1,909 research outputs found

    Safeguarding E-Commerce against Advisor Cheating Behaviors: Towards More Robust Trust Models for Handling Unfair Ratings

    Full text link
    In electronic marketplaces, after each transaction buyers will rate the products provided by the sellers. To decide the most trustworthy sellers to transact with, buyers rely on trust models to leverage these ratings to evaluate the reputation of sellers. Although the high effectiveness of different trust models for handling unfair ratings have been claimed by their designers, recently it is argued that these models are vulnerable to more intelligent attacks, and there is an urgent demand that the robustness of the existing trust models has to be evaluated in a more comprehensive way. In this work, we classify the existing trust models into two broad categories and propose an extendable e-marketplace testbed to evaluate their robustness against different unfair rating attacks comprehensively. On top of highlighting the robustness of the existing trust models for handling unfair ratings is far from what they were claimed to be, we further propose and validate a novel combination mechanism for the existing trust models, Discount-then-Filter, to notably enhance their robustness against the investigated attacks

    Interactive Reputation Systems - How to Cope with Malicious Behavior in Feedback Mechanisms

    Get PDF
    Early reputation systems use simple computation metrics that can easily be manipulated by malicious actors. Advanced computation models that mitigate their weaknesses, however, are non-transparent to the end-users thus lowering their understandability and the users’ trust towards the reputation system. The paper proposes the concept of interactive reputation systems that combine the cognitive capabilities of the user with the advantages of robust metrics while preserving the system’s transparency. Results of the evaluation show that interactive reputation systems increase both the users’ detection ability (robustness) and understanding of malicious behavior while avoiding trade-offs in usability

    Reputation Systems: A framework for attacks and frauds classification

    Get PDF
    Reputation and recommending systems have been widely used in e-commerce, as well as online collaborative networks, P2P networks and many other contexts, in order to provide trust to the participants involved in the online interaction. Based on a reputation score, the e-commerce user feels a sense of security, leading the person to trust or not when buying or selling. However, these systems may give the user a false sense of security due to their gaps. This article discusses the limitations of the current reputation systems in terms of models to determine the reputation score of the users. We intend to contribute to the knowledge in this field by providing a systematic overview of the main types of attack and fraud found in those systems, proposing a novel framework of classification based on a matrix of attributes. We believe such a framework could help analyse new types of attacks and fraud. Our work was based on a systematic literature review methodology.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

    TRIVIA: visualizing reputation profiles to detect malicious sellers in electronic marketplaces

    Get PDF
    Reputation systems are an essential part of electronic marketplaces that provide a valuable method to identify honest sellers and punish malicious actors. Due to the continuous improvement of the computation models applied, advanced reputation systems have become non-transparent and incomprehensible to the end-user. As a consequence, users become skeptical and lose their trust toward the reputation system. In this work, we are taking a step to increase the transparency of reputation systems by means of providing interactive visual representations of seller reputation profiles. We thereto propose TRIVIA - a visual analytics tool to evaluate seller reputation. Besides enhancing transparency, our results show that through incorporating the visual-cognitive capabilities of a human analyst and the computing power of a machine in TRIVIA, malicious sellers can be reliably identified. In this way we provide a new perspective on how the problem of robustness could be addressed

    An evolutionary model for constructing robust trust networks.

    Get PDF
    ABSTRACT In reputation systems for multiagent-based e-marketplaces, buying agents model the reputation of selling agents based on ratings shared by other buyers (called advisors). With the existence of unfair rating attacks from dishonest advisors, the effectiveness of reputation systems thus heavily relies on whether buyers can accurately determine which advisors to include in trust networks and their trustworthiness. In this paper, we propose a novel multiagent evolutionary trust model (MET) where each buyer evolves its trust network. In each generation, each buyer acquires trust network information from its advisors and generates a candidate trust network using evolutionary operators. Only trust networks providing more accurate seller reputation estimation shall survive to the next generation. Experimental results demonstrate MET is more robust than the state-ofthe-art trust models against various unfair rating attacks

    Rational Trust Modeling

    Get PDF
    Trust models are widely used in various computer science disciplines. The main purpose of a trust model is to continuously measure trustworthiness of a set of entities based on their behaviors. In this article, the novel notion of "rational trust modeling" is introduced by bridging trust management and game theory. Note that trust models/reputation systems have been used in game theory (e.g., repeated games) for a long time, however, game theory has not been utilized in the process of trust model construction; this is where the novelty of our approach comes from. In our proposed setting, the designer of a trust model assumes that the players who intend to utilize the model are rational/selfish, i.e., they decide to become trustworthy or untrustworthy based on the utility that they can gain. In other words, the players are incentivized (or penalized) by the model itself to act properly. The problem of trust management can be then approached by game theoretical analyses and solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium. Although rationality might be built-in in some existing trust models, we intend to formalize the notion of rational trust modeling from the designer's perspective. This approach will result in two fascinating outcomes. First of all, the designer of a trust model can incentivise trustworthiness in the first place by incorporating proper parameters into the trust function, which can be later utilized among selfish players in strategic trust-based interactions (e.g., e-commerce scenarios). Furthermore, using a rational trust model, we can prevent many well-known attacks on trust models. These two prominent properties also help us to predict behavior of the players in subsequent steps by game theoretical analyses

    Control Mechanisms for Assessing the Quality of Handmade and Artistic Products in e-Marketplace Platforms

    Get PDF
    Selling handmade and artistic goods online is challenging since buyers need to be able to assess product quality before purchase. This study aims to explore how control mechanisms aid the assessment of the product quality of handmade and artistic goods. We do so by extracting control mechanisms for e-marketplace platforms from existing literature and discussing to what extent these are suitable for handmade and artistic goods. We found that existing literature mainly focuses on reputation systems. We reshaped the findings by conducting desk research to identify how control mechanisms are applied in a number of e-marketplaces. Our results show that in e-marketplaces that focus on selling handmade artistic products, a reputation system is not sufficient to ensure product quality in an online environment. Thus, it is critical to apply other control mechanisms which are more effective in increasing the trustworthiness of the seller of artistic and handmade goods. Last, we also suggest alternative control mechanisms to be explored in future research
    • …
    corecore