72 research outputs found
Differential Cryptanalysis of SMS4 Block Cipher
SMS4 is a 128-bit block cipher used in the
WAPI standard for wireless networks in China. In this paper, we
analyze the security of SMS4 block cipher against differential
cryptanalysis. Firstly, we prove three theorems and one corollary
that reflect relationships of 5- and 6-round SMS4. Nextly, by
these relationships, we clarify the minimum number of differentially
active S-boxes in 6-, 7- and 12-round SMS4 respectively.
Finally, based on the above results, we present a family of about
differential characteristics for 19-round SMS4, which
leads to an attack on 23-round SMS4 with chosen
plaintexts and encryptions. Our attack is the best known
attack on SMS4 so far
Security Evaluation against Differential Cryptanalysis for Block Cipher Structures
Estimating immunity against differential and linear cryptanalysis is essential in designing secure block ciphers. A practical measure to achieve it is to find the minimal number of active S-boxes, or a lower bound for this minimal number. In this paper, we provide a general algorithm using integer programming, which not only can estimate a good lower bound of the minimal differential active S-boxes for various block cipher structures, but also provides an efficient way to select new structures with good properties against differential cryptanalysis. Experimental results for the Feistel, CAST256, SMS4, CLEFIA and Generalized Feistel structures indicate that bounds obtained by our algorithm are the tightest except for a few rounds of the SMS4 structure. Then, for the first time, bounds of the differential active S-boxes number for the MISTY1, Skipjack, MARS and Four-cell structures are illustrated with the application of our algorithm. Finally, our algorithm is used to find four new structures with good properties against differential cryptanalysis. Security evaluation against liner cryptanalysis can be processed with our algorithm similarly by considering dual structures
Parallelizing the Camellia and SMS4 Block Ciphers - Extended version
The n-cell GF-NLFSR (Generalized Feistel-NonLinear Feedback Shift Register) structure [8] is a generalized unbalanced Feistel network that can be considered as a generalization of the outer function FO of the KASUMI block cipher. An advantage of this cipher over other n-cell generalized Feistel networks, e.g. SMS4 [11] and Camellia [5], is that it is parallelizable for up to n rounds. In hardware implementations, the benefits translate to speeding up encryption by up to n times while consuming similar area and significantly less power. At the same time n-cell GF-NLFSR structures offer similar proofs of security against differential cryptanalysis as conventional n-cell Feistel structures. We also ensure that parallelized versions of Camellia and SMS4 are resistant against other block cipher attacks such as linear, boomerang, integral, impossible differential, higher order differential,interpolation, slide, XSL and related-key differential attacks
the upper bounds on differntial characteristics in block cipher SMS4
SMS4 is a 128-bit block cipher with a 128-bit user key and 32 rounds, which is used in the Chinese National Standard for Wireless LAN WAPI. In this paper, all possible differential patterns are divided into several sections by six designed rules. In order to evaluate the security against the differential cryptanalysis of SMS4, we calculate the lower bounds on the number of active S-Boxes for all kinds of sections, based on which the lower bounds on the number of active S-Boxes in all possible differential patterns can be derived. Finally, the upper bounds on differential characteristic probabilities of arbitrary round numbers are given, which can be used to estimate the strength of SMS4 against differential attack and linear attack
Multiple Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round SMS4 Block Cipher
SMS4 is a 32-round unbalanced Feistel block cipher with its block
size and key size being 128 bits. As a fundamental block cipher used
in the WAPI standard, the Chinese national standard for WLAN, it has
been widely implemented in Chinese WLAN industry. In this paper, we
present a modified branch-and-bound algorithm which can be used for
searching multiple linear characteristics for SMS4-like unbalanced
Feistel block ciphers. Furthermore, we find a series of 5-round
iterative linear characteristics of SMS4 when applying the modified
algorithm in SMS4. Then based on each 5-round iterative linear
characteristic mentioned above, an 18-round linear characteristic of
SMS4 can be constructed, thus leading to a list of 18-round linear
characteristics of SMS4. According to the framework of Biryukov $et\
al.$ from Crpto 2004, a key recovery attack can be mounted on
22-round SMS4 by utilizing the above multiple linear
characteristics. As a matter of fact, our result has much lower data
complexity than the previously best known cryptanalytic result on
22-round SMS4, which is also the previously best known result on
SMS4
Links among Impossible Differential, Integral and Zero Correlation Linear Cryptanalysis
As two important cryptanalytic methods, impossible differential cryptanalysis and integral cryptanalysis have attracted much attention in recent years. Although relations among other important cryptanalytic approaches have been investigated, the link between these two methods has been missing. The motivation in this paper is to fix this gap and establish links between impossible differential cryptanalysis and integral cryptanalysis.
