6 research outputs found
Self-Confirming Price Prediction for Bidding in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
Simultaneous, separate ascending auctions are ubiquitous, even when agents have preferences over combinations of goods, from which arises the emph{exposure problem}. Little is known about
strategies that perform well when the exposure problem is important. We present a new family of bidding strategies for this situation, in which agents form and utilize various amounts of
information from predictions of the distribution of final prices.
The predictor strategies we define differ in their choice of method for generating the initial (pre-auction) prediction. We explore several methods, but focus on emph{self-confirming} predictions. An agents prediction of characteristics of the
distribution of closing prices is self-confirming if, when all agents follow the same predictor bidding strategy, the final price distributions that actually result are consistent with the
utilized characteristics of the prediction.
We extensively analyze an auction environment with five goods, and five agents who each can choose from 53 different bidding strategies (resulting in over 4.2 million distinct strategy combinations). We find that the self-confirming distribution
predictor is a highly stable, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We have been unable to find any other Nash strategies in this environment.
In limited experiments in other environments the self-confirming distribution predictor consistently performs well, but is not generally a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
Self-Confirming Price Prediction for Bidding in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
Simultaneous, separate ascending auctions are ubiquitous, even when agents have preferences over combinations of goods, from which arises the emph{exposure problem}. Little is known about
strategies that perform well when the exposure problem is important. We present a new family of bidding strategies for this situation, in which agents form and utilize various amounts of
information from predictions of the distribution of final prices.
The predictor strategies we define differ in their choice of method for generating the initial (pre-auction) prediction. We explore several methods, but focus on emph{self-confirming} predictions. An agents prediction of characteristics of the
distribution of closing prices is self-confirming if, when all agents follow the same predictor bidding strategy, the final price distributions that actually result are consistent with the
utilized characteristics of the prediction.
We extensively analyze an auction environment with five goods, and five agents who each can choose from 53 different bidding strategies (resulting in over 4.2 million distinct strategy combinations). We find that the self-confirming distribution
predictor is a highly stable, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We have been unable to find any other Nash strategies in this environment.
In limited experiments in other environments the self-confirming distribution predictor consistently performs well, but is not generally a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
Self-Confirming Price Prediction for Bidding in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents
with the exposure problem: bidding to acquire a
bundle risks the possibility of obtaining an undesired
subset of the goods. Auction theory provides
little guidance for dealing with this problem.
We present a new family of decisiontheoretic
bidding strategies that use probabilistic
predictions of final prices. We focus on selfconfirming
price distribution predictions, which
by definition turn out to be correct when all
agents bid decision-theoretically based on them.
Bidding based on these is provably not optimal in
general, but our experimental evidence indicates
the strategy can be quite effective compared to
other known methods.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/49509/1/ppsaa.pd
Automated Markets and Trading Agents
Computer automation has the potential, just starting to be realized, of transforming the
design and operation of markets, and the behaviors of agents trading in them. We discuss
the possibilities for automating markets, presenting a broad conceptual framework
covering resource allocation as well as enabling marketplace services such as search
and transaction execution. One of the most intriguing opportunities is provided by markets
implementing computationally sophisticated negotiation mechanisms, for example
combinatorial auctions. An important theme that emerges from the literature is the centrality
of design decisions about matching the domain of goods over which a mechanism
operates to the domain over which agents have preferences. When the match is imperfect
(as is almost inevitable), the market game induced by the mechanism is analytically
intractable, and the literature provides an incomplete characterization of rational bidding
policies. A review of the literature suggests that much of our existing knowledge
comes from computational simulations, including controlled studies of abstract market
designs (e.g., simultaneous ascending auctions), and research tournaments comparing
agent strategies in a variety of market scenarios. An empirical game-theoretic methodology
combines the advantages of simulation, agent-based modeling, and statistical and
game-theoretic analysis.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/49510/1/ace_galleys.pd
Empirical Game-Theoretic Methods for Strategy Design and Analysis in Complex Games.
Complex multi-agent systems often are not amenable to standard game-theoretic analysis. I study methods for strategic reasoning that scale to more complex interactions, drawing on computational and empirical techniques. Several recent studies have applied simulation to estimate game models, using a methodology known as empirical game-theoretic analysis. I report a successful application of this methodology to the Trading Agent Competition Supply Chain Management game. Game theory has previously played little—if any—role in analyzing this scenario, or others like it. In the rest of the thesis, I perform broader evaluations of empirical game analysis methods using a novel experimental framework.
I introduce meta-games to model situations where players make strategy choices based on estimated game models. Each player chooses a meta-strategy, which is a general method for strategy selection that can be applied to a class of games. These meta-strategies can be used to select strategies based on empirical models, such as an estimated payoff matrix. I investigate candidate meta-strategies experimentally, testing them across different classes of games and observation models to identify general performance patterns. For example, I show that the strategy choices made using a naive equilibrium model quickly degrade in quality as observation noise is introduced.
I analyze three families of meta-strategies that predict distributions of play, each interpolating
between uninformed and naive equilibrium predictions using a single parameter. These strategy spaces improve on the naive method, capturing (to some degree) the effects of observation uncertainty. Of these candidates, I identify logit equilibrium as the champion, supported by considerable evidence that its predictions generalize across many contexts.
I also evaluate exploration policies for directing game simulations on two tasks: equilibrium confirmation and strategy selection. Policies based on computing best responses are able to exploit a variety of structural properties to confirm equilibria with limited payoff evidence. A novel policy I propose—subgame best-response dynamics—improves previous methods for this task by confirming mixed equilibria in addition to pure equilibria. I apply meta-strategy analysis to show that these exploration policies can improve the strategy selections of logit equilibrium.Ph.D.Computer Science & EngineeringUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/61590/1/ckiekint_1.pd