Risk Estimation and Expert Judgment: The Case of Yucca Mountain

Professor Shrader-Frechette discusses factors responsible for acute disagreement between the federal government and Nevada citizens over potential Risks at Yucca Mountain and focuses on the use of expert judgment, concluding that some of them appear to exemplify bad science. That aside, she argues that 1,000 year predictions cannot be made from current knowledge of geology or, e.g., institutional behavior and concludes that permanent disposal of radioactive waste is currently impossible

Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal

RL33461 Management of civilian radioactive waste has posed difficult issues for Congress since the beginning of the nuclear power industry in the 1950s. Federal policy is based on the premise that nuclear waste can be disposed of safely, but proposed storage and disposal facilities have frequently been challenged on safety, health, and environmental grounds. Although civilian radioactive waste encompasses a wide range of materials, most of the current debate focuses on highly radioactive spent fuel from nuclear power plants. The United States currently has no permanent disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel or other highly radioactive waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) calls for disposal of spent nuclear fuel in a deep geologic repository. NWPA requires the Department of Energy (DOE) to develop such a repository, which would be licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Amendments to NWPA in 1987 restricted DOE’s repository site studies to Yucca Mountain in Nevada. DOE submitted a license application for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository to NRC on June 3, 2008. The State of Nevada strongly opposes the Yucca Mountain project, citing excessive water infiltration, earthquakes, volcanoes, human intrusion, and other technical issue

Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal

RL33461 Management of civilian radioactive waste has posed difficult issues for Congress since the beginning of the nuclear power industry in the 1950s. Federal policy is based on the premise that nuclear waste can be disposed of safely, but proposed storage and disposal facilities have frequently been challenged on safety, health, and environmental grounds. Although civilian radioactive waste encompasses a wide range of materials, most of the current debate focuses on highly radioactive spent fuel from nuclear power plants. The United States currently has no permanent disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel or other highly radioactive waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) calls for disposal of spent nuclear fuel in a deep geologic repository. NWPA requires the Department of Energy (DOE) to develop such a repository, which would be licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Amendments to NWPA in 1987 restricted DOE’s repository site studies to Yucca Mountain in Nevada. DOE submitted a license application for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository to NRC on June 3, 2008. The State of Nevada strongly opposes the Yucca Mountain project, citing excessive water infiltration, earthquakes, volcanoes, human intrusion, and other technical issue

Rethinking the Challenge of High-Level Nuclear Waste

A report on strategic planning for defense high-level waste and spent fuel disposal. This research was completed money allocated during Round 5 of the Citizens’ Monitoring and Technical Assessment Fund (MTA Fund). Clark University was named conservator of these works. If you have any questions or concerns please contact us at [email protected]://commons.clarku.edu/yakama/1000/thumbnail.jp

Risky business: Moral arguments againts the Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendments of 1987 Can consent be engineered?

Risky Business: Moral Arguments Against the Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendments of 1987, Can Consent Be Engineered? asks the moral and ethical questions of assigning risk. In a democracy a fundamental principle for imposing risk is obtaining the consent of the governed. In the case of a proposed high-level nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, Congress has ignored this basic principle. An unwilling population in a politically weak state has been forced to bear the burden from highly radioactive spent fuel from nuclear power reactors operating in the majority of states. The State of Nevada does not reap the benefits from nuclear power generation and does not operate a nuclear reactor. Should a single state bear the current and future impacts and costs from such an unwanted risk? Is there a democratic solution to nuclear waste management

Waist-Deep in Nuclear Waste: How the NRC Can Rebuild Confidence in a Stalled Waste Management Program

This comment will explain why the federal nuclear waste management program is at a standstill and will suggest a course of action for the NRC to help revive the program. Part II describes the environmental hazards of spent nuclear fuel and the federal government’s effort to site and build a geologic repository for this nuclear waste. Part III explains the role of the NRC in the nuclear regulatory scheme and how safety and environmental regulations are promulgated and enforced. Part IV narrows in on the NRC rulemakings called the “Waste Confidence Decision” and “Temporary Storage Rule,” and the reasons why they were defeated in New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In Part V, I propose that the NRC make significant changes to these “waste confidence” rulings to ensure compliance with NEPA