Side Channel Resistance Evaluation and Measurement

While unknown to most people, hardware implementation attacks provide a serious adversary for systems that contain sensitive data. Mission critical information can be extracted from a design with little effort from an attacker when they have access to the physical hardware. Thus designers try to mitigate this problem by using unique countermeasures styles. This work presents the first practical differential power analysis security evaluation of a countermeasure style called t-private logic. A PRESENT block cipher S-Box was implemented on a Virtex 5 FPGA as a reference platform. Both hardware and simulated power traces were collected. Statistical analyses were performed (CPA and Correlation enhanced collision attack) and our results revealed a first-order side channel attack vulnerability

Sensing circuits for multiwire proportional chambers

Integrated sensing circuits were designed, fabricated, and packaged for use in determining the direction and fluence of ionizing radiation passing through a multiwire proportional chamber. CMOS on sapphire was selected because of its high speed and low power capabilities. The design of the proposed circuits is described and the results of computer simulations are presented. The fabrication processes for the CMOS on sapphire sensing circuits and hybrid substrates are outlined. Several design options are described and the cost implications of each discussed. To be most effective, each chip should handle not more than 32 inputs, and should be mounted on its own hybrid substrate

Design and Implementation of a Secure RISC-V Microprocessor

Secret keys can be extracted from the power consumption or electromagnetic emanations of unprotected devices. Traditional counter-measures have limited scope of protection, and impose several restrictions on how sensitive data must be manipulated. We demonstrate a bit-serial RISC-V microprocessor implementation with no plain-text data. All values are protected using Boolean masking. Software can run with little to no counter-measures, reducing code size and performance overheads. Unlike previous literature, our methodology is fully automated and can be applied to designs of arbitrary size or complexity. We also provide details on other key components such as clock randomizer, memory protection, and random number generator. The microprocessor was implemented in 65 nm CMOS technology. Its implementation was evaluated using NIST tests as well as side channel attacks. Random numbers generated with our RNG pass on all NIST tests. Side-channel analysis on the baseline implementation extracted the AES key using only 375 traces, while our secure microprocessor was able to withstand attacks using 20 M traces.Comment: Submitted to IEEE for possible publication. Copyright may be transferred. This version may no longer be accessibl

Side-channel attacks and countermeasures in the design of secure IC's devices for cryptographic applications

Abstract--- A lot of devices which are daily used have to guarantee the retention of sensible data. Sensible data are ciphered by a secure key by which only the key holder can get the data. For this reason, to protect the cipher key against possible attacks becomes a main issue. The research activities in hardware cryptography are involved in finding new countermeasures against various attack scenarios and, in the same time, in studying new attack methodologies. During the PhD, three different logic families to counteract Power Analysis were presented and a novel class of attacks was studied. Moreover, two different activities related to Random Numbers Generators have been addressed

Local Epitaxial Overgrowth for Stacked Complementary MOS Transistor Pairs

A three-dimensional silicon processing technology for CMOS circuits was developed and characterized. The first fully depleted SOI devices with individually biasable gates on both sides of the silicon film were realized. A vertically stacked CMOS Inverter built by lateral overgrowth was reported for the first time. Nucleation-free epitaxial lateral overgrowth of silicon over thin oxides was developed for both a pancake and a barrel-type epitaxy reactor: This process was optimized to limit damage to gate oxides and minimize dopant diffusion within the Substrate. Autodoping from impurities of the MOS transistors built in the substrate was greatly reduced. A planarisation technique was developed to reduce the silicon film thickness from 13μm to below 0.5μm for full depletion. Chemo-mechanical polishing was modified to yield an automatic etch stop with the corresponding control and uniformity of the silicon film. The resulting wafer topography is more planar than in a conventional substrate CMOS process. PMOS transistors which match the current drive of bulk NM0S devices of equal geometry were characterized, despite the three-times lower hole mobility. Devices realized in the substrate, at the bottom and on top of the SOI film were essentially indistinguishable from bulk devices. A novel device with two insulated gates controlling the same channel was characterized. Inverters were realized both as joint-gate configuration and with symmetric performance of n- and p-channel. These circuits were realized in the area of a single NMOS transistor

Explointing FPGA block memories for protected cryptographic implementations

Modern Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are power packed with features to facilitate designers. Availability of features like huge block memory (BRAM), Digital Signal Processing (DSP) cores, embedded CPU makes the design strategy of FPGAs quite different from ASICs. FPGA are also widely used in security-critical application where protection against known attacks is of prime importance. We focus ourselves on physical attacks which target physical implementations. To design countermeasures against such attacks, the strategy for FPGA designers should also be different from that in ASIC. The available features should be exploited to design compact and strong countermeasures. In this paper, we propose methods to exploit the BRAMs in FPGAs for designing compact countermeasures. BRAM can be used to optimize intrinsic countermeasures like masking and dual-rail logic, which otherwise have significant overhead (at least 2X). The optimizations are applied on a real AES-128 co-processor and tested for area overhead and resistance on Xilinx Virtex-5 chips. The presented masking countermeasure has an overhead of only 16% when applied on AES. Moreover Dual-rail Precharge Logic (DPL) countermeasure has been optimized to pack the whole sequential part in the BRAM, hence enhancing the security. Proper robustness evaluations are conducted to analyze the optimization for area and security