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Socially Conscious Decision Making
For individually motivated agents to work collaboratively to satisfy shared goals, they must make decisions about actions and intentions that take into account their commitments to group activities. This paper examines the role of social consciousness in the process of reconciling intentions to do group-related actions with other, conflicting intentions. We operationalize the notion of social consciousness and provide a first attempt to formally add social consciousness to a cooperative decision-making model. We define a measure of social consciousness; describe its incorporation into the SPIRE experimental system, a simulation environment that allows the process of intention reconciliation in team contexts to be studied; and present results of several experiments that investigate the interaction in decision-making of measures of group and individual good. In particular, we investigate the effect of varying levels of social consciousness on the utility of the group and the individuals it comprises. A key finding is that an intermediate level of social consciousness yields better results in certain circumstances than an extreme commitment. We suggest preliminary principles for designers of collaborative agents based on the results.Engineering and Applied Science
Kvalioista laatuarvioihin : subjektiivinen kokemus, tietoinen ajattelu ja kuinka pÀÀtökset selitetÀÀn
Academic psychology has traditionally considered subjective explanations for judgments and decisions unreliable or even fabricated. Additionally, explanations have been shown to interfere with judgment and decision making processes, which can degrade the quality of choices. These phenomena have been attributed to the lack of conscious access to the decision making processes. Explaining is assumed to shift the processing from the non-conscious mode into a more verbalized and conscious mode, leading to either fabrication or interference.
This dissertation examines these effects by assuming that subjective experience is a highly relevant intermediate processing stage in decision making, whereas subjective explanations reflect the contents of socially oriented conscious thought, which originates from the metacognitive understanding related to the judgment and decision-making processes. When subjective experience and conscious thought are dissociated, interference or fabrication can occur.
The dissertation presents the ideas underlying the Interpretation-Based Quality (IBQ) method, which emphasizes the special nature of subjective experience in judgments and decisions: Every individual has his or her own subjective point of view, from which the world is interpreted. In the context of preferential judgment and decision making, these differences between individuals, arising from different ways of experiencing the world, are easily regarded as measurement error. The IBQ method approaches these differences by asking research participants to explain their decisions in their own words. These explanations have been further analyzed qualitatively in order to find the relevant subjective dimensions on which decisions are based.
As subjective explanations are used as data, the use of the IBQ method must respond to claims concerning unreliability, fabrication and interference. Therefore, four studies were conducted to test these claims in the evaluation of high image quality. As explaining has been found to shift processing into a more conscious mode, these studies also inform about the role of conscious thought in judgments and decisions.
The general finding of this research was that conscious thought, evoked by the requirement to explain judgments, can also enhance the decision makerâs performance in cases that require tradeoffs, effortful information search and consistency over several decisions. The results suggest that when conscious thought and subjective experience work in concert, subjective explanations can provide highly useful qualitative data about the dimensions of subjective experience that are relevant in judgments and decisions. These dimensions are dependent on personal and contextual factors and cannot be predicted from physical data alone.
The importance of conscious thought in decision making appears to be its ability to bring relevant information into consciousness by means of voluntary attention. This happens particularly in conflicts and when the decisions are novel. In these situations conscious thought and an analytic approach is activated automatically. This mechanism derives from metacognitive understanding, which is learned gradually in similar judgment and decision-making situations.Akateemisen psykologian piirissÀ on perinteisesti suhtauduttu skeptisesti selityksille, joita ihmiset antavat pÀÀtöksilleen: NiitÀ ei pidetÀ vain epÀluotettavina vaan suorastaan tekaistuina. LisÀksi pÀÀtösten selittÀmisen on todettu vaikuttavan hÀiritsevÀsti itse pÀÀtöksentekoprosessiin. NÀiden ilmiöiden on oletettu johtuvan siitÀ, ettei ihminen pÀÀse kiinni pÀÀosin tiedostamattomiin pÀÀtöksentekoprosesseihin. TÀstÀ seurauksena voi olla tekaistu selitys, joka ei kerro alkuperÀisestÀ prosessista, tai huonompi pÀÀtös, joka perustuu helpommin perusteltaviin syihin.
