Econometric Analysis of Pricing and Operational Strategies

This dissertation contains three essays. The first essay, entitled Pricing and Production Flexibility: An Empirical Analysis of the U.S. Automotive Industry, uses a detailed dataset of the U.S. auto industry to examine the relationship between production flexibility and responsive pricing. Our analysis shows that deploying production flexibility is associated with a reduction in observed discounts and with an increase in plant utilization. Our results allow quantifying some of the benefits of production flexibility. The second essay, entitled An Empirical Analysis of Reputation in Online Service Marketplaces, uses a detailed dataset from a leading online intermediary for software development services to empirically examine the role of reputation on choices and prices in service marketplaces. We find that buyers trade off reputation and price and are willing to accept higher bids posted by more reputable bidders. Sellers primarily use a superior reputation to increase their probability of being selected, as opposed to increasing their prices. Our analysis shows that the numerical reputation score has a smaller effect in situations where there exists a previous relationship between buyer and seller, when the seller has certified his or her skills, when the seller is local, or in situations that prompt higher interpersonal trust. The third essay, entitled The Effects of Product Line Breadth: Evidence from the Automotive Industry, studies the effects of product line breadth on market shares and costs, using data from the U.S. automotive industry. Our results show a positive association between product line breadth and market share and production costs. Beyond the effects on production costs, we study the effect of product line breadth on mismatch costs, which arise from demand uncertainty, and we find that product line breadth has a substantial impact on average discounts and inventories. Our results also show that platform strategies can reduce production costs and that a broader product line can provide a hedge against changes in demand conditions

Web Elements and Strategies for Success in Online Marketplaces: An Exploratory Analysis

Among the most prominent and fastest-growing markets on the Internet are online marketplaces. The leader and main exemplar of this type of market is eBay. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive examination of the salient website elements and strategies as success factor in online marketplaces. In this exploratory analysis, we report on the behavior of different types of sellers and their distinct approaches for achieving their desired goals. The conceptual framework for this examination is based on marketing mix theory and its synthesis with competitive heterogeneity theory, allowing us to formulate a success model for sellers operating in this market. The conceptual model is empirically tested by the random collection of over 2000 auction listings from eBay’s Motors Division spread over a period of six months. Our results bring to light the presence of different types of sellers in this market, and the differences in website designs and strategies they use for success in this market

Promoting Honesty in Electronic Marketplaces: Combining Trust Modeling and Incentive Mechanism Design

This thesis work is in the area of modeling trust in multi-agent systems, systems of software agents designed to act on behalf of users (buyers and sellers), in applications such as e-commerce. The focus is on developing an approach for buyers to model the trustworthiness of sellers in order to make effective decisions about which sellers to select for business. One challenge is the problem of unfair ratings, which arises when modeling the trust of sellers relies on ratings provided by other buyers (called advisors). Existing approaches for coping with this problem fail in scenarios where the majority of advisors are dishonest, buyers do not have much personal experience with sellers, advisors try to flood the trust modeling system with unfair ratings, and sellers vary their behavior widely. We propose a novel personalized approach for effectively modeling trustworthiness of advisors, allowing a buyer to 1) model the private reputation of an advisor based on their ratings for commonly rated sellers 2) model the public reputation of the advisor based on all ratings for the sellers ever rated by that agent 3) flexibly weight the private and public reputation into one combined measure of the trustworthiness of the advisor. Our approach tracks ratings provided according to their time windows and limits the ratings accepted, in order to cope with advisors flooding the system and to deal with changes in agents' behavior. Experimental evidence demonstrates that our model outperforms other models in detecting dishonest advisors and is able to assist buyers to gain the largest profit when doing business with sellers. Equipped with this richer method for modeling trustworthiness of advisors, we then embed this reasoning into a novel trust-based incentive mechanism to encourage agents to be honest. In this mechanism, buyers select the most trustworthy advisors as their neighbors from which they can ask advice about sellers, forming a social network. In contrast with other researchers, we also have sellers model the reputation of buyers. Sellers will offer better rewards to satisfy buyers that are well respected in the social network, in order to build their own reputation. We provide precise formulae used by sellers when reasoning about immediate and future profit to determine their bidding behavior and the rewards to buyers, and emphasize the importance for buyers to adopt a strategy to limit the number of sellers that are considered for each good to be purchased. We theoretically prove that our mechanism promotes honesty from buyers in reporting seller ratings, and honesty from sellers in delivering products as promised. We also provide a series of experimental results in a simulated dynamic environment where agents may be arriving and departing. This provides a stronger defense of the mechanism as one that is robust to important conditions in the marketplace. Our experiments clearly show the gains in profit enjoyed by both honest sellers and honest buyers when our mechanism is introduced and our proposed strategies are followed. In general, our research will serve to promote honesty amongst buyers and sellers in e-marketplaces. Our particular proposal of allowing sellers to model buyers opens a new direction in trust modeling research. The novel direction of designing an incentive mechanism based on trust modeling and using this mechanism to further help trust modeling by diminishing the problem of unfair ratings will hope to bridge researchers in the areas of trust modeling and mechanism design

