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Cryptographic security of quantum key distribution
This work is intended as an introduction to cryptographic security and a
motivation for the widely used Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) security
definition. We review the notion of security necessary for a protocol to be
usable in a larger cryptographic context, i.e., for it to remain secure when
composed with other secure protocols. We then derive the corresponding security
criterion for QKD. We provide several examples of QKD composed in sequence and
parallel with different cryptographic schemes to illustrate how the error of a
composed protocol is the sum of the errors of the individual protocols. We also
discuss the operational interpretations of the distance metric used to quantify
these errors.Comment: 31+23 pages. 28 figures. Comments and questions welcom
Security of two-way quantum key distribution
Quantum key distribution protocols typically make use of a one-way quantum
channel to distribute a shared secret string to two distant users. However,
protocols exploiting a two-way quantum channel have been proposed as an
alternative route to the same goal, with the potential advantage of
outperforming one-way protocols. Here we provide a strategy to prove security
for two-way quantum key distribution protocols against the most general quantum
attack possible by an eavesdropper. We utilize an entropic uncertainty
relation, and only a few assumptions need to be made about the devices used in
the protocol. We also show that a two-way protocol can outperform comparable
one-way protocols.Comment: 10 pages, 5 figure
Attacking practical quantum key distribution system with wavelength dependent beam splitter and multi-wavelength sources
Unconditional security of quantum key distribution protocol can be guaranteed
by the basic property of quantum mechanics. Unfortunately, the practical
quantum key distribution system always have some imperfections, and the
practical system may be attacked if the imperfection can be controlled by the
eavesdropper Eve. Applying the fatal security loophole introduced by the
imperfect beam splitter's wavelength dependent optical property, we propose
wavelength-dependent attacking model, which can be applied to almost all
practical quantum key distribution systems with the passive state modulation
and photon state detection after the practical beam splitter. Utilizing our
attacking model, we experimentally demonstrate the attacking system based on
practical polarization encoding quantum key distribution system with almost
100% success probability. Our result demonstrate that all practical devices
require tightened security inspection for avoiding side channel attacks in
practical quantum key distribution experimental realizations
The Security of Practical Quantum Key Distribution
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the first quantum information task to reach
the level of mature technology, already fit for commercialization. It aims at
the creation of a secret key between authorized partners connected by a quantum
channel and a classical authenticated channel. The security of the key can in
principle be guaranteed without putting any restriction on the eavesdropper's
power.
The first two sections provide a concise up-to-date review of QKD, biased
toward the practical side. The rest of the paper presents the essential
theoretical tools that have been developed to assess the security of the main
experimental platforms (discrete variables, continuous variables and
distributed-phase-reference protocols).Comment: Identical to the published version, up to cosmetic editorial change
No Signalling and Quantum Key Distribution
Standard quantum key distribution protocols are provably secure against
eavesdropping attacks, if quantum theory is correct. It is theoretically
interesting to know if we need to assume the validity of quantum theory to
prove the security of quantum key distribution, or whether its security can be
based on other physical principles. The question would also be of practical
interest if quantum mechanics were ever to fail in some regime, because a
scientifically and technologically advanced eavesdropper could perhaps use
post-quantum physics to extract information from quantum communications without
necessarily causing the quantum state disturbances on which existing security
proofs rely. Here we describe a key distribution scheme provably secure against
general attacks by a post-quantum eavesdropper who is limited only by the
impossibility of superluminal signalling. The security of the scheme stems from
violation of a Bell inequality.Comment: Clarifications and minor revisions in response to comments. Final
version; to appear in Phys. Rev. Let
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