TÀmÀ vÀitöskirja tarkastelee kyseisiÀ ilmiöitÀ kuvanlaadun arvioinnin kontekstissa, olettaen ettÀ subjektiivisen kokemus on olennainen vÀlivaihe matalan tason havaintoprosessien ja varsinaisen pÀÀtöksen vÀlillÀ. Selitykset pÀÀtöksille taas heijastelevat tietoista ajattelua, jonka ajatellaan olevan sosiaalista todellisuutta heijasteleva korkeamman asteen tietoisuuden muoto. Tietoinen ajattelu pohjaa pÀÀtöstilanteiden metakognitiiviseen ymmÀrtÀmiseen. Jos tietoisen ajattelun yhteys subjektiiviseen kokemukseen ei toimi kunnolla, selittÀmisen aiheuttama prosessin muutos voi hÀiritÀ pÀÀtöksiÀ tai johtaa tekaistuihin selityksiin.
VÀitöskirjassa esitellÀÀn tulkintaan perustuva laatu -lÀhestymistapa (Interpretation-Based Quality, lyh. IBQ), joka korostaa subjektiivisen kokemuksen erityistÀ luonnetta pÀÀtöksenteossa: subjektiivinen kokemus syntyy aina yksilöllisestÀ nÀkökulmasta, jonka kautta maailmaa tulkitaan. Jos nÀmÀ tulkinnat eivÀt ole tutkijan tiedossa, yksilöiden vÀliset erot tulkitaan helposti mittausvirheeksi. IBQ lÀhestyy nÀitÀ eroja pyytÀmÀllÀ koehenkilöitÀ kuvaamaan perusteluja tekemilleen pÀÀtöksille omin sanoin. Perustelut analysoidaan laadullisesti, jotta pystytÀÀn kuvaamaan koehenkilöiden pÀÀtöksenteon kannalta olennaiset ulottuvuudet.
Koska tutkimusaineistona kÀytetÀÀn subjektiivisia selityksiÀ pÀÀtöksille, on IBQ-menetelmÀn vastattava kyseisiin tutkimusmenetelmiin liittyvÀÀn kritiikkiin koskien perustelujen luotettavuutta ja niiden vaikutusta alkuperÀiseen pÀÀtöksentekoprosessiin. TÀmÀn vuoksi suoritettiin neljÀ tutkimusta, joissa tarkasteltiin ko. vÀitteisiin liittyviÀ tutkimuskysymyksiÀ. Tutkimusten avulla on mahdollista myös ymmÀrtÀÀ tietoisen ajattelun merkitystÀ aistinvaraisissa pÀÀtöksissÀ.
Tulosten perusteella voidaan sanoa, ettÀ pÀÀtösten perusteleminen ja siihen liittyvÀ tietoinen ajattelu voi myös parantaa pÀÀtöksentekijÀn suoriutumista, kun pÀÀtös vaatii kompromisseja vaihtoehtojen eri ominaisuuksien vÀlillÀ, tahdonalaista tiedonhakua tai yhdenmukaisuutta eri pÀÀtösten vÀlillÀ. Tulokset osoittavat, ettÀ kun tietoinen ajattelu ja subjektiivinen kokemus ovat sopusoinnussa, subjektiiviset perustelut pÀÀtöksille voivat tuottaa hyödyllistÀ tietoa olennaisista pÀÀtöksentekoulottuvuuksista. NÀmÀ ulottuvuudet ovat riippuvaisia yksilö- ja kontekstitekijöistÀ eikÀ niitÀ ole mahdollista ennustaa fysikaalisesta informaatiosta. Tietoisen ajattelun merkitys pÀÀtöksenteossa nÀyttÀisi olevan tahdonalaisen tarkkaavaisuuden avulla tuoda pÀÀtöksen kannalta olennainen informaatio tietoisuuteen. NÀin todennÀköisesti tapahtuu erityisesti konflikteissa ja kun pÀÀtös on yksilölle uusi