Firstly, by introducing the concept of structure and dual structure, we prove that is an impossible differential of a structure if and only if it is a zero correlation linear hull of the dual structure . More specifically, constructing a zero correlation linear hull of a Feistel structure with -type round function where is invertible, is equivalent to constructing an impossible differential of the same structure with instead of . Constructing a zero correlation linear hull of an SPN structure is equivalent to constructing an impossible differential of the same structure with instead of . Meanwhile, our proof shows that the automatic search tool presented by Wu and Wang could find all impossible differentials of both Feistel structures with -type round functions and SPN structures, which is useful in provable security of block ciphers against impossible differential cryptanalysis.
Secondly, by establishing some boolean equations, we show that a zero correlation linear hull always indicates the existence of an integral distinguisher while a special integral implies the existence of a zero correlation linear hull. With this observation we improve the integral distinguishers of Feistel structures by round, build a -round integral distinguisher of CAST- based on which we propose the best known key recovery attack on reduced round CAST- in the non-weak key model, present a -round integral distinguisher of SMS4 and an -round integral distinguisher of Camellia without . Moreover, this result provides a novel way for establishing integral distinguishers and converting known plaintext attacks to chosen plaintext attacks.
Finally, we conclude that an -round impossible differential of always leads to an -round integral distinguisher of the dual structure . In the case that and are linearly equivalent, we derive a direct link between impossible differentials and integral distinguishers of . Specifically, we obtain that an -round impossible differential of an SPN structure, which adopts a bit permutation as its linear layer, always indicates the existence of an -round integral distinguisher. Based on this newly established link, we deduce that impossible differentials of SNAKE(2), PRESENT, PRINCE and ARIA, which are independent of the choices of the -boxes, always imply the existence of integral distinguishers.
Our results could help to classify different cryptanalytic tools. Furthermore, when designing a block cipher, the designers need to demonstrate that the cipher has sufficient security margins against important cryptanalytic approaches, which is a very tough task since there have been so many cryptanalytic tools up to now. Our results certainly facilitate this security evaluation process
Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced SMS4 Block Cipher
SMS4 is a 128-bit block cipher with a 128-bit user key and 32 rounds, which is used in WAPI, the Chinese WLAN national standard. In this paper, we present a linear attack and a differential attack on a 22-round reduced SMS4; our 22-round linear attack has a data complexity of 2^{117} known plaintexts, a memory complexity of 2^{109} bytes and a time complexity of 2^{109.86} 22-round SMS4 encryptions and 2^{120.39} arithmetic operations, while our 22-round differential attack requires 2^{118} chosen plaintexts, 2^{123} memory bytes and 2^{125.71} 22-round SMS4 encryptions. Both of our attacks are better than any previously known cryptanalytic results on SMS4 in terms of the number of attacked rounds. Furthermore, we present a boomerang and a rectangle attacks on a 18-round reduced SMS4. These results are better than previously known rectangle attacks on reduced SMS4. The methods presented to attack SMS4 can be applied to other unbalanced Feistel ciphers with incomplete diffusion
Improvements for Finding Impossible Differentials of Block Cipher Structures
We improve Wu and Wang’s method for finding impossible differentials of block cipher structures. This improvement is more general than Wu and Wang’s method where it can find more impossible differentials with less time. We apply it on Gen-CAST256, Misty, Gen-Skipjack, Four-Cell, Gen-MARS, SMS4, MIBS, Camellia⁎, LBlock, E2, and SNAKE block ciphers. All impossible differentials discovered by the algorithm are the same as Wu’s method. Besides, for the 8-round MIBS block cipher, we find 4 new impossible differentials, which are not listed in Wu and Wang’s results. The experiment results show that the improved algorithm can not only find more impossible differentials, but also largely reduce the search time
Differential Fault Analysis on SMS4 Using a Single Fault
Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) attack is a powerful cryptanalytic
technique that could be used to retrieve the secret key by
exploiting computational errors in the encryption (decryption) procedure. In the present paper, we propose a new DFA attack on SMS4 using a single fault. We show that if a random byte fault is induced into either the second, third, or fourth word register at the input of the -th round, the 128-bit master key could be recovered with an exhaustive search of bits on average. The proposed attack makes use of the characteristic of the cipher\u27s structure, the speciality of the diffusion layer, and the differential property of the S-box. Furthermore, it can be tailored to any block cipher
employing a similar structure and an SPN-style round function as that of SMS4
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