401 research outputs found
False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms
In Internet auctions, it is easy for a bidder to submit multiple bids
under multiple identifiers (e.g., multiple e-mail addresses).
If only one good is sold, a bidder cannot make any additional profit by using multiple bids. However, in combinatorial auctions, where multiple
goods are sold simultaneously, submitting multiple bids under fictitious names can be profitable. A bid made under a fictitious name is called a {em false-name bid}. In this talk, I describe the summary of existing works and open problems
on false-name bids
Economic Mechanism Design for Securing Online Auctions
Enhancing e-commerce security through computing technology alone is not sufficient. E-commerce designers should apply economic mechanisms to design proper digital processes that accommodate new perspectives raised in e-commerce. For instance, traditional auction mechanisms, such as the Generalized Vickrey Auction, are vulnerable to false-name bidding, an online fraud exploiting the lack of authentication over the Internet. We develop a Sealed-bid Multi-round Auction Protocol (S-MAP), which sells multi-unit identical goods. S- MAP is not only robust against false-name bidding but also simple and efficient
Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness
In open, anonymous environments such as the
Internet, mechanism design is complicated by
the fact that a single agent can participate in
the mechanism under multiple identifiers. One
way to address this is to design false-name-proof
mechanisms, which choose the outcome in such
a way that agents have no incentive to use more
than one identifier. Unfortunately, there are inherent
limitations on what can be achieved with
false-name-proof mechanisms, and at least in
some cases, these limitations are crippling. An
alternative approach is to verify the identities of
all agents. This imposes significant overhead and
removes any benefits from anonymity.
In this paper, we propose a middle ground. Based
on the reported preferences, we check, for various
subsets of the reports, whether the reports in
the subset were all submitted by different agents.
If they were not, then we discard some of them.
We characterize when such a limited verification
protocol induces false-name-proofness for a
mechanism, that is, when the combination of the
mechanism and the verification protocol gives
the agents no incentive to use multiple identi-
fiers. This characterization leads to various optimization
problems for minimizing verification
effort. We study how to solve these problems.
Throughout, we use combinatorial auctions (using
the Clarke mechanism) and majority voting
as examples
05011 Abstracts Collection -- Computing and Markets
From 03.01.05 to 07.01.05, the
Dagstuhl Seminar 05011``Computing and Markets\u27\u27 was held
in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI),
Schloss Dagstuhl.
During the seminar, several participants presented their current
research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of
the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of
seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section
describes the seminar topics and goals in general.
Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available
Towards Optimal Prior-Free Permissionless Rebate Mechanisms, with applications to Automated Market Makers & Combinatorial Orderflow Auctions
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has become a critical issue for blockchain
ecosystems, as it enables validators or block proposers to extract value by
ordering, including or censoring users' transactions. This paper aims to
present a formal approach for determining the appropriate compensation for
users whose transactions are executed in bundles, as opposed to individually.
We explore the impact of MEV on users, discuss the Shapley value as a solution
for fair compensation, and delve into the mechanisms of MEV rebates and
auctions as a means to undermine the power of the block producer
False-name-proof combinatorial auction design via single-minded decomposition
This paper proposes a new approach to building false-name-proof (FNP) combinatorial auctions from those that are FNP only with single-minded bidders, each of whom requires only one particular bundle. Under this approach, a general bidder is decomposed into a set of single-minded bidders, and after the decomposition the price and the allocation are determined by the FNP auctions for single-minded bidders. We first show that the auctions we get with the single-minded decomposition are FNP if those for single-minded bidders satisfy a condition called PIA. We then show that another condition, weaker than PIA, is necessary for the decomposition to build FNP auctions. To close the gap between the two conditions, we have found another sufficient condition weaker than PIA for the decomposition to produce strategy-proof mechanisms. Furthermore, we demonstrate that once we have PIA, the mechanisms created by the decomposition actually satisfy a stronger version of false-name-proofness, called false-name-proofness with withdrawal
Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists
There is a veritable menagerie of auctions-single-dimensional, multi-dimensional, single-sided, double-sided, first-price, second-price, English, Dutch, Japanese, sealed-bid-and these have been extensively discussed and analyzed in the economics literature. The main purpose of this article is to survey this literature from a computer science perspective, primarily from the viewpoint of computer scientists who are interested in learning about auction theory, and to provide pointers into the economics literature for those who want a deeper technical understanding. In addition, since auctions are an increasingly important topic in computer science, we also look at work on auctions from the computer science literature. Overall, our aim is to identifying what both these bodies of work these tell us about creating electronic auctions. © 2011 ACM.This work was funded in part by HP under the “Always on” grant, by NSF IIS-0329037 “Tools and Techniques for Automated Mechanism Design”, and by IEA (TIN2006-15662-C02-01), OK (IST-4-027253-STP), eREP(EC-FP6-CIT5-28575) and Agreement Technologies (CONSOLIDER CSD2007-0022, INGENIO 2010).Peer Reviewe
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