ĐŃĐŽĐżĐŸĐČŃĐŽĐ°Đ»ŃĐœŃŃŃŃ ĐżŃĐžĐčĐœŃŃŃŃ ŃŃŃĐ”ĐœŃ ĐœĐ° Đ·Đ°ŃĐ°ĐŽĐ°Ń ĐșĐŸŃĐżĐŸŃĐ°ŃĐžĐČĐœĐŸŃ ŃĐŸŃŃĐ°Đ»ŃĐœĐŸŃ ĐČŃĐŽĐżĐŸĐČŃĐŽĐ°Đ»ŃĐœĐŸŃŃŃ
Company decision-makers increasingly have to confront with the expectations of their closer or extended community, also that of their environment in connection with the consequences of their business-decisions. On the other hand, they must represent the interests of their proprietors and must also sustain profitable economy. The author reviews those factors which have a significant impact on socially responsible decision-making process, concerning the decision-makers, the company and the outer environment. The author answers to the question of what the specialities of such decisions are and in what direction the attitude of economic entities develop, concerning socially responsible operation. The author proved that corporate social responsibility (CSR in short form) manifests itself in a growing and expanding measure in the activities of corporations and business structures, on the one hand, as an expectation in connection with their courses, on the other hand, such a factor if fai ls, can
make long-term competitiveness worse. Decisions related to CSR are strategic decisions, so they are made at the highest lev el. The personality, leadership style and self-assessment of the decision maker play a decisive role in the process of the influence of external expectations regarding CSR on organizational decisions. In addition, the size of the company, the regional location, the surrounding national culture, the social system and traditions also
have a significant influence on socially responsible decisions. The described article/presentation/study was carried out as part of the EFOP-3.6.1-16-00011 âYounger and Renewing University â Innovative Knowledge City â institutional development of the University of Miskolc aiming at intelligent specialisationâ project implemented in the frame work of the Szechenyi 2020 program. The realization of this project is supported by the European Union, co-financed by the European Social Fund.ĐĐ”ŃŃĐČĐœĐžĐșĐ°ĐŒ ĐșĐŸĐŒĐżĐ°ĐœŃĐč ĐČŃĐ” ŃĐ°ŃŃŃŃĐ” ĐŽĐŸĐČĐŸĐŽĐžŃŃŃŃ ŃŃĐžĐșĐ°ŃĐžŃŃ Đ· ĐŸŃŃĐșŃĐČĐ°ĐœĐœŃĐŒĐž ŃŃ
