Social Orderings for the Assignment of Indivisible Objects

In the assignment problem of indivisible objects with money, we study social ordering functions which satisfy the requirement that social orderings should be independent of changes in preferences over infeasible bundles. We combine this axiom with efficiency, consistency and equity axioms. Our result is that the only social ordering function satisfying those axioms is the leximin function in money utility.Indivisible Good, Social Ordering Function, Leximin

Welfare Egalitarianism in Non-Rival Environments

We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private contributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering functions satisfying the property that individual welfare levels exceeding a legitimate upper bound should be reduced. Combining that property with efficiency and robustness properties with respect to changes in the set of agents, we obtain a kind of welfare egalitarianism based on a constructed numerical representation of individual preferences.

Two Criteria for Social Decisions

This paper studies the ethical underpinnings of two social criteria which are prominent in the literature dealing with the problem of evaluating allocations of several consumption goods in a population with heteregenous preferences. The Pazner-Schmeidler criterion (Pazner-Schmeidler 1978) and the Walrasian criterion (Fleurbaey and Maniquet 1996) are prima facie quite different. But it is shown here that these criteria are related to close variants of the fairness condition that an allocation is better when every individual bundle in it dominates the average consumption in another allocation. In addition, the results suggest that the Pazner-Schmeidler criterion can be viewed as the best extension of the Walrasian criterion to non-convex economies.social welfare, social choice, fairness

Interactive Geometry for Surplus Sharing in Cooperative Games

This paper presents interactive geometrical depictions of the Shapley value, nucleolus, and per-capita nucleolus surplus-sharing rules for cooperative games with three players. The program graphically demonstrates how the simplexes corresponding to a host of characteristic functions are shrunk to their corresponding cores, calculates allocations using the Shapley Value, nucleolus, and per-capita nucleolus surplus-sharing rules, and graphically depicts the locations of these allocations in the corresponding cores

Two criteria for social decisions

1ères lignes : La distribution de la presse est un sujet d’actualité. Un projet de loi réformant la loi Bichet de 1947 sera discuté ce printemps. L’enjeu est de taille : il s’agit de « moderniser l’environnement législatif, sans casser les fondamentaux qui font le succès du système de distribution de la presse », a déclaré le ministre de la Culture, Franck Riester. La formule est pour le moins biaisée dans un contexte de crise où, durant ces dix dernières années, les ventes ont baissé de 50 %, le chiffre d’affaires de 40 %, et où la principale messagerie (Presstalis) a été au bord de la faillite en 2017

Allocation de ressources et ordonnancement multi-utilisateurs : une approche basée sur l'équité

Grid and Cloud computing make possible the sharing of computer system resources, such as storage or computation time, among a set of users, according to their requests, thereby creating an illusion of infinite resources. However, as soon as those resources are insufficient to meet users’s expectations, conflicts of interest arise. Therefore, unlimited access to limited resources may lead to inefficient usage which penalizes the whole set of users. In such environments, arbitration becomes necessary in order to settle those conflicts and ensure a fair allocation to all users. We present two classes of problems : multi-user resource allocation under uncertainty and multi-user periodic task scheduling. We tackle these problems from the point of view of fairness.Les grilles de calcul et le “cloud computing” permettent de distribuer un ensemble de ressources informatiques, telles que du stockage ou du temps de calcul, à un ensemble d’utilisateurs en fonction de leurs demandes en donnant l’illusion de ressources infinies. Cependant, lorsque l’ensemble de ces ressources est insuffisant pour satisfaire les exigences des utilisateurs, des conflits d’intérêts surgissent. Ainsi, un libre accès à des ressources limitées peut entraîner une utilisation inefficace qui pénalise l’ensemble des participants. Dans de tels environnements, il devient nécessaire d’établir des procédures d’arbitrage afin de résoudre ces conflits en garantissant une distribution équitable aux différents utilisateurs. Nous présentons une nouvelle classe de problèmes : celle des ordonnancements multi-utilisateurs. Cette thèse aborde la notion d’équité au travers de problèmes d’allocation de ressources sous incertitudes et d’ordonnancement de tâches périodiques

Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects

In the assignment problem of indivisible objects with money, we study social ordering functions which satisfy the requirement that social orderings should be independent of changes in preferences over infeasible bundles. We combine this axiom with efficiency, consistency and equity axioms. Our result is that the only social ordering function satisfying those axioms is the leximin function in money utility

Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects

In the assignment problem of indivisible objects with money, we study social ordering functions which satisfy the requirement that social orderings should be independent of changes in preferences over infeasible bundles. We combine this axiom with efficiency, consistency and equity axioms. Our result is that the only social ordering function satisfying those axioms is the leximin function in money utility.Indivisible good Social ordering function Leximin