Some natural zero one laws for ordinals below ε0

We are going to prove that every ordinal α with ε_0 > α ≥ ω^ω satisfies a natural zero one law in the following sense. For α < ε_0 let Nα be the number of occurences of ω in the Cantor normal form of α. (Nα is then the number of edges in the unordered tree which can canonically be associated with α.) We prove that for any α with ω ω  ≤ α < ε_0 and any sentence ϕ in the language of linear orders the asymptotic density of ϕ along α is an element of  {0,1}. We further show that for any such sentence ϕ the asymptotic density along ε_0 exists although this limit is in general in between 0 and 1. We also investigate corresponding asymptotic densities for ordinals below ω^ω

The Finite and the Infinite in Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik

Discusses Frege's formal definitions and characterizations of infinite and finite sets. Speculates that Frege might have discovered the "oddity" in Dedekind's famous proof that all infinite sets are Dedekind infinite and, in doing so, stumbled across an axiom of countable choice

Arithmetic, Set Theory, Reduction and Explanation

Philosophers of science since Nagel have been interested in the links between intertheoretic reduction and explanation, understanding and other forms of epistemic progress. Although intertheoretic reduction is widely agreed to occur in pure mathematics as well as empirical science, the relationship between reduction and explanation in the mathematical setting has rarely been investigated in a similarly serious way. This paper examines an important particular case: the reduction of arithmetic to set theory. I claim that the reduction is unexplanatory. In defense of this claim, I offer evidence from mathematical practice, and I respond to contrary suggestions due to Steinhart, Maddy, Kitcher and Quine. I then show how, even if set-theoretic reductions are generally not explanatory, set theory can nevertheless serve as a legitimate foundation for mathematics. Finally, some implications of my thesis for philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science are discussed. In particular, I suggest that some reductions in mathematics are probably explanatory, and I propose that differing standards of theory acceptance might account for the apparent lack of unexplanatory reductions in the empirical sciences

Indicative conditionals, restricted quantification, and naive truth

This paper extends Kripke’s theory of truth to a language with a variably strict conditional operator, of the kind that Stalnaker and others have used to represent ordinary indicative conditionals of English. It then shows how to combine this with a different and independently motivated conditional operator, to get a substantial logic of restricted quantification within naive truth theory