ĐœŃĐŸŃ Đ±Đ»ĐžĐ¶ŃĐŸŃ Đ°Đ±ĐŸ ŃĐŸĐ·ŃĐžŃĐ”ĐœĐŸŃ ŃĐżŃĐ»ŃĐœĐŸŃĐž, Đ° ŃĐ°ĐșĐŸĐ¶ Đ· ŃŃ
ĐœŃĐŒ ĐŸŃĐŸŃĐ”ĐœĐœŃĐŒ Ń Đ·ĐČ'ŃĐ·ĐșŃ Đ· ĐœĐ°ŃĐ»ŃĐŽĐșĐ°ĐŒĐž ŃĐČĐŸŃŃ
бŃĐ·ĐœĐ”Ń-ŃŃŃĐ”ĐœŃ. Đ ŃĐœŃĐŸĐłĐŸ Đ±ĐŸĐșŃ, ĐČĐŸĐœĐž ĐżĐŸĐČĐžĐœĐœŃ ĐżŃДЎŃŃĐ°ĐČĐ»ŃŃĐž ŃĐœŃĐ”ŃĐ”ŃĐž ŃĐČĐŸŃŃ
ĐČлаŃĐœĐžĐșŃĐČ Ń ĐżĐŸĐČĐžĐœĐœŃ ŃĐ°ĐșĐŸĐ¶ ĐżŃĐŽŃŃĐžĐŒŃĐČĐ°ŃĐž ĐżŃОбŃŃĐșĐŸĐČŃ Đ”ĐșĐŸĐœĐŸĐŒŃĐșŃ. ĐĐČŃĐŸŃ ŃĐŸĐ·ĐłĐ»ŃĐŽĐ°Ń ŃŃ ŃĐ°ĐșŃĐŸŃĐž, ŃĐșŃ ĐŒĐ°ŃŃŃ Đ·ĐœĐ°ŃĐœĐžĐč ĐČплОĐČ ĐœĐ° ŃĐŸŃŃĐ°Đ»ŃĐœĐŸ ĐČŃĐŽĐżĐŸĐČŃĐŽĐ°Đ»ŃĐœĐžĐč ĐżŃĐŸŃĐ”Ń ĐżŃĐžĐčĐœŃŃŃŃ ŃŃŃĐ”ĐœŃ, ŃĐŸ ŃŃĐŸŃŃŃŃŃŃŃ ĐŸŃŃб, ŃĐșŃ ĐżŃĐžĐčĐŒĐ°ŃŃŃ ŃŃŃĐ”ĐœĐœŃ, ĐșĐŸĐŒĐżĐ°ĐœŃŃ ŃĐ° Đ·ĐŸĐČĐœŃŃĐœŃĐŸĐłĐŸ ŃĐ”ŃĐ”ĐŽĐŸĐČĐžŃĐ°. ĐĐČŃĐŸŃ ĐČŃĐŽĐżĐŸĐČŃĐŽĐ°Ń ĐœĐ° пОŃĐ°ĐœĐœŃ, ŃĐŸ ŃĐ°ĐșĐ” ĐŸŃĐŸĐ±Đ»ĐžĐČĐŸŃŃŃ ŃĐ°ĐșĐžŃ
ŃŃŃĐ”ĐœŃ Ń ĐČ ŃĐșĐŸĐŒŃ ĐœĐ°ĐżŃŃĐŒĐșŃ ŃĐŸĐ·ĐČĐžĐČĐ°ŃŃŃŃŃ ŃŃĐ°ĐČĐ»Đ”ĐœĐœŃ ŃŃб'ŃĐșŃŃĐČ ĐłĐŸŃĐżĐŸĐŽĐ°ŃŃĐČĐ°ĐœĐœŃ ĐŽĐŸ ŃĐŸŃŃĐ°Đ»ŃĐœĐŸ ĐČŃĐŽĐżĐŸĐČŃĐŽĐ°Đ»ŃĐœĐŸŃ ĐŽŃŃĐ»ŃĐœĐŸŃŃŃ. ĐĐČŃĐŸŃ ĐŽĐŸĐČŃĐČ, ŃĐŸ ĐșĐŸŃĐżĐŸŃĐ°ŃĐžĐČĐœĐ° ŃĐŸŃŃĐ°Đ»ŃĐœĐ° ĐČŃĐŽĐżĐŸĐČŃĐŽĐ°Đ»ŃĐœŃŃŃŃ (ĐĐĄĐ ĐČ ĐșĐŸŃĐŸŃĐșŃĐč ŃĐŸŃĐŒŃ) ĐżŃĐŸŃĐČĐ»ŃŃŃŃŃŃ ĐČ Đ·ŃĐŸŃŃĐ°ŃŃĐŸĐŒŃ Ń Đ·ŃĐŸŃŃĐ°ŃŃĐŸĐŒŃ ĐČĐžĐŒŃŃŃ ĐŽŃŃĐ»ŃĐœĐŸŃŃŃ ĐșĐŸŃĐżĐŸŃĐ°ŃŃĐč Ń Đ±ŃĐ·ĐœĐ”c-ŃŃŃŃĐșŃŃŃ, Đ· ĐŸĐŽĐœĐŸĐłĐŸ Đ±ĐŸĐșŃ, ŃĐș ĐŸŃŃĐșŃĐČĐ°ĐœĐœŃ Ń Đ·ĐČ'ŃĐ·ĐșŃ Đ· ŃŃ
ĐșŃŃŃĐ°ĐŒĐž, Đ· ŃĐœŃĐŸĐłĐŸ Đ±ĐŸĐșŃ, ŃĐ°ĐșŃĐŸŃ, ŃĐșŃĐŸ ŃĐ” ĐœĐ” ĐČĐŽĐ°ŃŃŃŃŃ, ĐŒĐŸĐ¶Đ” ĐżĐŸĐłŃŃŃĐžŃĐž ĐŽĐŸĐČĐłĐŸŃŃŃĐŸĐșĐŸĐČŃ ĐșĐŸĐœĐșŃŃĐ”ĐœŃĐŸŃĐżŃĐŸĐŒĐŸĐ¶ĐœŃŃŃŃ. Đ ŃŃĐ”ĐœĐœŃ, ĐżĐŸĐČ'ŃĐ·Đ°ĐœŃ Đ· ĐĐĄĐ, Ń ŃŃŃĐ°ŃДгŃŃĐœĐžĐŒĐž ŃŃŃĐ”ĐœĐœ ŃĐŒĐž, ŃĐŸĐŒŃ ĐČĐŸĐœĐž ĐżŃĐžĐčĐŒĐ°ŃŃŃŃŃ ĐœĐ° ĐœĐ°ĐčĐČĐžŃĐŸĐŒŃ ŃŃĐČĐœŃ. ĐŃĐŸĐ±ĐžŃŃŃŃŃŃ, ŃŃĐžĐ»Ń Đ»ŃĐŽĐ”ŃŃŃĐČĐ° ŃĐ° ŃĐ°ĐŒĐŸĐŸŃŃĐœĐșĐ° ĐŸŃĐŸĐ±Đž, ŃĐșĐ° ĐżŃĐžĐčĐŒĐ°Ń ŃŃŃĐ”ĐœĐœŃ, ĐČŃĐŽŃĐłŃĐ°ŃŃŃ ĐČĐžŃŃŃĐ°Đ»ŃĐœŃ ŃĐŸĐ»Ń Ń ĐżŃĐŸŃĐ”ŃŃ ĐČплОĐČŃ Đ·ĐŸĐČĐœŃŃĐœŃŃ
ĐŸŃŃĐșŃĐČĐ°ĐœŃ ŃĐŸĐŽĐŸ ĐĐĄĐ ĐœĐ° ĐŸŃĐłĐ°ĐœŃĐ·Đ°ŃŃĐčĐœŃ ŃŃŃĐ”ĐœĐœŃ. ĐŃŃĐŒ ŃĐŸĐłĐŸ, ŃĐŸĐ·ĐŒŃŃ ĐșĐŸĐŒĐżĐ°ĐœŃŃ, ŃДгŃĐŸĐœĐ°Đ»ŃĐœĐ” ŃĐŸĐ·ŃĐ°ŃŃĐČĐ°ĐœĐœŃ, ĐœĐ°ĐČĐșĐŸĐ»ĐžŃĐœŃ ĐœĐ°ŃŃĐŸĐœĐ°Đ»ŃĐœĐ° ĐșŃĐ»ŃŃŃŃĐ°, ŃĐŸŃŃĐ°Đ»ŃĐœĐ° ŃĐžŃŃĐ”ĐŒĐ° Ń ŃŃĐ°ĐŽĐžŃŃŃ ŃĐ°ĐșĐŸĐ¶ ĐŒĐ°ŃŃŃ Đ·ĐœĐ°ŃĐœĐžĐč ĐČплОĐČ ĐœĐ° ŃĐŸŃŃĐ°Đ»ŃĐœĐŸ ĐČŃĐŽĐżĐŸĐČŃĐŽĐ°Đ»ŃĐœŃ ŃŃŃĐ”ĐœĐœŃ. ĐпОŃĐ°ĐœĐ° ŃŃĐ°ŃŃŃ / ĐżŃĐ”Đ·Đ”ĐœŃĐ°ŃŃŃ / ĐŽĐŸŃĐ»ŃĐŽĐ¶Đ”ĐœĐœŃ Đ±ŃĐ»ĐŸ ĐżŃĐŸĐČĐ”ĐŽĐ”ĐœĐŸ ĐČ ŃĐ°ĐŒĐșĐ°Ń
ĐżŃĐŸĐ”ĐșŃŃ EFOP-3.6.1-16-00011 «ĐĐŸĐ»ĐŸĐŽŃĐžĐč ŃĐ° ĐŸĐœĐŸĐČĐ»ŃĐČĐ°ĐœĐžĐč ŃĐœŃĐČĐ”ŃŃĐžŃĐ”Ń - ĐŒŃŃŃĐŸ ŃĐœĐœĐŸĐČĐ°ŃŃĐčĐœĐžŃ
Đ·ĐœĐ°ĐœŃ - ŃĐœŃŃĐžŃŃŃŃĐčĐœĐžĐč ŃĐŸĐ·ĐČĐžŃĐŸĐș ĐŃŃĐșĐŸĐ»ŃŃŃĐșĐŸĐłĐŸ ŃĐœŃĐČĐ”ŃŃĐžŃĐ”ŃŃ Đ· ĐŒĐ”ŃĐŸŃ ŃĐœŃДлДĐșŃŃĐ°Đ»ŃĐœĐŸŃ ŃпДŃŃĐ°Đ»ŃĐ·Đ°ŃŃŃ», ŃДалŃĐ·ĐŸĐČĐ°ĐœĐžĐč ĐČ ŃĐ°ĐŒĐșĐ°Ń
