Transformation of propositional calculus statements into integer and mixed integer programs: An approach towards automatic reformulation

A systematic procedure for transforming a set of logical statements or logical conditions imposed on a model into an Integer Linear Progamming (ILP) formulation Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) formulation is presented. An ILP stated as a system of linear constraints involving integer variables and an objective function, provides a powerful representation of decision problems through a tightly interrelated closed system of choices. It supports direct representation of logical (Boolean or prepositional calculus) expressions. Binary variables (hereafter called logical variables) are first introduced and methods of logically connecting these to other variables are then presented. Simple constraints can be combined to construct logical relationships and the methods of formulating these are discussed. A reformulation procedure which uses the extended reverse polish representation of a compound logical form is then described. These reformulation procedures are illustrated by two examples. A scheme of implementation.ithin an LP modelling system is outlined

High-level Counterexamples for Probabilistic Automata

Providing compact and understandable counterexamples for violated system properties is an essential task in model checking. Existing works on counterexamples for probabilistic systems so far computed either a large set of system runs or a subset of the system's states, both of which are of limited use in manual debugging. Many probabilistic systems are described in a guarded command language like the one used by the popular model checker PRISM. In this paper we describe how a smallest possible subset of the commands can be identified which together make the system erroneous. We additionally show how the selected commands can be further simplified to obtain a well-understandable counterexample

Robust Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games and Extension to Limited Lookahead

Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solution concept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problems such as security settings. In practice, however, there is typically uncertainty regarding the model about the opponent. This paper is, to our knowledge, the first to investigate Stackelberg equilibria under uncertainty in extensive-form games, one of the broadest classes of game. We introduce robust Stackelberg equilibria, where the uncertainty is about the opponent's payoffs, as well as ones where the opponent has limited lookahead and the uncertainty is about the opponent's node evaluation function. We develop a new mixed-integer program for the deterministic limited-lookahead setting. We then extend the program to the robust setting for Stackelberg equilibrium under unlimited and under limited lookahead by the opponent. We show that for the specific case of interval uncertainty about the opponent's payoffs (or about the opponent's node evaluations in the case of limited lookahead), robust Stackelberg equilibria can be computed with a mixed-integer program that is of the same asymptotic size as that for the deterministic setting.Comment: Published at AAAI1

An overview of decision table literature 1982-1995.

This report gives an overview of the literature on decision tables over the past 15 years. As much as possible, for each reference, an author supplied abstract, a number of keywords and a classification are provided. In some cases own comments are added. The purpose of these comments is to show where, how and why decision tables are used. The literature is classified according to application area, theoretical versus practical character, year of publication, country or origin (not necessarily country of publication) and the language of the document. After a description of the scope of the interview, classification results and the classification by topic are presented. The main body of the paper is the ordered list of publications with abstract, classification and comments.

Smoothing Method for Approximate Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium

Nash equilibrium is a popular solution concept for solving imperfect-information games in practice. However, it has a major drawback: it does not preclude suboptimal play in branches of the game tree that are not reached in equilibrium. Equilibrium refinements can mend this issue, but have experienced little practical adoption. This is largely due to a lack of scalable algorithms. Sparse iterative methods, in particular first-order methods, are known to be among the most effective algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in large-scale two-player zero-sum extensive-form games. In this paper, we provide, to our knowledge, the first extension of these methods to equilibrium refinements. We develop a smoothing approach for behavioral perturbations of the convex polytope that encompasses the strategy spaces of players in an extensive-form game. This enables one to compute an approximate variant of extensive-form perfect equilibria. Experiments show that our smoothing approach leads to solutions with dramatically stronger strategies at information sets that are reached with low probability in approximate Nash equilibria, while retaining the overall convergence rate associated with fast algorithms for Nash equilibrium. This has benefits both in approximate equilibrium finding (such approximation is necessary in practice in large games) where some probabilities are low while possibly heading toward zero in the limit, and exact equilibrium computation where the low probabilities are actually zero.Comment: Published at IJCAI 1