True or False Prosperity? The Effect of Token Incentives in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations

Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAO) received many discussions and attempts recently with the rapid development of blockchain. Token incentive is one of its most important features and owns multiple attributes of equity, property, and currency. To explore its unknown effect, we utilize a quasi-experiment setting in the NFT marketplaces. We find that the token incentives with DAO implementation in Rarible can significantly motivate users’ participation compared with SuperRare at the platform level. At the seller level, by the comparison of cross-platform users and only-OpenSea users, we find it significantly changes users’ trading behavior which reflects in the increment in transactions number and average prices. However, through the equilibrium analysis based on the supply and demand model, the growth rate of the average prices is far beyond the magnitude it should be at the equilibrium state. Therefore, we argue that buyers’ purchase decision is driven by the high expectations of token value

E-COMMERCE IN AGRICULTURE: DEVELOPMENT, STRATEGY, AND MARKET IMPLICATIONS

Marketing,

Integration of Blockchain and Auction Models: A Survey, Some Applications, and Challenges

In recent years, blockchain has gained widespread attention as an emerging technology for decentralization, transparency, and immutability in advancing online activities over public networks. As an essential market process, auctions have been well studied and applied in many business fields due to their efficiency and contributions to fair trade. Complementary features between blockchain and auction models trigger a great potential for research and innovation. On the one hand, the decentralized nature of blockchain can provide a trustworthy, secure, and cost-effective mechanism to manage the auction process; on the other hand, auction models can be utilized to design incentive and consensus protocols in blockchain architectures. These opportunities have attracted enormous research and innovation activities in both academia and industry; however, there is a lack of an in-depth review of existing solutions and achievements. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive state-of-the-art survey of these two research topics. We review the existing solutions for integrating blockchain and auction models, with some application-oriented taxonomies generated. Additionally, we highlight some open research challenges and future directions towards integrated blockchain-auction models

Reverse Auction in Pricing Model

Dynamic price discrimination adjusts prices based on the option value of future sales, which varies with time and units available. This paper surveys the theoretical literature on dynamic price discrimination, and confronts the theories with new data from airline pricing behavior, Consider a multiple booking class airline-seat inventory control problem that relates to either a single flight leg or to multiple flight legs. During the time before the flight, the airline may face the problems of (1) what are the suitable prices for the opened booking classes, and (2) when to close those opened booking classes. This work deals with these two problems by only using the pricing policy. In this paper, a dynamic pricing model is developed in which the demand for tickets is modeled as a discrete time stochastic process. An important result of this work is that the strategy for the ticket booking policy can be reduced to sets of critical decision periods, which eliminates the need for large amounts of data storage