595 research outputs found
Voting for Committees in Agreeable Societies
We examine the following voting situation. A committee of people is to be
formed from a pool of n candidates. The voters selecting the committee will
submit a list of candidates that they would prefer to be on the committee.
We assume that . For a chosen committee, a given voter is said to
be satisfied by that committee if her submitted list of candidates is a
subset of that committee. We examine how popular is the most popular committee.
In particular, we show there is always a committee that satisfies a certain
fraction of the voters and examine what characteristics of the voter data will
increase that fraction.Comment: 11 pages; to appear in Contemporary Mathematic
A comparison of the Dodgson method and the Copeland rule
This paper compares binary versions of two well-known preference aggregation methods designed to overcome problems occurring from voting cycles, Copeland's (1951) and Dodgson''s (1876) method. In particular it will first be shown that the Copeland winner can occur at any position in the Dodgson ranking. Second, it will be proved that for some list of individual preferences over the set of alternatives, the Dodgson ranking and the Copeland ranking will be exactly the opposite, i.e. maximally different.Copeland Rule
Paradoxical Oddities in Two Multiwinner Elections from Scotland
Ranked-choice voting anomalies such as monotonicity paradoxes have been
extensively studied through creating hypothetical examples and generating
elections under various models of voter behavior. However, very few real-world
examples of such voting paradoxes have been found and analyzed. We investigate
two single-transferable vote elections from Scotland that demonstrate upward
monotonicity, downward monotonicity, no-show, and committee size paradoxes.
These paradoxes are rarely observed in real-world elections, and this article
is the first case study of such paradoxes in multiwinner elections
Understanding Voting for Committees Using Wreath Products
In this thesis, we construct an algebraic framework for analyzing committee elections. In this framework, module homomorphisms are used to model positional voting procedures. Using the action of the wreath product group S2[Sn] on these modules, we obtain module decompositions which help us to gain an understanding of the module homomorphism. We use these decompositions to construct some interesting voting paradoxes
James DeWitt Andrews: Classifying the Law in the Early Twentieth Century*
This paper examines the efforts of New York lawyer James DeWitt Andrews and others to create a new classification system for American law in the early years of the twentieth century. Inspired by fragments left by founding father James Wilson, Andrews worked though the American Bar Association and organized independent projects to classify the law. A controversial figure, whose motives were often questioned, Andrews engaged the support and at times the antagonism of prominent legal figures such as John H. Wigmore, Roscoe Pound, and William Howard Taft before his plans ended with the founding of the American Law Institute in 1923
Hollins Columns (1960 Mar 10)
Table of Contents: Joint Leg. Discusses Hostesses, Hours Point of Clarification Stephens To Edit Hollins Columns Three Vie for SGA Presidency Joint Leg. Members Should Represent Campus - Wide Election Is Needed House Pres. Election Is Inconsistent Freshmen Explain No Vote Traditional Songs Are Part of Hollins Shinnick, Pondrom Vie for Veep. Three Run for Honor Court Post Lancaster, Deisroth, Timberlake Nominated for Secretary of SGA Cheatham Unopposed For SGA Treasurer Writer Becomes Fund Raiser Destination: Campus, Roanoke, and Vicinity Campbell, Eliot Seek Chairmanship Election Schedule NSA Reports Widespread Student Reaction to Nashville Sit-Ins Martin, Cone, Ruggles Nominated For Veep. of Christian Council Dick, Strobel Seek West Post Two Run for Pres. of Main Sacred Music Recital To Be Given Monday Diercks Included In Festival Choir To Sing in Washington Graduate Guidance Studied Anouilh Farce Was Excellent On Campus with Max Shulmanhttps://digitalcommons.hollins.edu/newspapers/1726/thumbnail.jp
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