ĐżŃĐŸĐ”ĐșŃŃ ĐżŃĐŸĐłŃĐ°ĐŒĐž «ХДŃĐ”ĐœŃ 2020». РДалŃĐ·Đ°ŃŃŃ ŃŃĐŸĐłĐŸ ĐżŃĐŸĐ”ĐșŃŃ ĐżŃĐŽŃŃĐžĐŒŃŃ ĐĐČŃĐŸĐżĐ”ĐčŃŃĐșĐžĐč ĐĄĐŸŃĐ·, ŃĐșĐžĐč ŃŃĐœĐ°ĐœŃŃŃŃŃŃŃ ĐĐČŃĐŸĐżĐ”ĐčŃŃĐșĐžĐŒ ŃĐŸŃŃĐ°Đ»ŃĐœĐžĐŒ ŃĐŸĐœĐŽĐŸĐŒ
Institutions for Intuitive Man
By its critics, the rational choice model is routinely accused of being unrealistic. One key objection has it that, for all nontrivial problems, calculating the best response is cognitively way too taxing, given the severe cognitive limitations of the human mind. If one confines the analysis to consciously controlled decision-making, this criticism is certainly warranted. But it ignores a second mental apparatus. Unlike conscious deliberation, this apparatus does not work serially but in parallel. It handles huge amounts of information in almost no time. It only is not consciously accessible. Only the end result is propelled back to consciousness as an intuition. It is too early to decide whether the rational choice model is ultimately even descriptively correct. But at any rate institutional analysts and institutional designers are well advised to take this powerful mechanisms seriously. In appropriate contexts, institutions should see to it that decision-makers trust their intuitions. This frequently creates a dilemma. For better performance is often not the only goal pursued by institutional intervention. Accountability, predictability and regulability are also desired. Sometimes, clever interventions are able to get them both. Arguably, the obligation to write an explicit set of reasons for a court decision is a case in point. The judge is not obliged to report the mental processes by which she has taken her decision. Justification is only ex post control. Intuitive decision-making is even more desirable if the underlying social problem is excessively complex (NP hard, to be specific), or ill-defined. Sometimes, it is enough for society to give room for intuitive decision-making. For instance, in simple social dilemmas, a combination of cheater detection and punishing sentiments does the trick. However, intuition can be misled. For instance, punishing sentiments are triggered by a hurt sense of fairness. Now in more complex social dilemmas, there are competing fairness norms, and people intuitively choose with a self-serving bias. In such contexts, institutions must step in so that clashing intuitions do not lead to social unrest.intuition, consciousness, rational choice, heuristics, ill-defined social problems, institutions
