Open Source vs. Proprietary Software: Competition and Compatibility

We use a Hotelling linear city model to study competition between open source and proprietary software, where only the producer of the proprietary software aims at maximizing the profit. The producer of the proprietary software must decide on compatibility. Different compatibility strategies will lead to different network externality, and thus result in different profit for the producer of the proprietary software. We found that the proprietary producer¡¯s choice of compatibility strategy depends on the market coverage conditions. When the market is fully covered, one-way compatibility is the best strategy for the proprietary software. When the market is partly covered, two-way compatibility is the best strategy. Such results are not affected by software quality. Furthermore, when the provider of the open source software pursues the maximum market share rather than reacts passively, two-way compatibility would be the best choice for both the open source and the proprietary software. Moreover, the proprietary software producer does not favor its proprietary rival changing to open source software. Such a change may lower the social welfare.Open Source Software, Proprietary Software, Compatibility, Competition

Open Source vs. Proprietary Software: Competition and Compatibility

e use a Hotelling linear city model to study competition between open source and proprietary software, where only the producer of the proprietary software aims at maximizing the profit. The producer of the proprietary software must decide on compatibility. Different compatibility strategies will lead to different network externality, and thus result in different profit for the producer of the proprietary software. We found that the proprietary producer¡¯s choice of compatibility strategy depends on the market coverage conditions. When the market is fully covered, one-way compatibility is the best strategy for the proprietary software. When the market is partly covered, two-way compatibility is the best strategy. Such results are not affected by software quality. Furthermore, when the provider of the open source software pursues the maximum market share rather than reacts passively, two-way compatibility would be the best choice for both the open source and the proprietary software. Moreover, the proprietary software producer does not favor its proprietary rival changing to open source software. Such a change may lower the social welfare.Open Source Software, Proprietary Software, Compatibility, Competition

Market leadership through technology – Backward compatibility in the U.S. Handheld Video Game Industry

The introduction of a new product generation forces incumbents in network industries to rebuild their installed base to maintain an advantage over potential entrants. We study if backward compatibility moderates this process of rebuilding an installed base. Using a structural model of the U.S. market for handheld game consoles, we show that backward compatibility lets incumbents transfer network effects from the old generation to the new to some extent but that it also reduces supply of new software. We examine the tradeoff between technological progress and backward compatibility and find that backward compatibility matters less if there is a large technological leap between two generations. We subsequently use our results to assess the role of backward compatibility as a strategy to sustain market leadership

Backward Compatibility to Sustain Market Dominance – Evidence from the US Handheld Video Game Industry

The introduction of a new product generation forces incumbents in network industries to rebuild their installed base to maintain an advantage over potential entrants. We study if backward compatibility can help moderate this process of rebuilding an installed base. Using a structural model of the US market for handheld game consoles, we show that backward compatibility lets incumbents transfer network effects from the old generation to the new to some extent but that it also reduces supply of new software. We also find that backward compatibility matters most shortly after the introduction of a new generation. Finally, we examine the tradeoff between technological progress and backward compatibility and find that backward compatibility matters less if there is a large technological leap between two generations. We subsequently use our results to assess the role of backward compatibility as a strategy to sustain a dominant market position

NATURAL graphics

The hardware and software developments in computer graphics are discussed. Major topics include: system capabilities, hardware design, system compatibility, and software interface with the data base management system

Multimission Modular Spacecraft Ground Support Software System (MMS/GSSS) state-of-the-art computer systems/ compatibility study

The compatibility of the Multimission Modular Spacecraft (MMS) Ground Support Software System (GSSS), currently operational on a ModComp IV/35, with the VAX 11/780 system is discussed. The compatibility is examined in various key areas of the GSSS through the results of in depth testing performed on the VAX 11/780 and ModComp IV/35 systems. The compatibility of the GSSS with the ModComp CLASSIC is presented based upon projections from ModComp supplied literature

Market Leadership Through Technology - Backward Compatibility in the U.S. Handheld Video Game Industry

The introduction of a new product generation forces incumbents in network industries to rebuild their installed base to maintain an advantage over potential entrants. We study if backward compatibility moderates this process of rebuilding an installed base. Using a structural model of the U.S. market for handheld game consoles, we show that backward compatibility lets incumbents transfer network effects from the old generation to the new to some extent but that it also reduces supply of new software. We examine the tradeoff between technological progress and backward compatibility and find that backward compatibility matters less if there is a large technological leap between two generations. We subsequently use our results to assess the role of backward compatibility as a strategy to sustain market leadership.backward compatibility, market leadership, network effects, video games, two-sided markets

Price Indexes for PC Database Software and the Value of Code Compatibility

Changing product quality poses a challenge for the computation of price indexes, in particular in technologically advanced industries. We assess the differences between traditional and quality-corrected indexes by computing hedonic and matched-model price indexes for personal computer database software. Our database covers the price development in Germany from 1986 to 1994. Quality-adjusted software prices decline by 7.4 percent according to our hedonic index. Surprisingly, a matchedmodel index based on linking the prices of directly comparable program versions decreases even faster than the hedonic index (9.3 percent). This unusual result is apparently caused by the simultaneous selling of old and new versions of a given software product. The estimation results also confirm the importance of network effects. Code compatibility, i.e. the capability of executing programs written for the dominant database product, yields a significant price premium. The ability to read and write data in the dominant spreadsheet format (file compatibility) is also associated with higher prices, but the price differential is much smaller than in the case of code compatibility. --price indexes,hedonic methods,technical change

Backward Compatibility to Sustain Market Dominance – Evidence from the US Handheld Video Game Industry

The introduction of a new product generation forces incumbents in network industries to rebuild their installed base to maintain an advantage over potential entrants. We study if backward compatibility can help moderate this process of rebuilding an installed base. Using a structural model of the US market for handheld game consoles, we show that backward compatibility lets incumbents transfer network effects from the old generation to the new to some extent but that it also reduces supply of new software. We also find that backward compatibility matters most shortly after the introduction of a new generation. Finally, we examine the tradeoff between technological progress and backward compatibility and find that backward compatibility matters less if there is a large technological leap between two generations. We subsequently use our results to assess the role of backward compatibility as a strategy to sustain a dominant market position.backward compatibility market dominance network effects two-sided markets