10,069 research outputs found
Rationality: a social-epistemology perspective
Both in philosophy and in psychology, human rationality has traditionally been studied from an "individualistic" perspective. Recently, social epistemologists have drawn attention to the fact that epistemic interactions among agents also give rise to important questions concerning rationality. In previous work, we have used a formal model to assess the risk that a particular type of social-epistemic interactions lead agents with initially consistent belief states into inconsistent belief states. Here, we continue this work by investigating the dynamics to which these interactions may give rise in the population as a whole
Disassembling the System: A Reply to Paolo Palladino and Adam Riggio
Final instalment of a book-review symposium on: Jeff Kochan (2017), Science as Social Existence: Heidegger and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (Cambridge UK: Open Book Publishers). -- Author's response to: Paolo Palladino (2018), 'Heidegger Today: On Jeff Kochanâs Science and Social Existence,' Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7(8): 41-46; and Adam Riggio (2018), 'The Very Being of a Conceptual Scheme: Disciplinary and Conceptual Critiques,' Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7(11): 53-59
Social Epistemology
International audienceSocial epistemology studies knowledge in social contexts. Knowledge is 'social' when its holder communicates with or learns from others (Epistemology in groups), or when its holder is a group as a whole, literally or metaphorically (Epistemology of groups). Group knowledge can emerge explicitly, through aggregation procedures like voting, or implicitly, through institutions like deliberation or prediction markets. In the truth-tracking paradigm, group beliefs aim at truth, and group decisions at 'correctness', in virtue of external facts that are empirical or normative, real or constructed, universal or relativistic, etc. Procedures and institutions are evaluated by epistemic performance: Are they truth-conducive? Do groups become 'wiser' than their members? We review several procedures and institutions, discussing epistemic successes and failures. Jury theorems provide formal arguments for epistemic success. Some jury theorems misleadingly conclude that 'huge groups are infallible', an artifact of inappropriate premises. Others have defensible premises, and still conclude that groups outperform individuals, without being infallible
Social epistemology
International audienceSocial epistemology studies knowledge in social contexts. Knowledge is 'social' when its holder communicates with or learns from others (Epistemology in groups), or when its holder is a group as a whole, literally or metaphorically (Epistemology of groups). Group knowledge can emerge explicitly, through aggregation procedures like voting, or implicitly, through institutions like deliberation or prediction markets. In the truth-tracking paradigm, group beliefs aim at truth, and group decisions at 'correctness', in virtue of external facts that are empirical or normative, real or constructed, universal or relativistic, etc. Procedures and institutions are evaluated by epistemic performance: Are they truth-conducive? Do groups become 'wiser' than their members? We review several procedures and institutions, discussing epistemic successes and failures. Jury theorems provide formal arguments for epistemic success. Some jury theorems misleadingly conclude that 'huge groups are infallible', an artifact of inappropriate premises. Others have defensible premises, and still conclude that groups outperform individuals, without being infallible
Social Epistemology as a New Paradigm for Journalism and Media Studies
Journalism and media studies lack robust theoretical concepts for studying journalistic knowledge âgeneration. More specifically, conceptual challenges attend the emergence of big data and âalgorithmic sources of journalistic knowledge. A family of frameworks apt to this challenge is âprovided by âsocial epistemologyâ: a young philosophical field which regards societyâs participation âin knowledge generation as inevitable. Social epistemology offers the best of both worlds for âjournalists and media scholars: a thorough familiarity with biases and failures of obtaining âknowledge, and a strong orientation toward best practices in the realm of knowledge-acquisition âand truth-seeking. This paper articulates the lessons of social epistemology for two central nodes of âknowledge-acquisition in contemporary journalism: human-mediated knowledge and technology-âmediated knowledge.
The Social Epistemology of Consensus and Dissent
This paper reviews current debates in social epistemology about the relations âbetween âknowledge âand consensus. These relations are philosophically interesting on their âown, but âalso have âpractical consequences, as consensus takes an increasingly significant ârole in âinforming public âdecision making. The paper addresses the following questions. âWhen is a âconsensus attributable to an epistemic community? Under what conditions may âwe âlegitimately infer that a consensual view is knowledge-based or otherwise âepistemically âjustified? Should consensus be the aim of scientific inquiry, and if so, what âkind of âconsensus? How should dissent be handled? It is argued that a legitimate inference âthat a âtheory is correct from the fact that there is a scientific consensus on it requires taking âinto âconsideration both cognitive properties of the theory as well as social properties of âthe âconsensus. The last section of the paper reviews computational models of âconsensus âformation.
Truth approximation, social epistemology, and opinion dynamics
This paper highlights some connections between work on truth approximation and work in social epistemology, in particular work on peer disagreement. In some of the literature on truth approximation, questions have been addressed concerning the efficiency of research strategies for approximating the truth. So far, social aspects of research strategies have not received any attention in this context. Recent findings in the field of opinion dynamics suggest that this is a mistake. How scientists exchange and take into account information about each othersâ beliefs may greatly influence the accuracy and speed with which the scientific community as a whole approximates the truth. On the other hand, social epistemologists concerned with peer disagreement have so far neglected the question of how practices of responding to disagreements with peers fare with respect to the goal of approximating the truth. Again, work on opinion dynamics shows that this may be a mistake, and that how we ought to respond to disagreements with our peers may depend on the specific purposes of our investigations
"A Brilliant Mind": Margaret Egan and Social Epistemology
Margaret Egan (1905???59) taught at the Graduate Library School of the
University of Chicago (1946???55) and at the School of Library Science at
Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio (1955???59). With her colleague
Jesse Shera, Egan wrote ???Foundations of a Theory of Bibliography???
for Library Quarterly in 1952; this article marked the fi rst appearance of
the term ???social epistemology.??? After Egan???s death, Shera has often been
credited for the idea of social epistemology. However, there is ample evidence
to show that it was Egan who originated the concept???one that is
commonly viewed as fundamental to the theoretical foundations of library
and information science.published or submitted for publicatio
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