Philanthropy: A Gift or Investment?
CAF latest report on philanthropic habits, "Philanthropy A gift or investment?", reveals striking differences in approaches to giving between generations. This snapshot explores the attitudes and behaviour of wealthy donors, with the means to make strategic choices about how they support the causes they care about.Two-thirds of the people surveyed described themselves as active, socially-conscious investors, rising to four out of five among those under 40 years old. Their findings suggest that this younger generation especially are widely engaged in 'values-based' investment approaches, which fit their ethical outlook or aim to balance social and financial returns
Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture
Many efforts to understand and respond to a succession of corporate scandals over the last few years have underscored the importance of organizational culture in shaping the behavior of individuals. This focus reflects appreciation that even if an organization has adopted elaborate rules and policies designed to ensure legal compliance and ethical behavior, those pronouncements will be ineffective if other norms and incentives promote contrary conduct.
Responding to the call for creating and sustaining an ethical culture in organizations requires appreciating the subtle ways in which various characteristics of an organization may work in tandem or at cross-purposes in shaping behavior. The idea is to identify the influences likely to be most important, analyze how people are apt to respond to them, and revise them if necessary so that they create the right kinds of incentives when individuals are deciding how to act.
This can be a tall order even if we assume that most behavior is the result of a deliberative process that weighs multiple risks and rewards. Itâs even more daunting if we accept the notion that conscious deliberation typically plays but a minor role in shaping behavior. A focus on what two scholars describe as âthe unbearable automaticity of beingâ posits that most of a personâs everyday life is determined not by conscious intentions and deliberate choices but by mental processes outside of conscious awareness.
