Evolution of conditional cooperation in collective-risk social dilemma with repeated group interactions

The evolution and long-term sustenance of cooperation has consistently piqued scholarly interest across the disciplines of evolutionary biology and social sciences. Previous theoretical and experimental studies on collective risk social dilemma games have revealed that the risk of collective failure will affect the evolution of cooperation. In the real world individuals usually adjust their decisions based on environmental factors such as risk intensity and cooperation level. However, it is still not well understood how such conditional behaviors affect the evolution of cooperation in repeated group interactions scenario from a theoretical perspective. Here, we construct an evolutionary game model with repeated interactions, in which defectors decide whether to cooperate in subsequent rounds of the game based on whether the risk exceeds their tolerance threshold and whether the number of cooperators exceeds the collective goal in the early rounds of the game. We find that the introduction of conditional cooperation strategy can effectively promote the emergence of cooperation, especially when the risk is low. In addition, the risk threshold significantly affects the evolutionary outcomes, with a high risk promoting the emergence of cooperation. Importantly, when the risk of failure to reach collective goals exceeds a certain threshold, the timely transition from a defective strategy to a cooperative strategy by conditional cooperators is beneficial for maintaining high-level cooperation.Comment: Accepted by Proceedings of the Royal Society B-Biological Science

Strategy intervention for the evolution of fairness

Masses of experiments have shown individual preference for fairness which seems irrational. The reason behind it remains a focus for research. The effect of spite (individuals are only concerned with their own relative standing) on the evolution of fairness has attracted increasing attention from experiments, but only has been implicitly studied in one evolutionary model. The model did not involve high-offer rejections, which have been found in the form of non-monotonic rejections (rejecting offers that are too high or too low) in experiments. Here, we introduce a high offer and a non-monotonic rejection in structured populations of finite size, and use strategy intervention to explicitly study how spite influences the evolution of fairness: five strategies are in sequence added into the competition of a fair strategy and a selfish strategy. We find that spite promotes fairness, altruism inhibits fairness, and the non-monotonic rejection can cause fairness to overcome selfishness, which cannot happen without high-offer rejections. Particularly for the group-structured population with seven discrete strategies, we analytically study the effect of population size, mutation, and migration on fairness, selfishness, altruism, and spite. A larger population size cannot change the dominance of fairness, but it promotes altruism and inhibits selfishness and spite. Intermediate mutation maximizes selfishness and fairness, and minimizes spite; intermediate mutation maximizes altruism for intermediate migration and minimizes altruism otherwise. The existence of migration inhibits selfishness and fairness, and promotes altruism; sufficient migration promotes spite. Our study may provide important insights into the evolutionary origin of fairness.Comment: 15 pages, 7 figures. Comments welcom

Risk-Averse Evolutionary Game Model of Aviation Joint Emergency Response

We study effects of risk-averse attitude of both participators in aviation joint emergency response on the coevolution of cooperation mechanisms and individual preferences between airport and nonprofit organization. First, based on the current aviation joint emergency mechanism in China, we put forward two mechanisms to select the joint nonprofit organization, including reputation cooperation and bidding competition. Meanwhile, we consider two preferences including altruism and selfishness. Then we build replicator dynamics equations using the theory of conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) taking risk aversion attitude into account. Finally, we introduce the factor of government and give all participators some suggestions. We show that the risk-averse attitude of the other game participator affects the one participator's decision and the effects subject to some parameters

Evidence in practice: how structural and programmatic scaffolds enable knowledge transfer in international development

This inductive study of eight international development interventions across four countries analyzes the mechanisms that enable effective integration of evidence in practice, as an enduring challenge of learning and coordination across occupational and organizational boundaries. We identify how a set of critical, complementary structural and programmatic scaffolding practices, jointly provided a shared architecture for actors across organizations and communities of practice to collaborate and learn within the uncertainty and complexity inherent in the international development context. Scaffolding practices offered modular, temporary counter-balancing stabilizing and extending support that enabled the unusual and counter normative behaviors and mindsets required for continuous learning and adaptive coordination. Through 226 in-depth interviews with a range of international development experts, including practitioners engaged in eight matched interventions in India, Mexico, South Africa, and Ghana,we identified and analyzed the mechanisms that explain the varying degrees of effectiveness with which rigorous evidence was integrated in each case. Our findings have implications for interorganizational innovation and collaboration under conditions of complexity and uncertainty, as well as the dynamic interactions between individuals, their organizations, and their communities of practice when attempting to bring about systemic change.William and Flora Hewlett FoundationAccepted manuscrip

