Conformity-Driven Agents Support Ordered Phases in the Spatial Public Goods Game

We investigate the spatial Public Goods Game in the presence of fitness-driven and conformity-driven agents. This framework usually considers only the former type of agents, i.e., agents that tend to imitate the strategy of their fittest neighbors. However, whenever we study social systems, the evolution of a population might be affected also by social behaviors as conformism, stubbornness, altruism, and selfishness. Although the term evolution can assume different meanings depending on the considered domain, here it corresponds to the set of processes that lead a system towards an equilibrium or a steady-state. We map fitness to the agents' payoff so that richer agents are those most imitated by fitness-driven agents, while conformity-driven agents tend to imitate the strategy assumed by the majority of their neighbors. Numerical simulations aim to identify the nature of the transition, on varying the amount of the relative density of conformity-driven agents in the population, and to study the nature of related equilibria. Remarkably, we find that conformism generally fosters ordered cooperative phases and may also lead to bistable behaviors.Comment: 13 pages, 5 figure

Agent-based Social Psychology: from Neurocognitive Processes to Social Data

Moral Foundation Theory states that groups of different observers may rely on partially dissimilar sets of moral foundations, thereby reaching different moral valuations. The use of functional imaging techniques has revealed a spectrum of cognitive styles with respect to the differential handling of novel or corroborating information that is correlated to political affiliation. Here we characterize the collective behavior of an agent-based model whose inter individual interactions due to information exchange in the form of opinions are in qualitative agreement with experimental neuroscience data. The main conclusion derived connects the existence of diversity in the cognitive strategies and statistics of the sets of moral foundations and suggests that this connection arises from interactions between agents. Thus a simple interacting agent model, whose interactions are in accord with empirical data on conformity and learning processes, presents statistical signatures consistent with moral judgment patterns of conservatives and liberals as obtained by survey studies of social psychology.Comment: 11 pages, 4 figures, 2 C codes, to appear in Advances in Complex System

Homogeneous symmetrical threshold model with nonconformity: independence vs. anticonformity

We study two variants of the modified Watts threshold model with a noise (with nonconformity, in the terminology of social psychology) on a complete graph. Within the first version, a noise is introduced via so-called independence, whereas in the second version anticonformity plays the role of a noise, which destroys the order. The modified Watts threshold model, studied here, is homogeneous and posses an up-down symmetry, which makes it similar to other binary opinion models with a single-flip dynamics, such as the majority-vote and the q-voter models. Because within the majority-vote model with independence only continuous phase transitions are observed, whereas within the q-voter model with independence also discontinuous phase transitions are possible, we ask the question about the factor, which could be responsible for discontinuity of the order parameter. We investigate the model via the mean-field approach, which gives the exact result in the case of a complete graph, as well as via Monte Carlo simulations. Additionally, we provide a heuristic reasoning, which explains observed phenomena. We show that indeed, if the threshold r = 0.5, which corresponds to the majority-vote model, an order-disorder transition is continuous. Moreover, results obtained for both versions of the model (one with independence and the second one with anticonformity) give the same results, only rescaled by the factor of 2. However, for r > 0.5 the jump of the order parameter and the hysteresis is observed for the model with independence, and both versions of the model give qualitatively different results.Comment: 12 pages, 4 figures, accepted to Complexit

Social Conformity Despite Individual Preferences for Distinctiveness

We demonstrate that individual behaviors directed at the attainment of distinctiveness can in fact produce complete social conformity. We thus offer an unexpected generative mechanism for this central social phenomenon. Specifically, we establish that agents who have fixed needs to be distinct and adapt their positions to achieve distinctiveness goals, can nevertheless self-organize to a limiting state of absolute conformity. This seemingly paradoxical result is deduced formally from a small number of natural assumptions, and is then explored at length computationally. Interesting departures from this conformity equilibrium are also possible, including divergence in positions. The effect of extremist minorities on these dynamics is discussed. A simple extension is then introduced, which allows the model to generate and maintain social diversity, including multimodal distinctiveness distributions. The paper contributes formal definitions, analytical deductions, and counterintuitive findings to the literature on individual distinctiveness and social conformity.Comment: 11 pages, 6 figures, appendi

The Role of Noise in the Spatial Public Goods Game

In this work we aim to analyze the role of noise in the spatial Public Goods Game, one of the most famous games in Evolutionary Game Theory. The dynamics of this game is affected by a number of parameters and processes, namely the topology of interactions among the agents, the synergy factor, and the strategy revision phase. The latter is a process that allows agents to change their strategy. Notably, rational agents tend to imitate richer neighbors, in order to increase the probability to maximize their payoff. By implementing a stochastic revision process, it is possible to control the level of noise in the system, so that even irrational updates may occur. In particular, in this work we study the effect of noise on the macroscopic behavior of a finite structured population playing the Public Goods Game. We consider both the case of a homogeneous population, where the noise in the system is controlled by tuning a parameter representing the level of stochasticity in the strategy revision phase, and a heterogeneous population composed of a variable proportion of rational and irrational agents. In both cases numerical investigations show that the Public Goods Game has a very rich behavior which strongly depends on the amount of noise in the system and on the value of the synergy factor. To conclude, our study sheds a new light on the relations between the microscopic dynamics of the Public Goods Game and its macroscopic behavior, strengthening the link between the field of Evolutionary Game Theory and statistical physics.Comment: 14 pages, 3 figure