10 research outputs found
Pelatihan Pembuatan Website pada Guru-Guru SMA Muhammadiyah Sumowono: Peningkatan Kualitas Sekolah Berbasis Teknologi
Keberadaan website sekolah sangat penting untuk menyebarluaskan informasi yang dibutuhkan sekolah, guru, siswa, dan masyarakat. Hasil wawancara akhir kegiatan ini didapatkan bahwa website ini memberikan banyak manfaat bagi masyarakat serta kemudahan dalam mengelola sistem informasi oleh operator. Oleh karena itu, pengabdian ini bertujuan untuk menambah keahlian guru-guru di SMA Muhammadiyah Sumowono untuk meningkatkan kualitas diri dan sekolah dengan memanfaatkan website sebagai sumber informasi terkini dari sekolah baik kegiatan sekolah, SDM sekolah, keunggulan sekolah dan penciri sekolah yang membedakan dengan sekolah lain sehingga mampu menarik minat masyarakat untuk menyekolahkan putra-putri mereka di SMA Muhammadiyah Sumowono. Metode yang digunakan adalah deskriptif kuantitatif yang dirinci menjadi metode survey, persiapan, pelatihan, penyuluhan, pendampingan, diskusi, praktik membuat website, tanya jawab serta monitoring dan evaluasi kegiatan. Adapun hasil pengabdian ini menunjukkan bahwa adanya hasil pemahaman yang baik terhadap sosialisasi dan pelatihan membuat website untuk guru-guru SMA di SMA Muhammadiyah Sumowono sehingga mampu mendukung kualitas sekolah khususnya di dalam bidang pendidikan dan branding sekolah di khalayak masyarakat
CPU Port Contention Without SMT
CPU port contention has been used in the last years as a stateless side channel to perform side-channel attacks and transient execution attacks. One drawback of this channel is that it heavily relies on simultaneous multi-threading, which can be absent from some CPUs or simply disabled by the OS.
In this paper, we present sequential port contention, which does not require SMT. It exploits sub-optimal scheduling to execution ports for instruction-level parallelization. As a result, specifically-crafted instruction sequences on a single thread suffer from an increased latency. We show that sequential port contention can be exploited from web browsers in WebAssembly. We present an automated framework to search for instruction sequences leading to sequential port contention for specific CPU generations, which we evaluated on 50 different CPUs. An attacker can use these sequences from the browser to determine the CPU generation within 12 second with a 95% accuracy. This fingerprint is highly stable and resistant to system noise, and we show that mitigations are either expensive or only probabilistic
Packet Chasing: Spying on Network Packets over a Cache Side-Channel
This paper presents Packet Chasing, an attack on the network that does not
require access to the network, and works regardless of the privilege level of
the process receiving the packets. A spy process can easily probe and discover
the exact cache location of each buffer used by the network driver. Even more
useful, it can discover the exact sequence in which those buffers are used to
receive packets. This then enables packet frequency and packet sizes to be
monitored through cache side channels. This allows both covert channels between
a sender and a remote spy with no access to the network, as well as direct
attacks that can identify, among other things, the web page access patterns of
a victim on the network. In addition to identifying the potential attack, this
work proposes a software-based short-term mitigation as well as a light-weight,
adaptive, cache partitioning mitigation that blocks the interference of I/O and
CPU requests in the last-level cache
Dos and Don'ts of Machine Learning in Computer Security
With the growing processing power of computing systems and the increasing
availability of massive datasets, machine learning algorithms have led to major
breakthroughs in many different areas. This development has influenced computer
security, spawning a series of work on learning-based security systems, such as
for malware detection, vulnerability discovery, and binary code analysis.