GOING BEYOND THE BEST INSUFFICIENT OPTION: AN EXPLORATION OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP INITIATIVES WITHIN TWO NON-PROFIT SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS IN ONTARIO

Facing a backdrop of decreased government funds and an increasing need for services, social service non-profit organizations are struggling to survive and provide services to their communities. One proposed solution to this financial struggle is to generate revenue through social entrepreneurship and social enterprise. Two non-profit organizations in Ontario have engaged in social enterprise and they form the basis for this case study. Adopting a hybrid social enterprise model, Organization X and Housing Corporation A receive revenue from three main sources: government funding, private donations, and profits created through social enterprise activities. These organizations have managed to broaden their service offering through their social enterprise initiatives and thus provide resources and services for their clients which might not otherwise have been available. Social enterprise has provided these organizations with financial stability, ensuring sustainability for their organizational operations. In this study, the impact of social enterprise on the sustainability of the hybrid social enterprise model is explored through the perceptions and experiences of the leaders in these organizations. The relationship between government and non-profit organizations engaged in social enterprise is also explored, with a particular emphasis on the support and challenges provided by the state. Furthermore, the interplay and tensions between the three sources is explored and analysed. This study contributes to satisfying the need for research into social enterprise case studies within a Canadian context, attempting to address the research gap as outlined by Cave (2016). During my research, I explore philosophical tensions and moral dilemmas pertaining to the social services sector, the use of social enterprise and the effectiveness of the hybrid social enterprise organizational model

Timing uncertainty in collective risk dilemmas encourages group reciprocation and polarization

Social dilemmas are often shaped by actions involving uncertain returns only achievable in the future, such as climate action or voluntary vaccination. In this context, uncertainty may produce non-trivial effects. Here, we assess experimentally — through a collective risk dilemma — the effect of timing uncertainty, i.e. how uncertainty about when a target needs to be reached affects the participants' behaviors. We show that timing uncertainty prompts not only early generosity but also polarized outcomes, where participants' total contributions are distributed unevenly. Furthermore, analyzing participants' behavior under timing uncertainty reveals an increase in reciprocal strategies. A data-driven game-theoretical model captures the self-organizing dynamics underpinning these behavioral patterns. Timing uncertainty thus casts a shadow on the future that leads participants to respond early, whereas reciprocal strategies appear to be important for group success. Yet, the same uncertainty also leads to inequity and polarization, requiring the inclusion of new incentives handling these societal issues.Xunta de GaliciaFundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia | Ref. PTDC/CCI-INF/7366/2020Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia | Ref. PTDC/MAT/STA/3358/2014Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia | Ref. UIDB/50021/202

The sustainable delivery of sexual violence prevention education in schools

Sexual violence is a crime that cannot be ignored: it causes our communities significant consequences including heavy economic costs, and evidence of its effects can be seen in our criminal justice system, public health system, Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC), and education system, particularly in our schools. Many agencies throughout New Zealand work to end sexual violence. Auckland-based Rape Prevention Education: Whakatu Mauri (RPE) is one such agency, and is committed to preventing sexual violence by providing a range of programmes and initiatives, information, education, and advocacy to a broad range of audiences. Up until early 2014 RPE employed one or two full-time positions dedicated to co-ordinating and training a large pool (up to 15) of educators on casual contracts to deliver their main school-based programmes, BodySafe – approximately 450 modules per year, delivered to some 20 high schools. Each year several of the contract educators, many of whom were tertiary students, found secure full time employment elsewhere. To retain sufficient contract educators to deliver its BodySafe contract meant that RPE had to recruit, induct and train new educators two to three times every year. This model was expensive, resource intense, and ultimately untenable. The Executive Director and core staff at RPE wanted to develop a more efficient and stable model of delivery that fitted its scarce resources. To enable RPE to know what the most efficient model was nationally and internationally, with Ministry of Justice funding, RPE commissioned Massey University to undertake this report reviewing national and international research on sexual violence prevention education (SVPE)