrine and the review of France’s White Book on Defence. Sarkozy’s emphasis on lifting France’s economic performance is also likely to be felt in defence planning and defence economics in general, with a strong support for the industry, as exemplified by the visit to EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Space) facilities in Toulouse, his first trip inside France as new President. Sarkozy has been rather ambiguous on France’s role in stabilisation operations and peacekeeping, an elusiveness he will have to brush away very soon as pressure in Afghanistan is mounting. Finally, one of the new President’s most surprising proposals is to create a National Security Council on the US model, which will necessary shake up a long-standing French institutional balance in defence matters
Expanding alliance: ANZUS cooperation and Asia–Pacific security
Is an alliance conceived as a bulwark against a resurgence of Japanese militarism and which cut its military and intelligence teeth in the Cold War is still relevant to today’s strategic concerns?
Overview
The alliance between Australia and the US, underpinned by the formal ANZUS Treaty of 1951, continues to be a central part of Australian defence and security thinking and an instrument of American policy in the Asia–Pacific.
How is it that an alliance conceived as a bulwark against a resurgence of Japanese militarism and which cut its military and intelligence teeth in the Cold War is still relevant to today’s strategic concerns? The answer is partly—and importantly—that the core values of the ANZUS members are strongly aligned, and successive Australian governments and American presidential administrations have seen great value in working with like-minded partners to ensure Asia–Pacific security. Far from becoming a historical curiosity, today it’s not just relevant, but of greater importance than has been the case in the past few decades.
To explore new ideas on how to strengthen the US–Australia alliance, ASPI conducted a high-level strategic dialogue in Honolulu in July this year. Discussions canvassed the future strategic environment; the forthcoming Australian Defence White Paper; budget, sovereignty and expectation risks; and cooperation in the maritime, land, air, cyber, space and intelligence domains.
A key purpose of the Honolulu dialogue was to help ASPI develop policy recommendations on the alliance relationship for government. This report is the product of those discussions
The role of europarties in framing the European Union Foreign and Security Policy
The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty assessed new prerogatives to the European Parliament (EP) on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This has increased the role of the EP thus changing the balance of power with other EU institutions, as the Council of Ministers, the European Council and also the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). This new situation conveys more powers and responsibilities to the EP and to its main actors, i.e. the political parties. Even if also national parties have their own opinions on CFSP and CSDP issues, it is obvious that their supranational and EU level organisations, the so-called Europarties, devote to the foreign policy of EU much more attention.
Aim of this paper is to analyse whether Europarties share the same attitude towards the existence of a EU common foreign and defence policy, and what are the main conceptual frames adopted by each Europarty on some of the main EU foreign and defence issues.
Europarties’ positions are analysed through a discourse analysis approach in order to understand their ideas towards three fundamental institutional frameworks of the EU foreign policy: the Lisbon Treaty, the existence of the CFSP and the existence of the CSDP (and the European Defence Agency).
Moreover, a content analysis is conducted on Europarties’ electoral manifestos and on the main EU strategic documents in order to understand which are the main conceptual frames used by parties and by EU on the foreign and defence issues. In particular four categories concerning different aspects of the CFSP and of the CSDP are identified: nature of threats, foreign and defence policy tools, geographical areas of interest, multilateral organizations.
Results show that not only the non-mainstream Europarties, whose critical views towards the EU or some aspects of the EU were already known, but also amongst the EPP, the PES and ELDR there are some differences in their attitude towards the CFSP and the CSDP.
While the EPP and the ELDR seem to be clearly enthusiastic of the new CFSP and CSDP - as designed by the Lisbon Treaty - Socialists, even if they agree and underline the importance of the reformed CFSP, are more critical towards the CSDP. With respect to the four categories (nature of threats, foreign and defence policy tools, geographical areas of interest, multilateral organizations) the Europarties offer different attitudes and priorities to those expressed in the official documents of the EU. In particular, Europarties seem to have a completely different perception of which threats have to be considered the most dangerous. It is worth noting that every Europarty considers the climate change as the threat which deserves more space and attention while for the official documents the environmental issue represents only one of the menaces posed to the EU
Europe de la Défense:Quel processus d’allocation ?
Depuis 1999, l’Union européenne a décidé de disposer d’une politique de sécurité et de défense (pesd) autonome. La très forte hétérogénéité des préférences de chacun des États membres implique de définir la nature du processus d’allocation des ressources de défense au sein de cet espace. En assimilant la sécurité européenne à un bien collectif impur caractérisé par des phénomènes de spillin, cet article propose de tester, à partir d’un cadre d’analyse emprunté à l’économie des alliances, si l’Europe de la Défense suit un processus de type Cournot-Nash ou Lindhal. L’estimation économétrique, réalisée sur la période 1980-2002, admet qu’un processus Cournot-Nash est préféré pour dix des quinze pays de l’ue et souligne la difficulté de préciser un prix fiscal pour l’Europe de la Défense.The European Union has decided to implement in 1999 an independent European security and defence policy (esdp). As preferences in defence issues are strongly heterogeneous, it is required to determine the kind of allocation process for providing defence resources within this European space. By assuming European security as an impure public good due to spillin effects and considering an economics of alliance framework, this article aims at verifying whether a Nash-Cournot process or Lindhal process is better suitable for the esdp. Based on an econometric analysis for the 1980-2002 period, it is verified that the Europe of Defence follows a Nash-Cournot process for 10 out of 15 European countries. This result emphasizes the difficulty for defining a fiscal price in defence
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