Scepticism about Scepticism

Skeptical arguments are intuitively gripping. Or at least they seem to be. They readily capture the imagination and curiosity of beginners in philosophy. The arguments are easy to state but seemingly impossible to answer. Furthermore there is a powerful pessimistic induction. Those who think they have a reply inevitably haven’t appreciated the force of skeptical arguments. So, at least, I believed for many years, along with most of my fellow philosophers. In this paper I reconsider epistemological skepticism within a framework in which the dependence of epistemic properties on non-epistemic properties plays a central role. I argue that a notable consequence of foregrounding dependence is that skeptical arguments no longer have even a prima facie grip on us. At very least, parity is established between skepticism and its opposite. The presumption in favor of skepticism is obliterated. At most, the main types of skeptical argument are refuted. It sounds unlikely, I know, given the history of failures to refute skepticism, and the number of papers and books that begin with similar bravado yet end up failing with panache. Nevertheless, let’s see

How to entrain your evil demon

The notion that the brain is a prediction error minimizer entails, via the notion of Markov blankets and self-evidencing, a form of global scepticism — an inability to rule out evil demon scenarios. This type of scepticism is viewed by some as a sign of a fatally flawed conception of mind and cognition. Here I discuss whether this scepticism is ameliorated by acknowledging the role of action in the most ambitious approach to prediction error minimization, namely under the free energy principle. I argue that the scepticism remains but that the role of action in the free energy principle constrains the demon’s work. This yields new insights about the free energy principle, epistemology, and the place of mind in nature

“Policy scepticism” and the impact of Scottish Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) on their host region: accounting for regional budget constraints under devolution

A “policy scepticism” has emerged that challenges the results of conventional regional HEI impact analyses. Its denial of the importance of the expenditure impacts of HEIs appears to be based on a belief in either a binding regional resource constraint or a regional public sector budget constraint. In this paper we provide a systematic critique of this policy scepticism. However, while rejecting the extreme form of policy scepticism, we argue that it is crucial to recognise the importance of the public-sector expenditure constraints that are binding under devolution. We show how conventional impact analyses can be augmented to accommodate regional public sector budget constraints. While our results suggest that conventional impact studies overestimate the expenditure impacts of HEIs, they also demonstrate that the policy scepticism that treats these expenditure effects as irrelevant neglects some key aspects of HEIs, in particular their export intensity

‘Policy scepticism’ and the impact of Scottish higher education institutions (HEIs) on their host region : accounting for regional budget constraints under devolution

A “policy scepticism” has emerged that challenges the results of conventional regional HEI impact analyses. Its denial of the importance of the expenditure impacts of HEIs appears to be based on a belief in either a binding regional resource constraint or a regional public sector budget constraint. In this paper we provide a systematic critique of this policy scepticism. However, while rejecting the extreme form of policy scepticism, we argue that it is crucial to recognise the importance of the public-sector expenditure constraints that are binding under devolution. We show how conventional impact analyses can be augmented to accommodate regional public sector budget constraints. While our results suggest that conventional impact studies overestimate the expenditure impacts of HEIs, they also demonstrate that the policy scepticism that treats these expenditure effects as irrelevant neglects some key aspects of HEIs, in particular their export intensity

The Problem of God’s Existence: In Defence of Skepticism

There are four main positions in the argument about whether God exists: atheism, theism, agnosticism, and scepticism. From an epistemological standpoint, scepticism is the most rational; even if a decisive argument which would settle the debate has not been discovered yet, one cannot exclude the possibility of finding it eventually. Agnosticism is too radical, but theism and atheism exceed the available data. However, from a practical standpoint, choosing theism or atheism seems to be more rational than scepticism ; one of them is bound to be right, because there are only two possibilities, one of which has to be true: either God exists or not

"Policy scepticism" and the impact of Northern Irish higher education institutions (HEIS) on their host region : accounting for regional budget contraints

