Special Libraries, April 1912

Volume 3, Issue 4https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sla_sl_1912/1003/thumbnail.jp

Secure and Verifiable Electronic Voting in Practice: the use of vVote in the Victorian State Election

The November 2014 Australian State of Victoria election was the first statutory political election worldwide at State level which deployed an end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system in polling places. This was the first time blind voters have been able to cast a fully secret ballot in a verifiable way, and the first time a verifiable voting system has been used to collect remote votes in a political election. The code is open source, and the output from the election is verifiable. The system took 1121 votes from these particular groups, an increase on 2010 and with fewer polling places

Where Have All the Parties Gone? Fraenkel and Grofman on the Alternative Vote - Yet Again

The alternative vote (AV) is a preferential electoral system that tends to reward political moderation and compromise. Fraenkel and Grofman have repeatedly attempted to show that AV is not conducive to inter-ethnic moderation in severely divided societies. In this response to their latest attempt,the author points out that neither political party coordination of the vote nor strategic voting plays any part in their analysis. In contrast, he explains how moderate parties of one ethnic group are able to induce their supporters to cast ballots for moderate parties supported by voters of another ethnic group. Prof. Horowitz also explains why the incentives for parties to arrange interethnic vote transfers are much greater under AV than they are under systems such as single transferable vote, which is in use in Northern Ireland, and shows that Fraenkel and Grofman\u27s interpretations of AV\u27s operation in Australia, Fiji, Sri Lanka, and Papua-New Guinea are contrary to the evidence

The New South Wales iVote System: Security Failures and Verification Flaws in a Live Online Election

In the world's largest-ever deployment of online voting, the iVote Internet voting system was trusted for the return of 280,000 ballots in the 2015 state election in New South Wales, Australia. During the election, we performed an independent security analysis of parts of the live iVote system and uncovered severe vulnerabilities that could be leveraged to manipulate votes, violate ballot privacy, and subvert the verification mechanism. These vulnerabilities do not seem to have been detected by the election authorities before we disclosed them, despite a pre-election security review and despite the system having run in a live state election for five days. One vulnerability, the result of including analytics software from an insecure external server, exposed some votes to complete compromise of privacy and integrity. At least one parliamentary seat was decided by a margin much smaller than the number of votes taken while the system was vulnerable. We also found protocol flaws, including vote verification that was itself susceptible to manipulation. This incident underscores the difficulty of conducting secure elections online and carries lessons for voters, election officials, and the e-voting research community

Rational choice meets the new politics: choosing the Scottish Parliament’s electoral system

Although there has been extensive research about electoral system choice at the national level, we know relatively little about the dynamics of deciding the rules of the game for sub-state institutions. This article examines the factors that influenced the choice of a proportional electoral system for the new Scottish Parliament in 1999. Through the use of archival sources and interviews with key participants, we challenge the conventional rational choice explanation for the adoption of the mixed-member proportional (MMP) system. Although rational considerations on the part of the Labour Party were involved in the choice of MMP, our findings suggest that, as at the national level, theories of electoral system choice need to consider normative values as well

Voter ID

The question of whether voters should be required to present an acceptable form of identification (ID) when casting a ballot at a federal election has persisted. Executive summary The question of whether voters should be required to present an acceptable form of identification (ID) when casting a ballot at a federal election has persisted, notwithstanding quite exhaustive debate and deliberation in numerous forums. Arguments advanced in favour of requiring voter ID included the need to: protect the integrity of the information contained on the roll deter attempts by voters to impersonate another voter discourage attempts by a voter to vote more than once. In 2001, in its report User friendly, not abuser friendly: Report of the inquiry into the integrity of the electoral roll, the Joint Standing Committee of Electoral Matters (JSCEM) concluded that that the introduction of voter identification was not warranted as a measure to deter fraud But while some consider that the level of alleged electoral fraud is minuscule, others have a much more pessimistic view. The report of the JSCEM Inquiry into the conduct of the 2001 Federal election addressed proof-of-identity requirements, but focussed on initial enrolment or re-enrolment, not the requirement to produce ID in the normal course of casting a ballot at a polling booth. The Committee recommended ‘that people making a first-time enrolment, those seeking re-enrolment, and those transferring their enrolment details, first be required to provide proof of identity and address, via a driver’s licence or similar. But evidence to that same JSCEM inquiry highlighted problems with the ready availability of ID among people who are extremely disadvantaged or living in Indigenous communities. Others argued that the alleged difficulties of producing ID are over stated, citing the numbers that attend large sports clubs or present ID to access video stores. Australians have a history of resistance to the adoption of any kind of universal ID card that can be legally required to be shown in order to access government services or to confirm one’s identity. The arguments against such a card are broadly couched in terms of personal privacy and an aversion to a ‘surveillance state’

DON’T WASTE YOUR VOTE (AGAIN!). THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S DECISION ON ELECTION LAWS: AN EPISODE OF STRICT COMPARATIVE SCRUTINY

With a single judgment (sent. 1/2014), the Italian Constitutional Court has almost revolutionized Parliamentary election law, the national political landscape, the types of controversies with which it deals, and the means through which it reviews domestic legislation. In order to do so, the Court drew from globalized concepts and levels of scrutiny such as the so-called “proportionality test,” making explicit references to foreign decisions, while downplaying the Constitutional Framers’ intention. Although this decision has brought Italy closer in line with the trends that characterize contemporary global constitutionalism, its concrete effects on Italian law and the political system are not so promising or clear. This paper investigates the explicit and implicit sources of inspiration for the decision, its hidden implications, and it resonates with globalized trends in constitutional law