Foreknowledge, Free Will, and the Divine Power Distinction in Thomas Bradwardine\u27s De futuris contingentibus

Thomas Bradwardine (d. 1349) was an English philosopher, logician, and theologian of some note; but though recent scholarship has revived an interest in much of his work, little attention has been paid to an early treatise he wrote on the topic of future contingents, entitled De futuris contingentibus. In this thesis I aim to address this deficit, arguing in particular that the treatise makes original use of the divine power distinction to resolve the apparent conflict between God’s foreknowledge on the one hand, and human free will on the other. Bradwardine argues that God’s foreknowledge operates in accord with God’s ordained power, and so relative to God’s ordained power, our actions are indeed compelled; however, because of Bradwardine’s appeal to the distinction in power, he is able to maintain that our actions remain free relative to God’s absolute power, and are thus free, absolutely speaking. This solution is, I argue, unique to Bradwardine, although it seems to be abandoned in his later writing. Bradwardine’s approach to the problem is heavily influenced by three figures in particular — Boethius, Anselm of Canterbury, and John Duns Scotus — each of whose solutions I discuss in some detail. Furthermore, Bradwardine explicitly places his own solution in opposition to that of William Ockham, and so I give substantial attention to examining Ockham’s position. But while I agree with Bradwardine’s assessment that Ockham’s position undermines God’s foreknowledge in ways that should be untenable to someone of 14th-century Christian commitments, I argue that Bradwardine’s solution amounts to an equally untenable determinism. An appendix contains excerpts from my own English translation of the De futuris contingentibus (the first into any modern language), in parallel with the original Latin

Tongues in Corinth - The Case for Human Languages: A Study of Corinthians 12-14

This treatise supports the historical view that the tongues phenomenon in 1 Cor 14 is identical to that in Acts 2. Hence, it argues that the tongues referred to in 1 Corinthians are known human languages and not angel speech, riddles, ecstatic irrational utterances or groans. In addition, it contends that this gift was meant to be used for an evangelism that would build up the church. Nevertheless, the local tongues-speakers were abusing this gift by employing it to exalt self, even using it in public worship services where no one present knew the language. It is this abuse that Paul addresses throughout 1 Corinthians, not the phenomenon itself. When seen in this light, the difficult texts in this biblical passage become clear

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