This paper replicates the analysis of Scottish HEIs in Hermannsson et al (2010b) for the case of Northern Ireland. The motivation is to provide a self-contained analysis that is readily accessible by those whose primary concern is with the regional impacts of Northern Irish HEIs. A comparative analysis will follow in due course. A "policy scepticism" has emerged that challenges the results of conventional regional HEI impact analyses. This denial of the importance of the expenditure impacts of HEIs appears to be based on a belief in either a binding regional resource constraint or a regional public sector budget constraint. In this paper we provide a systematic critique of this policy scepticism. However, while rejecting the extreme form of policy scepticism, we argue that it is crucial to recognise the importance of the publicsector expenditure constraints that are binding under devolution. We show how conventional impact analyses can be augmented to accommodate regional public sector budget constraints. While our results suggest that conventional impact studies overestimate the expenditure impacts of HEIs, they also demonstrate that the policy scepticism that treats these expenditure effects as irrelevant neglects some key aspects of HEIs, in particular their export intensity

Forensic Accounting and the Law: The Forensic Accountant in the Capacity of an Expert Witness

This paper focuses on what constitutes “an attitude that includes a questioning mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence”, namely professional scepticism. It also briefly considers factors and reasons contributory to the ever increasing use of (and the need for) professionals who exercise professional scepticism – that is an attitude that includes a questioning mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence

“Policy scepticism” and the impact of London based higher edication institutions (HEIS) on the economy of England : accounting for alternative uses of public expenditure

This paper replicates the analysis of Scottish HEIs in Hermannsson et al (2010a) for the case of London-based HEIs’ impact on the English economy in order to provide a self-contained analysis that is readily accessible by those whose primary concern is with the regional impacts of London HEIs. A “policy scepticism” has emerged that challenges the results of conventional regional HEI impact analyses. This denial of the importance of the expenditure impacts of HEIs appears to be based on a belief in either a binding regional resource constraint or a regional public sector budget constraint. In this paper we provide a systematic critique of this policy scepticism. However, while rejecting the extreme form of policy scepticism, we argue that it is crucial to recognise the importance of alternative uses of public expenditure, and show how conventional impact analyses can be augmented to accommodate this. While our results suggest that conventional impact studies overestimate the expenditure impacts of HEIs, they also demonstrate that the policy scepticism that treats these expenditure effects as irrelevant neglects some key aspects of HEIs, in particular their export intensity

"Policy Scepticism" and the Impact of Welsh Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) on their Host Region : Accounting for Regional Budget Constraints

This paper replicates the analysis of Scottish HEIs in Hermannsson et al (2010b) for the case of Wales in order to provide a self-contained analysis that is readily accessible by those whose primary concern is with the regional impacts of Welsh HEIs. A "policy scepticism" has emerged that challenges the results of conventional regional HEI impact analyses. This denial of the importance of the expenditure impacts of HEIs appears to be based on a belief in either a binding regional resource constraint or a regional public sector budget constraint. In this paper we provide a systematic critique of this policy scepticism. However, while rejecting the extreme form of policy scepticism, we argue that it is crucial to recognise the importance of the publicsector expenditure constraints that are binding under devolution. We show how conventional impact analyses can be augmented to accommodate regional public sector budget constraints. While our results suggest that conventional impact studies overestimate the expenditure impacts of HEIs, they also demonstrate that the policy scepticism that treats these expenditure effects as irrelevant neglects some key aspects of HEIs, in particular their export intensity

Another Failed Refutation of Scepticism

Jessica Wilson has recently offered a more sophisticated version of the self-defeat objection to Cartesian scepicism. She argues that the assertion of Cartesian scepticism results in an unstable vicious regress. The way out of the regress is to not engage with the Cartesian sceptic at all, to stop the regress before it starts, at the warranted assertion that the external world exists. We offer three reasons why this objection fails: first, the sceptic need not accept Wilson’s characterization of the sceptical thesis and thus need not start her regress; second, even if she did commit to the regress, it would not undermine scepticism in the way Wilson envisages; and third, the appeal to mental state scepticism which is necessary to generate the second and subsequent steps in the regress is not justified