Scalable randomized patrolling for securing rapid transit networks

Mass Rapid Transit using rail is a popular mode of transport employed by millions of people in many urban cities across the world. Typically, these networks are massive, used by many and thus, can be a soft target for criminals. In this paper, we consider the problem of scheduling randomised patrols for improving security of such rail networks. Similar to existing work in randomised patrols for protecting critical infrastructure, we also employ Stackelberg Games to represent the problem. In solving the Stackelberg games for massive rail networks, we make two key contributions. Firstly, we provide an approach called RaPtoR for computing randomized strategies in patrol teams, which guarantees (i) Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE); and (ii) Optimality in terms of distance traveled by the patrol teams for specific constraints on schedules. Secondly, we demonstrate RaPtoR on a real world data set corresponding to the rail network in Singapore. Furthermore, we also show that the algorithm scales easily to large rail networks while providing SSE randomized strategies

On the Inducibility of Stackelberg Equilibrium for Security Games

Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. As opposed to the weak Stackelberg equilibrium (WSE), the SSE assumes that the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader and this is widely acknowledged and justified by the assertion that the defender can often induce the attacker to choose a preferred action by making an infinitesimal adjustment to her strategy. Unfortunately, in security games with resource assignment constraints, the assertion might not be valid; it is possible that the defender cannot induce the desired outcome. As a result, many results claimed in the literature may be overly optimistic. To remedy, we first formally define the utility guarantee of a defender strategy and provide examples to show that the utility of SSE can be higher than its utility guarantee. Second, inspired by the analysis of leader's payoff by Von Stengel and Zamir (2004), we provide the solution concept called the inducible Stackelberg equilibrium (ISE), which owns the highest utility guarantee and always exists. Third, we show the conditions when ISE coincides with SSE and the fact that in general case, SSE can be extremely worse with respect to utility guarantee. Moreover, introducing the ISE does not invalidate existing algorithmic results as the problem of computing an ISE polynomially reduces to that of computing an SSE. We also provide an algorithmic implementation for computing ISE, with which our experiments unveil the empirical advantage of the ISE over the SSE.Comment: The Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligenc

An extended study on addressing defender teamwork while accounting for uncertainty in attacker defender games using iterative Dec-MDPs

Multi-agent teamwork and defender-attacker security games are two areas that are currently receiving significant attention within multi-agent systems research. Unfortunately, despite the need for effective teamwork among multiple defenders, little has been done to harness the teamwork 1 research in security games. The problem that this paper seeks to solve is the coordination of decentralized defender agents in the presence of uncer-tainty while securing targets against an observing adversary. To address this problem, we offer the following novel contributions in this paper: (i) New model of security games with defender teams that coordinate under uncertainty; (ii) New algorithm based on column generation that uti-lizes Decentralized Markov Decision Processes (Dec-MDPs) to generate defender strategies that incorporate uncertainty; (iii) New techniques to handle global events (when one or more agents may leave the system) during defender execution; (iv) Heuristics that help scale up in the num-ber of targets and agents to handle real-world scenarios; (v) Exploration of the robustness of randomized pure strategies. The paper opens the door to a potentially new area combining computational game theory and multi-agent teamwork.

Horizon 2020-funded security research projects with dual-use potential: An overview (2014-2018)

The analysis carried out in this report facilitates the identification of dual-use research topics and projects funded under Horizon 2020 that have a dual-use civilian/military potential, the results of which could be applied both by security and defence stakeholders (including industry). In this way, it could support the future security and defence research programmes in their attempt of avoiding duplication of investments and promoting synergies.JRC.E.7-Knowledge for Security and Migratio

Rapid Response Command and Control (R2C2): a systems engineering analysis of scaleable communications for Regional Combatant Commanders

Includes supplementary materialDisaster relief operations, such as the 2005 Tsunami and Hurricane Katrina, and wartime operations, such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, have identified the need for a standardized command and control system interoperable among Joint, Coalition, and Interagency entities. The Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 9 (SEA-9) Rapid Response Command and Control (R2C2) integrated project team completed a systems engineering (SE) process to address the military’s command and control capability gap. During the process, the R2C2 team conducted mission analysis, generated requirements, developed and modeled architectures, and analyzed and compared current operational systems versus the team’s R2C2 system. The R2C2 system provided a reachback capability to the Regional Combatant Commander’s (RCC) headquarters, a local communications network for situational assessments, and Internet access for civilian counterparts participating in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief operations. Because the team designed the R2C2 system to be modular, analysis concluded that the R2C2 system was the preferred method to provide the RCC with the required flexibility and scalability to deliver a rapidly deployable command and control capability to perform the range of military operations

Security in Distributed, Grid, Mobile, and Pervasive Computing

This book addresses the increasing demand to guarantee privacy, integrity, and availability of resources in networks and distributed systems. It first reviews security issues and challenges in content distribution networks, describes key agreement protocols based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange and key management protocols for complex distributed systems like the Internet, and discusses securing design patterns for distributed systems. The next section focuses on security in mobile computing and wireless networks. After a section on grid computing security, the book presents an overview of security solutions for pervasive healthcare systems and surveys wireless sensor network security