Despite great potential, machine learning in security is prone to subtle
pitfalls that undermine its performance and render learning-based systems
potentially unsuitable for security tasks and practical deployment. In this
paper, we look at this problem with critical eyes. First, we identify common
pitfalls in the design, implementation, and evaluation of learning-based
security systems. We conduct a study of 30 papers from top-tier security
conferences within the past 10 years, confirming that these pitfalls are
widespread in the current security literature. In an empirical analysis, we
further demonstrate how individual pitfalls can lead to unrealistic performance
and interpretations, obstructing the understanding of the security problem at
hand. As a remedy, we propose actionable recommendations to support researchers
in avoiding or mitigating the pitfalls where possible. Furthermore, we identify
open problems when applying machine learning in security and provide directions
for further research.Comment: to appear at USENIX Security Symposium 202
On Fingerprinting Attacks and Length-Hiding Encryption
It is well-known that already the length of encrypted messages may reveal sensitive information about encrypted data. Fingerprinting attacks enable an adversary to determine web pages visited by a user and even the language and phrases spoken in voice-over-IP conversations.
Prior research has established the general perspective that a length-hiding padding which is long enough to improve security significantly incurs an unfeasibly large bandwidth overhead. We argue that this perspective is a consequence of the choice of the security models considered in prior works, which are based on classical indistinguishability of two messages, and that this does not reflect the attacker model of typical fingerprinting attacks well. Furthermore, these models also consider a model where the attacker is restricted to choosing messages of bounded length difference, depending on a given length-hiding padding of the encryption scheme. This restriction seems difficult to enforce in practice, because application layer protocols are typically unaware of the concrete length-hiding padding applied by an underlying encryption protocol, such as TLS. We also do not want to make application-layer messages dependent on the underlying encryption scheme, but instead want to provide length hiding encryption that satisfies the requirements of the given application.
Therefore we propose a new perspective on length hiding encryption, which aims to capture security against fingerprinting attacks more accurately. This makes it possible to concretely quantify the security provided by length-hiding padding against fingerprinting attacks, depending on the real message distribution of an application. We find that for many real-world applications (such as webservers with static content, DNS requests, Google search terms, or Wikipedia page visits) and their specific message distributions, even length-hiding padding with relatively small bandwidth overhead of only 2-5% can already significantly improve security against fingerprinting attacks. This gives rise to a new perspective on length-hiding encryption, which helps understanding how and under what conditions length-hiding encryption can be used to improve security
Robust website fingerprinting through the cache occupancy channel
Website fingerprinting attacks, which use statistical analysis on network traffic to compromise user privacy, have been shown to be effective even if the traffic is sent over anonymity-preserving networks such as Tor. The classical attack model used to evaluate website fingerprinting attacks assumes an on-path adversary, who can observe all traffic traveling between the user's computer and the secure network. In this work we investigate these attacks under a different attack model, in which the adversary is capable of sending a small amount of malicious JavaScript code to the target user's computer. The malicious code mounts a cache side-channel attack, which exploits the effects of contention on the CPU's cache, to identify other websites being browsed. The effectiveness of this attack scenario has never been systematically analyzed, especially in the open-world model which assumes that the user is visiting a mix of both sensitive and non-sensitive sites. We show that cache website fingerprinting attacks in JavaScript are highly feasible. Specifically, we use machine learning techniques to classify traces of cache activity. Unlike prior works, which try to identify cache conflicts, our work measures the overall occupancy of the last-level cache. We show that our approach achieves high classification accuracy in both the open-world and the closed-world models. We further show that our attack is more resistant than network-based fingerprinting to the effects of response caching, and that our techniques are resilient both to network-based defenses and to side-channel countermeasures introduced to modern browsers as a response to the Spectre attack. To protect against cache-based website fingerprinting, new defense mechanisms must be introduced to privacy-sensitive browsers and websites. We investigate one such mechanism, and show that generating artificial cache activity reduces the effectiveness of the attack and completely eliminates it when used in the Tor Browser.Anatoly Shusterman, Lachlan Kang, Yarden Haskal, Yosef Meltser, Prateek Mittal, Yossi Oren, Yuval Yaro