4,487 research outputs found
SEABASS: Symmetric-keychain Encryption and Authentication for Building Automation Systems
There is an increasing security risk in Building Automation Systems (BAS) in that its communication is unprotected, resulting in the adversary having the capability to inject spurious commands to the actuators to alter the behaviour of BAS. The communication between the Human-Machine-Interface (HMI) and the controller (PLC) is vulnerable as there is no secret key being used to protect the authenticity, confidentiality and integrity of the sensor data and commands.
We propose SEABASS, a lightweight key management scheme to distribute and manage session keys between HMI and PLCs, providing a secure communication channel between any two communicating devices in BAS through a symmetric-key based hash-chain encryption and authentication of message exchange. Our scheme facilitates automatic renewal of session keys periodically based on the use of a reversed hash-chain. A prototype was implemented using the BACnet/IP communication protocol and the preliminary results show that the symmetric keychain approach is lightweight and incurs low latency
Intelligent monitoring of the health and performance of distribution automation
With a move to 'smarter' distribution networks through an increase in distribution automation and active network management, the volume of monitoring data available to engineers also increases. It can be onerous to interpret such data to produce meaningful information about the health and performance of automation and control equipment. Moreover, indicators of incipient failure may have to be tracked over several hours or days. This paper discusses some of the data analysis challenges inherent in assessing the health and performance of distribution automation based on available monitoring data. A rule-based expert system approach is proposed to provide decision support for engineers regarding the condition of these components. Implementation of such a system using a complex event processing system shell, to remove the manual task of tracking alarms over a number of days, is discussed
Towards a Layered Architectural View for Security Analysis in SCADA Systems
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems support and control
the operation of many critical infrastructures that our society depend on, such
as power grids. Since SCADA systems become a target for cyber attacks and the
potential impact of a successful attack could lead to disastrous consequences
in the physical world, ensuring the security of these systems is of vital
importance. A fundamental prerequisite to securing a SCADA system is a clear
understanding and a consistent view of its architecture. However, because of
the complexity and scale of SCADA systems, this is challenging to acquire. In
this paper, we propose a layered architectural view for SCADA systems, which
aims at building a common ground among stakeholders and supporting the
implementation of security analysis. In order to manage the complexity and
scale, we define four interrelated architectural layers, and uses the concept
of viewpoints to focus on a subset of the system. We indicate the applicability
of our approach in the context of SCADA system security analysis.Comment: 7 pages, 4 figure
Uncovering Vulnerable Industrial Control Systems from the Internet Core
Industrial control systems (ICS) are managed remotely with the help of
dedicated protocols that were originally designed to work in walled gardens.
Many of these protocols have been adapted to Internet transport and support
wide-area communication. ICS now exchange insecure traffic on an inter-domain
level, putting at risk not only common critical infrastructure but also the
Internet ecosystem (e.g., DRDoS~attacks).
In this paper, we uncover unprotected inter-domain ICS traffic at two central
Internet vantage points, an IXP and an ISP. This traffic analysis is correlated
with data from honeypots and Internet-wide scans to separate industrial from
non-industrial ICS traffic. We provide an in-depth view on Internet-wide ICS
communication. Our results can be used i) to create precise filters for
potentially harmful non-industrial ICS traffic, and ii) to detect ICS sending
unprotected inter-domain ICS traffic, being vulnerable to eavesdropping and
traffic manipulation attacks
Internet of Things-aided Smart Grid: Technologies, Architectures, Applications, Prototypes, and Future Research Directions
Traditional power grids are being transformed into Smart Grids (SGs) to
address the issues in existing power system due to uni-directional information
flow, energy wastage, growing energy demand, reliability and security. SGs
offer bi-directional energy flow between service providers and consumers,
involving power generation, transmission, distribution and utilization systems.
SGs employ various devices for the monitoring, analysis and control of the
grid, deployed at power plants, distribution centers and in consumers' premises
in a very large number. Hence, an SG requires connectivity, automation and the
tracking of such devices. This is achieved with the help of Internet of Things
(IoT). IoT helps SG systems to support various network functions throughout the
generation, transmission, distribution and consumption of energy by
incorporating IoT devices (such as sensors, actuators and smart meters), as
well as by providing the connectivity, automation and tracking for such
devices. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey on IoT-aided SG
systems, which includes the existing architectures, applications and prototypes
of IoT-aided SG systems. This survey also highlights the open issues,
challenges and future research directions for IoT-aided SG systems
A survey on cyber security for smart grid communications
A smart grid is a new form of electricity network with high fidelity power-flow control, self-healing, and energy reliability and energy security using digital communications and control technology. To upgrade an existing power grid into a smart grid, it requires significant dependence on intelligent and secure communication infrastructures. It requires security frameworks for distributed communications, pervasive computing and sensing technologies in smart grid. However, as many of the communication technologies currently recommended to use by a smart grid is vulnerable in cyber security, it could lead to unreliable system operations, causing unnecessary expenditure, even consequential disaster to both utilities and consumers. In this paper, we summarize the cyber security requirements and the possible vulnerabilities in smart grid communications and survey the current solutions on cyber security for smart grid communications. © 2012 IEEE
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