2,178 research outputs found

    Solving the Shortest Vector Problem in Lattices Faster Using Quantum Search

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    By applying Grover's quantum search algorithm to the lattice algorithms of Micciancio and Voulgaris, Nguyen and Vidick, Wang et al., and Pujol and Stehl\'{e}, we obtain improved asymptotic quantum results for solving the shortest vector problem. With quantum computers we can provably find a shortest vector in time 21.799n+o(n)2^{1.799n + o(n)}, improving upon the classical time complexity of 22.465n+o(n)2^{2.465n + o(n)} of Pujol and Stehl\'{e} and the 22n+o(n)2^{2n + o(n)} of Micciancio and Voulgaris, while heuristically we expect to find a shortest vector in time 20.312n+o(n)2^{0.312n + o(n)}, improving upon the classical time complexity of 20.384n+o(n)2^{0.384n + o(n)} of Wang et al. These quantum complexities will be an important guide for the selection of parameters for post-quantum cryptosystems based on the hardness of the shortest vector problem.Comment: 19 page

    Ring Learning With Errors: A crossroads between postquantum cryptography, machine learning and number theory

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    The present survey reports on the state of the art of the different cryptographic functionalities built upon the ring learning with errors problem and its interplay with several classical problems in algebraic number theory. The survey is based to a certain extent on an invited course given by the author at the Basque Center for Applied Mathematics in September 2018.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1508.01375 by other authors/ comment of the author: quotation has been added to Theorem 5.

    Not-so-adiabatic quantum computation for the shortest vector problem

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    Since quantum computers are known to break the vast majority of currently-used cryptographic protocols, a variety of new protocols are being developed that are conjectured, but not proven to be safe against quantum attacks. Among the most promising is lattice-based cryptography, where security relies upon problems like the shortest vector problem. We analyse the potential of adiabatic quantum computation for attacks on lattice-based cryptography, and give numerical evidence that even outside the adiabatic regime such methods can facilitate the solution of the shortest vector and similar problems.Comment: 15 pages total, 9 figures, journal submission to Phys Rev Research v2, corrected two typos (save --> safe, relies --> relies on

    Improved Classical and Quantum Algorithms for the Shortest Vector Problem via Bounded Distance Decoding

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    The most important computational problem on lattices is the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP). In this paper, we present new algorithms that improve the state-of-the-art for provable classical/quantum algorithms for SVP. We present the following results. \bullet A new algorithm for SVP that provides a smooth tradeoff between time complexity and memory requirement. For any positive integer 4qn4\leq q\leq \sqrt{n}, our algorithm takes q13n+o(n)q^{13n+o(n)} time and requires poly(n)q16n/q2poly(n)\cdot q^{16n/q^2} memory. This tradeoff which ranges from enumeration (q=nq=\sqrt{n}) to sieving (qq constant), is a consequence of a new time-memory tradeoff for Discrete Gaussian sampling above the smoothing parameter. \bullet A quantum algorithm for SVP that runs in time 20.953n+o(n)2^{0.953n+o(n)} and requires 20.5n+o(n)2^{0.5n+o(n)} classical memory and poly(n) qubits. In Quantum Random Access Memory (QRAM) model this algorithm takes only 20.873n+o(n)2^{0.873n+o(n)} time and requires a QRAM of size 20.1604n+o(n)2^{0.1604n+o(n)}, poly(n) qubits and 20.5n2^{0.5n} classical space. This improves over the previously fastest classical (which is also the fastest quantum) algorithm due to [ADRS15] that has a time and space complexity 2n+o(n)2^{n+o(n)}. \bullet A classical algorithm for SVP that runs in time 21.741n+o(n)2^{1.741n+o(n)} time and 20.5n+o(n)2^{0.5n+o(n)} space. This improves over an algorithm of [CCL18] that has the same space complexity. The time complexity of our classical and quantum algorithms are obtained using a known upper bound on a quantity related to the lattice kissing number which is 20.402n2^{0.402n}. We conjecture that for most lattices this quantity is a 2o(n)2^{o(n)}. Assuming that this is the case, our classical algorithm runs in time 21.292n+o(n)2^{1.292n+o(n)}, our quantum algorithm runs in time 20.750n+o(n)2^{0.750n+o(n)} and our quantum algorithm in QRAM model runs in time 20.667n+o(n)2^{0.667n+o(n)}.Comment: Faster Quantum Algorithm for SVP in QRAM, 43 pages, 4 figure

    A suite of quantum algorithms for the shortestvector problem

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    Crytography has come to be an essential part of the cybersecurity infrastructure that provides a safe environment for communications in an increasingly connected world. The advent of quantum computing poses a threat to the foundations of the current widely-used cryptographic model, due to the breaking of most of the cryptographic algorithms used to provide confidentiality, authenticity, and more. Consequently a new set of cryptographic protocols have been designed to be secure against quantum computers, and are collectively known as post-quantum cryptography (PQC). A forerunner among PQC is lattice-based cryptography, whose security relies upon the hardness of a number of closely related mathematical problems, one of which is known as the shortest vector problem (SVP). In this thesis I describe a suite of quantum algorithms that utilize the energy minimization principle to attack the shortest vector problem. The algorithms outlined span the gate-model and continuous time quantum computing, and explore methods of parameter optimization via variational methods, which are thought to be effective on near-term quantum computers. The performance of the algorithms are analyzed numerically, analytically, and on quantum hardware where possible. I explain how the results obtained in the pursuit of solving SVP apply more broadly to quantum algorithms seeking to solve general real-world problems; minimize the effect of noise on imperfect hardware; and improve efficiency of parameter optimization.Open Acces

    An Improved BKW Algorithm for LWE with Applications to Cryptography and Lattices

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    In this paper, we study the Learning With Errors problem and its binary variant, where secrets and errors are binary or taken in a small interval. We introduce a new variant of the Blum, Kalai and Wasserman algorithm, relying on a quantization step that generalizes and fine-tunes modulus switching. In general this new technique yields a significant gain in the constant in front of the exponent in the overall complexity. We illustrate this by solving p within half a day a LWE instance with dimension n = 128, modulus q=n2q = n^2, Gaussian noise α=1/(n/πlog2n)\alpha = 1/(\sqrt{n/\pi} \log^2 n) and binary secret, using 2282^{28} samples, while the previous best result based on BKW claims a time complexity of 2742^{74} with 2602^{60} samples for the same parameters. We then introduce variants of BDD, GapSVP and UniqueSVP, where the target point is required to lie in the fundamental parallelepiped, and show how the previous algorithm is able to solve these variants in subexponential time. Moreover, we also show how the previous algorithm can be used to solve the BinaryLWE problem with n samples in subexponential time 2(ln2/2+o(1))n/loglogn2^{(\ln 2/2+o(1))n/\log \log n}. This analysis does not require any heuristic assumption, contrary to other algebraic approaches; instead, it uses a variant of an idea by Lyubashevsky to generate many samples from a small number of samples. This makes it possible to asymptotically and heuristically break the NTRU cryptosystem in subexponential time (without contradicting its security assumption). We are also able to solve subset sum problems in subexponential time for density o(1)o(1), which is of independent interest: for such density, the previous best algorithm requires exponential time. As a direct application, we can solve in subexponential time the parameters of a cryptosystem based on this problem proposed at TCC 2010.Comment: CRYPTO 201
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