1,480 research outputs found

    Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions using Hybrid Ant Colony Optimization and Multi-Neighborhood Local Search

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    A combinatorial auction is an auction where the bidders have the choice to bid on bundles of items. The WDP in combinatorial auctions is the problem of finding winning bids that maximize the auctioneer’s revenue under the constraint that each item can be allocated to at most one bidder. The WDP is known as an NP-hard problem with practical applications like electronic commerce, production management, games theory, and resources allocation in multi-agent systems. This has motivated the quest for efficient approximate algorithms both in terms of solution quality and computational time. This paper proposes a hybrid Ant Colony Optimization with a novel Multi-Neighborhood Local Search (ACO-MNLS) algorithm for solving Winner Determination Problem (WDP) in combinatorial auctions. Our proposed MNLS algorithm uses the fact that using various neighborhoods in local search can generate different local optima for WDP and that the global optima of WDP is a local optima for a given its neighborhood. Therefore, proposed MNLS algorithm simultaneously explores a set of three different neighborhoods to get different local optima and to escape from local optima. The comparisons between ACO-MNLS, Genetic Algorithm (GA), Memetic Algorithm (MA), Stochastic Local Search (SLS), and Tabu Search (TS) on various benchmark problems confirm the efficiency of ACO-MNLS in the terms of solution quality and computational time

    A Pareto-metaheuristic for a bi-objective winner determination problem in a combinatorial reverse auction

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    The bi-objective winner determination problem (2WDP-SC) of a combinatorial procurement auction for transport contracts comes up to a multi-criteria set covering problem. We are given a set B of bundle bids. A bundle bid b in B consists of a bidding carrier c_b, a bid price p_b, and a set tau_b of transport contracts which is a subset of the set T of tendered transport contracts. Additionally, the transport quality q_t,c_b is given which is expected to be realized when a transport contract t is executed by a carrier c_b. The task of the auctioneer is to find a set X of winning bids (X is subset of B), such that each transport contract is part of at least one winning bid, the total procurement costs are minimized, and the total transport quality is maximized. This article presents a metaheuristic approach for the 2WDP-SC which integrates the greedy randomized adaptive search procedure, large neighborhood search, and self-adaptive parameter setting in order to find a competitive set of non-dominated solutions. The procedure outperforms existing heuristics. Computational experiments performed on a set of benchmark instances show that, for small instances, the presented procedure is the sole approach that succeeds to find all Pareto-optimal solutions. For each of the large benchmark instances, according to common multi-criteria quality indicators of the literature, it attains new best-known solution sets.Pareto optimization; multi-criteria winner determination; combinatorial auction; GRASP; LNS

    A General Large Neighborhood Search Framework for Solving Integer Programs

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    This paper studies how to design abstractions of large-scale combinatorial optimization problems that can leverage existing state-of-the-art solvers in general purpose ways, and that are amenable to data-driven design. The goal is to arrive at new approaches that can reliably outperform existing solvers in wall-clock time. We focus on solving integer programs, and ground our approach in the large neighborhood search (LNS) paradigm, which iteratively chooses a subset of variables to optimize while leaving the remainder fixed. The appeal of LNS is that it can easily use any existing solver as a subroutine, and thus can inherit the benefits of carefully engineered heuristic approaches and their software implementations. We also show that one can learn a good neighborhood selector from training data. Through an extensive empirical validation, we demonstrate that our LNS framework can significantly outperform, in wall-clock time, compared to state-of-the-art commercial solvers such as Gurobi

    Efficiency Resource Allocation for Device-to-Device Underlay Communication Systems: A Reverse Iterative Combinatorial Auction Based Approach

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    Peer-to-peer communication has been recently considered as a popular issue for local area services. An innovative resource allocation scheme is proposed to improve the performance of mobile peer-to-peer, i.e., device-to-device (D2D), communications as an underlay in the downlink (DL) cellular networks. To optimize the system sum rate over the resource sharing of both D2D and cellular modes, we introduce a reverse iterative combinatorial auction as the allocation mechanism. In the auction, all the spectrum resources are considered as a set of resource units, which as bidders compete to obtain business while the packages of the D2D pairs are auctioned off as goods in each auction round. We first formulate the valuation of each resource unit, as a basis of the proposed auction. And then a detailed non-monotonic descending price auction algorithm is explained depending on the utility function that accounts for the channel gain from D2D and the costs for the system. Further, we prove that the proposed auction-based scheme is cheat-proof, and converges in a finite number of iteration rounds. We explain non-monotonicity in the price update process and show lower complexity compared to a traditional combinatorial allocation. The simulation results demonstrate that the algorithm efficiently leads to a good performance on the system sum rate.Comment: 26 pages, 6 fgures; IEEE Journals on Selected Areas in Communications, 201

    Learning Theory and Algorithms for Revenue Optimization in Second-Price Auctions with Reserve

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    Second-price auctions with reserve play a critical role for modern search engine and popular online sites since the revenue of these companies often directly de- pends on the outcome of such auctions. The choice of the reserve price is the main mechanism through which the auction revenue can be influenced in these electronic markets. We cast the problem of selecting the reserve price to optimize revenue as a learning problem and present a full theoretical analysis dealing with the complex properties of the corresponding loss function. We further give novel algorithms for solving this problem and report the results of several experiments in both synthetic and real data demonstrating their effectiveness.Comment: Accepted at ICML 201
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