The Complexity of Reasoning for Fragments of Autoepistemic Logic

Autoepistemic logic extends propositional logic by the modal operator L. A formula that is preceded by an L is said to be "believed". The logic was introduced by Moore 1985 for modeling an ideally rational agent's behavior and reasoning about his own beliefs. In this paper we analyze all Boolean fragments of autoepistemic logic with respect to the computational complexity of the three most common decision problems expansion existence, brave reasoning and cautious reasoning. As a second contribution we classify the computational complexity of counting the number of stable expansions of a given knowledge base. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper analyzing the counting problem for autoepistemic logic

Graph- versus Vector-Based Analysis of a Consensus Protocol

The Paxos distributed consensus algorithm is a challenging case-study for standard, vector-based model checking techniques. Due to asynchronous communication, exhaustive analysis may generate very large state spaces already for small model instances. In this paper, we show the advantages of graph transformation as an alternative modelling technique. We model Paxos in a rich declarative transformation language, featuring (among other things) nested quantifiers, and we validate our model using the GROOVE model checker, a graph-based tool that exploits isomorphism as a natural way to prune the state space via symmetry reductions. We compare the results with those obtained by the standard model checker Spin on the basis of a vector-based encoding of the algorithm.Comment: In Proceedings GRAPHITE 2014, arXiv:1407.767

Quantum strategies

We consider game theory from the perspective of quantum algorithms. Strategies in classical game theory are either pure (deterministic) or mixed (probabilistic). We introduce these basic ideas in the context of a simple example, closely related to the traditional Matching Pennies game. While not every two-person zero-sum finite game has an equilibrium in the set of pure strategies, von Neumann showed that there is always an equilibrium at which each player follows a mixed strategy. A mixed strategy deviating from the equilibrium strategy cannot increase a player's expected payoff. We show, however, that in our example a player who implements a quantum strategy can increase his expected payoff, and explain the relation to efficient quantum algorithms. We prove that in general a quantum strategy is always at least as good as a classical one, and furthermore that when both players use quantum strategies there need not be any equilibrium, but if both are allowed mixed quantum strategies there must be.Comment: 8 pages, plain TeX, 1 figur