Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents
with the exposure problem: bidding to acquire a
bundle risks the possibility of obtaining an undesired
subset of the goods. Auction theory provides
little guidance for dealing with this problem.
We present a new family of decisiontheoretic
bidding strategies that use probabilistic
predictions of final prices. We focus on selfconfirming
price distribution predictions, which
by definition turn out to be correct when all
agents bid decision-theoretically based on them.
Bidding based on these is provably not optimal in
general, but our experimental evidence indicates
the strategy can be quite effective compared to
other known methods.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/49509/1/ppsaa.pd

Anna, Osepayshvili

MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.

Reeves, Daniel M.

Wellman, Michael P.

Deep Blue Documents at the University of Michigan

Self-Confirming Price Prediction for Bidding in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions

Simultaneous, separate ascending auctions are ubiquitous, even when agents have preferences over combinations of goods, from which arises the emph{exposure problem}.  Little is known about
strategies that perform well when the exposure problem is important.  We present a new family of bidding strategies for this situation, in which agents form and utilize various amounts of
information from predictions of the distribution of final prices.

The predictor strategies we define differ in their choice of method for generating the initial (pre-auction) prediction.  We explore several methods, but focus on emph{self-confirming} predictions. An agents prediction of characteristics of the
distribution of closing prices is self-confirming if, when all agents follow the same predictor bidding strategy, the final price distributions that actually result are consistent with the
utilized characteristics of the prediction.

We extensively analyze an auction environment with five goods, and five agents who each can choose from 53 different bidding strategies (resulting in over 4.2 million distinct strategy combinations). We find that the self-confirming distribution
predictor is a highly stable, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.  We have been unable to find any other Nash strategies in this environment.

In limited experiments in other environments the self-confirming distribution predictor consistently performs well, but is not generally a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium

Self-Confirming Price Prediction for Bidding in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions

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