In this article, I discuss a particular strand of research that is rooted in the study of non-conscious mental processes, and consider its implications for ethics and culture in the organizational setting. This is work on the process that we use to identify and respond to situations that raise what we think of as distinctly moral questions. A growing body of research suggests that a large portion of this process involves automatic non-conscious cognitive and emotional reactions rather than conscious deliberation. One way to think of these reactions is that they reflect reliance on moral intuitions. When such intuitions arise, we donât engage in moral reasoning in order to arrive at a conclusion. Instead, we do so in order to justify a conclusion that weâve already reached. In other words, moral conclusions precede, rather than follow, moral reasoning.
If this research accurately captures much of our moral experience, what does it suggest about whatâs necessary to foster an ethical organizational culture? At first blush, the implications seem unsettling. The non-conscious realm is commonly associated with irrational and arbitrary impulses, and morality often is characterized as the hard-won achievement of reason over these unruly forces. If most of our moral judgments are the product of non-conscious processes, how can we hope to understand, much less influence, our moral responses? Are moral reactions fundamentally inscrutable and beyond appeals to reason? If reason has no persuasive force, does appreciation of the non-conscious source of our moral judgments suggest that any effort to promote ethical conduct must rest on a crude behaviorism that manipulates penalties and rewards?
I believe that acknowledging the prominent role of non-conscious processes in shaping moral responses need not inevitably lead either to fatalism or Skinnerian behaviorism. Research has begun to shed light on how these processes operate. Related work has suggested how our moral responses may be rooted in human evolution. This perspective focuses on the ways in which our capacity for moral judgment is embedded in physical and mental processes that have provided an adaptive advantage in human evolution. These bodies of research contribute to a richer portrait of human cognition and behavior that can be valuable in thinking about how to promote ethical awareness and conduct.
As Owen Flanagan has put it, âseeing clearly the kinds of persons we are is a necessary condition for any productive ethical reflection.â If there were such a thing as a normative theory of human movement, it would be futile if it exhorted us to fly. Efforts to create an organizational culture that encouraged people to fly would be doomed as well. In thinking about ethics, we need to have a sense of what lies between simply accommodating what we tend to do and demanding that we fly. My hope is that this article takes a small step in that direction
Consumption in action. Mapping consumerism in international academic literature
The consumer-citizen and more generally, the emergence of active forms of citizenship mediated by consumption point to a change in the relations of production, consumption and distribution. These forms of citizenship come to encompass opposite poles of consumption such as hedonism and social responsibility. When consumption choices are associated with the social and environmental issues connected to manufacturing and distribution processes, the space claimed by the active consumer comes to represents a form of social identity recognition. This \u2018political\u2019 sphere, made up of individual and/or collective claims mediated by consumer society comes in the wake of a long period of market de-politicization. On the basis of these assumptions, this article surveys and evaluates the topics related to critical consumption that are most discussed in the social sciences. Such forms of socially oriented consumption \u2013 enacted in the form of individual or collective consumer choices \u2013 represent a new form of political participation and are understood as practices of active-citizenship promotion. The findings of this article are based on data gathered from 478 peer-reviewed articles published between 2004 and 2013. The articles were selected from Scopus on the basis of their broad connection to critical consumerism and forms of socially oriented consumerism. A software-based content analysis run through T-Lab software was used to generate an analytical model of the main research axis of the most recent international literature on these arguments. The heterogeneous body of scholarly literature on socially oriented consumption reflects the rich diversity of perspectives adopted to understand the political and ethical role of consumers in contemporary societies
"Why Don't Consumers Care about CSR?" - A Qualitative Study Exploring the Role of CSR in Consumption Decisions. Empirical Paper
There is an unresolved paradox concerning the role of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in consumer behavior. On the one hand, consumers demand more and more CSR information from corporations. On the other hand, research indicates a considerable gap between consumers' apparent interest in CSR and the limited role of CSR in purchase behavior. This paper attempts to shed light on this paradox by drawing on qualitative data from in-depth interviews. The findings show that the evaluation of CSR initiatives is a complex and hierarchically-structured process, where consumers distinguish between core, central, and peripheral factors. This paper describes these factors in detail and explains the complexity of consumers' assessment of CSR. These insights then serve as a basis for discussing the theoretical and managerial implications of the research findings. To this end, the paper contributes to a better understanding of the role of CSR in consumption decisions
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