Error-Correcting Data Structures

We study data structures in the presence of adversarial noise. We want to encode a given object in a succinct data structure that enables us to efficiently answer specific queries about the object, even if the data structure has been corrupted by a constant fraction of errors. This new model is the common generalization of (static) data structures and locally decodable error-correcting codes. The main issue is the tradeoff between the space used by the data structure and the time (number of probes) needed to answer a query about the encoded object. We prove a number of upper and lower bounds on various natural error-correcting data structure problems. In particular, we show that the optimal length of error-correcting data structures for the Membership problem (where we want to store subsets of size s from a universe of size n) is closely related to the optimal length of locally decodable codes for s-bit strings.Comment: 15 pages LaTeX; an abridged version will appear in the Proceedings of the STACS 2009 conferenc

Asymptotically Truthful Equilibrium Selection in Large Congestion Games

Studying games in the complete information model makes them analytically tractable. However, large $n$ player interactions are more realistically modeled as games of incomplete information, where players may know little to nothing about the types of other players. Unfortunately, games in incomplete information settings lose many of the nice properties of complete information games: the quality of equilibria can become worse, the equilibria lose their ex-post properties, and coordinating on an equilibrium becomes even more difficult. Because of these problems, we would like to study games of incomplete information, but still implement equilibria of the complete information game induced by the (unknown) realized player types. This problem was recently studied by Kearns et al. and solved in large games by means of introducing a weak mediator: their mediator took as input reported types of players, and output suggested actions which formed a correlated equilibrium of the underlying game. Players had the option to play independently of the mediator, or ignore its suggestions, but crucially, if they decided to opt-in to the mediator, they did not have the power to lie about their type. In this paper, we rectify this deficiency in the setting of large congestion games. We give, in a sense, the weakest possible mediator: it cannot enforce participation, verify types, or enforce its suggestions. Moreover, our mediator implements a Nash equilibrium of the complete information game. We show that it is an (asymptotic) ex-post equilibrium of the incomplete information game for all players to use the mediator honestly, and that when they do so, they end up playing an approximate Nash equilibrium of the induced complete information game. In particular, truthful use of the mediator is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in any Bayesian game for any prior.Comment: The conference version of this paper appeared in EC 2014. This manuscript has been merged and subsumed by the preprint "Robust Mediators in Large Games": http://arxiv.org/abs/1512.0269

Correlation Clustering with Adaptive Similarity Queries

In correlation clustering, we are given $n$ objects together with a binary similarity score between each pair of them. The goal is to partition the objects into clusters so to minimise the disagreements with the scores. In this work we investigate correlation clustering as an active learning problem: each similarity score can be learned by making a query, and the goal is to minimise both the disagreements and the total number of queries. On the one hand, we describe simple active learning algorithms, which provably achieve an almost optimal trade-off while giving cluster recovery guarantees, and we test them on different datasets. On the other hand, we prove information-theoretical bounds on the number of queries necessary to guarantee a prescribed disagreement bound. These results give a rich characterization of the trade-off between queries and clustering error