Dependencies and Simultaneity in Membrane Systems

Membrane system computations proceed in a synchronous fashion: at each step all the applicable rules are actually applied. Hence each step depends on the previous one. This coarse view can be refined by looking at the dependencies among rule occurrences, by recording, for an object, which was the a rule that produced it and subsequently (in a later step), which was the a rule that consumed it. In this paper we propose a way to look also at the other main ingredient in membrane system computations, namely the simultaneity in the rule applications. This is achieved using zero-safe nets that allows to synchronize transitions, i.e., rule occurrences. Zero-safe nets can be unfolded into occurrence nets in a classical way, and to this unfolding an event structure can be associated. The capability of capturing simultaneity of zero-safe nets is transferred on the level of event structure by adding a way to express which events occur simultaneously

Uniqueness of Simultaneity

We consider the problem of uniqueness of certain simultaneity structures in flat spacetime. Absolute simultaneity is specified to be a non-trivial equivalence relation which is invariant under the automorphism group Aut of spacetime. Aut is taken to be the identity-component of either the inhomogeneous Galilei group or the inhomogeneous Lorentz group. Uniqueness of standard simultaneity in the first, and absence of any absolute simultaneity in the second case are demonstrated and related to certain group theoretic properties. Relative simultaneity with respect to an additional structure X on spacetime is specified to be a non-trivial equivalence relation which is invariant under the subgroup in Aut that stabilises X. Uniqueness of standard Einstein simultaneity is proven in the Lorentzian case when X is an inertial frame. We end by discussing the relation to previous work of others.Comment: LeTeX-2e, 18 pages, no figure

The fate of presentism in modern physics

There has been a recent spate of essays defending presentism, the view in the metaphysics of time according to which all and only present events or entities exist. What is particularly striking about this resurgence is that it takes place on the background of the significant pressure exerted on the position by the relativity of simultaneity asserted in special relativity, and yet in several cases invokes modern physics for support. I classify the presentist arguments into a two by two matrix depending on whether they take a compatibilist or incompatibilist stance with respect to both special relativity in particular and modern physics in general. I then review and evaluate what I take to be some of the most forceful and intriguing presentist arguments turning on modern physics. Although nothing of what I will say eventuates its categorical demise, I hope to show that whatever presentism remains compatible with empirical facts and our best physics is metaphysically repugnant.Comment: 23 pages, 4 figure

Time as an Empirical Concept in Special Relativity

According to a widespread view, Einstein’s definition of time in his special relativity is founded on the positivist verification principle. The present paper challenges this received outlook. It shall be argued that Einstein’s position on the concept of time, to wit, simultaneity, is best understood as a mitigated version of concept empiricism. He contrasts his position to Newton’s absolutist and Kant’s transcendental arguments, and in part sides with Hume’s and Mach’s empiricist arguments. Nevertheless, Einstein worked out a concept empiricism that is considerably more moderate than what we find in the preceding empiricist tradition and early logical positivism. He did not think that the origin of concepts is in observations, but in conventions, and he also maintained a realist ontology of physical events, which he thought is necessary for his theory. Consequently, his philosophy of time in special relativity is not couched in terms of an anti-metaphysical verificationism