A novel result on the revenue equivalence theorem

This paper gives two examples to break through the revelation principle. Furthermore, the revenue equivalence theorem does not hold.Quantum game theory; Algorithmic Bayesian mechanism; Revelation principle; Revenue equivalence theorem.

A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions

Combining the result of Palfrey (1983) about the role of bundling and the revenue equivalence theorem, this note shows that there is a conflict between revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions even with symmetric bidders

A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions

Combining the result of Palfrey (1983) about the role of bundling and the revenue equivalence theorem, this note shows that there is a conflict between revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions even with symmetric bidders.efficiency

(SUB-)Optimal entry fees

We extend Myerson's (1981) model by allowing for uncertainty about the number of bidders. In such extension the Revenue Equivalence Theorem still holds and the optimal allocation rule remains the same. Hence, the optimal auction can be implemented with an appropriate reserve price. Nonetheless, we show that entry fees are sub-optimal. The reasons are heterogeneity in bidders' beliefs about the number of bidders, and auctioneer's uncertainty about the optimum entry fee, if any. Our result implies a reversal of the revenue ranking by Milgrom and Weber (1982) which is consistent with many real life situations: auction houses, internet auctions,..

(SUB-)OPTIMAL ENTRY FEES

We extend Myerson's (1981) model by allowing for uncertainty about the number of bidders. In such extension the Revenue Equivalence Theorem still holds and the optimal allocation rule remains the same. Hence, the optimal auction can be implemented with an appropriate reserve price. Nonetheless, we show that entry fees are sub-optimal. The reasons are heterogeneity in bidders' beliefs about the number of bidders, and auctioneer's uncertainty about the optimum entry fee, if any. Our result implies a reversal of the revenue ranking by Milgrom and Weber (1982) which is consistent with many real life situations: auction houses, internet auctions,...Optimal Auction; Random Number of Bidders; Reserve Price; Entry Fee.

National debt burden and ricardian equivalence

The paper deals with the views of Ricardo on the national debt issue. Ricardo, as well as other representatives of classical economics held the view that exorbitant taxation is the inevitable result of a large accumulation of national debt. Although an increase in the value of the annual produce leads to increased tax revenue received by the state, even at a constant level of the tax burden (the ratio of tax revenue to GDP). Provided statistical data on taxation and national debt growth show that tax burden remains around the same level, and fluctuations of that level by no means commensurate with the changes in the growth of public debt. Considerable attention to the problem of so-called “Ricardian equivalence theorem” is paid. According to “equivalence theorem”, formulated by American economist Robert Barro, future taxes for consumer are equal to the current taxes. But this does not reflect the real economic laws and is a simplification of the provisions made by Ricardo