6 research outputs found
Continuously Non-Malleable Codes from Authenticated Encryptions in 2-Split-State Model
Tampering attack is the act of deliberately modifying the codeword to produce another codeword of a related message. The main application is to find out the original message from the codeword. Non-malleable codes are introduced to protect the message from such attack. Any tampering attack performed on the message encoded by non-malleable codes, guarantee that output is either completely unrelated or original message. It is useful mainly in the situation when privacy and integrity of the message is important rather than correctness. Unfortunately, standard version of non-malleable codes are used for one-time tampering attack. In literature, we show that it is possible to construct non-malleable codes from authenticated encryptions. But, such construction does not provide security when an adversary tampers the codeword more than once. Later, continuously non-malleable codes are constructed where an attacker can tamper the message for polynomial number of times. In this work, we propose a construction of continuously non-malleable code from authenticated encryption in 2-split-state model. Our construction provides security against polynomial number of tampering attacks and non-malleability property is preserved. The security of proposed continuously non-malleable code reduces to the security of underlying leakage resilient storage when tampering experiment triggers self-destruct
Short Non-Malleable Codes from Related-Key Secure Block Ciphers
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Short Non-Malleable Codes from Related-Key Secure Block Ciphers, Revisited
We construct non-malleable codes in the split-state model with codeword length m + 3λ or m + 5λ, where m is the message size and λ is the security parameter, depending on how conservative one is. Our scheme is very simple and involves a single call to a block cipher meeting a new security notion which we dub entropic fixed-related-key security, which essentially means that the block cipher behaves like a pseudorandom permutation when queried upon inputs sampled from a distribution with sufficient min-entropy, even under related-key attacks with respect to an arbitrary but fixed key relation. Importantly, indistinguishability only holds with respect to the original secret key (and not with respect to the tampered secret key).In a previous work, Fehr, Karpman, and Mennink (ToSC 2018) used a related assumption (where the block cipher inputs can be chosen by the adversary, and where indistinguishability holds even with respect to the tampered key) to construct a nonmalleable code in the split-state model with codeword length m + 2λ. Unfortunately, no block cipher (even an ideal one) satisfies their assumption when the tampering function is allowed to be cipher-dependent. In contrast, we are able to show that entropic fixed-related-key security holds in the ideal cipher model with respect to a large class of cipher-dependent tampering attacks (including those which break the assumption of Fehr, Karpman, and Mennink)
Split-State Non-Malleable Codes and Secret Sharing Schemes for Quantum Messages
Non-malleable codes are fundamental objects at the intersection of
cryptography and coding theory. These codes provide security guarantees even in
settings where error correction and detection are impossible, and have found
applications to several other cryptographic tasks. Roughly speaking, a
non-malleable code for a family of tampering functions guarantees that no
adversary can tamper (using functions from this family) the encoding of a given
message into the encoding of a related distinct message. Non-malleable secret
sharing schemes are a strengthening of non-malleable codes which satisfy
additional privacy and reconstruction properties.
We first focus on the -split-state tampering model, one of the strongest
and most well-studied adversarial tampering models. Here, a codeword is split
into two parts which are stored in physically distant servers, and the
adversary can then independently tamper with each part using arbitrary
functions. This model can be naturally extended to the secret sharing setting
with several parties by having the adversary independently tamper with each
share.
Previous works on non-malleable coding and secret sharing in the split-state
tampering model only considered the encoding of \emph{classical} messages.
Furthermore, until the recent work by Aggarwal, Boddu, and Jain (arXiv 2022),
adversaries with quantum capabilities and \emph{shared entanglement} had not
been considered, and it is a priori not clear whether previous schemes remain
secure in this model.
In this work, we introduce the notions of split-state non-malleable codes and
secret sharing schemes for quantum messages secure against quantum adversaries
with shared entanglement. We also present explicit constructions of such
schemes that achieve low-error non-malleability
Split-State Non-Malleable Codes and Secret Sharing Schemes for Quantum Messages
Non-malleable codes are fundamental objects at the intersection of cryptography and coding theory. These codes provide security guarantees even in settings where error correction and detection are impossible, and have found applications to several other cryptographic tasks. One of the strongest and most well-studied adversarial tampering models is -split-state tampering. Here, a codeword is split into two parts which are stored in physically distant servers, and the adversary can then independently tamper with each part using arbitrary functions. This model can be naturally extended to the secret sharing setting with several parties by having the adversary independently tamper with each share. Previous works on non-malleable coding and secret sharing in the split-state tampering model only considered the encoding of classical messages. Furthermore, until recent work by Aggarwal, Boddu, and Jain (IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 2024 & arXiv 2022), adversaries with quantum capabilities and shared entanglement had not been considered, and it is a priori not clear whether previous schemes remain secure in this model.
In this work, we introduce the notions of split-state non-malleable codes and secret sharing schemes for quantum messages secure against quantum adversaries with shared entanglement. Then, we present explicit constructions of such schemes that achieve low-error non-malleability. More precisely, we construct efficiently encodable and decodable split-state non-malleable codes and secret sharing schemes for quantum messages preserving entanglement with external systems and achieving security against quantum adversaries having shared entanglement with codeword length , any message length at most , and error . In the easier setting of average-case non-malleability, we achieve efficient non-malleable coding with rate close to