Multi-Sectoral Cascading and Price Dynamics - A Bayesian Econometric Evaluation

Recent evidence by Bils and Klenow (2004) and Klenow and Kryvstov (2003) shows that the average price duration for US CPI-basket goods is in the order of one to two quarters, challenging the monetary business cycle research to try and explain how short price durations can nevertheless generate a large degree of aggregate inflation persistence. We empirically test the relevance of a cascading structure of production as an explanation for short price durations and large aggregate inflation persistence. The final good is produced through a chain of intermediate goods, which undergo several processing stages. At each stage the price is set in nominal terms, and can be adjusted only at random intervals. Though each individual price is adjusted frequently, because the final good price embeds the intermediate price movements, it will turn out to have a large degree of stickiness. We estimate the model using Bayesian techniques to evaluate the relative role of indexation, pricing contracts length, and cascading production structure in the US postwar data. The estimation shows that short pricing contracts within the standard Calvo pricing mechanism are compatible with large inflation persistence, and inflation indexation turns out to play a much less relevant role - in other words, it ends up being a reduced-form model for the cascading production structureInflation Inertia, Monetary Policy, Bayesian Estimation, Multisectoral Cascading

Fixed Price Approximability of the Optimal Gain From Trade

Bilateral trade is a fundamental economic scenario comprising a strategically acting buyer and seller, each holding valuations for the item, drawn from publicly known distributions. A mechanism is supposed to facilitate trade between these agents, if such trade is beneficial. It was recently shown that the only mechanisms that are simultaneously DSIC, SBB, and ex-post IR, are fixed price mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that are parametrised by a price p, and trade occurs if and only if the valuation of the buyer is at least p and the valuation of the seller is at most p. The gain from trade is the increase in welfare that results from applying a mechanism; here we study the gain from trade achievable by fixed price mechanisms. We explore this question for both the bilateral trade setting, and a double auction setting where there are multiple buyers and sellers. We first identify a fixed price mechanism that achieves a gain from trade of at least 2/r times the optimum, where r is the probability that the seller's valuation does not exceed the buyer's valuation. This extends a previous result by McAfee. Subsequently, we improve this approximation factor in an asymptotic sense, by showing that a more sophisticated rule for setting the fixed price results in an expected gain from trade within a factor O(log(1/r)) of the optimal gain from trade. This is asymptotically the best approximation factor possible. Lastly, we extend our study of fixed price mechanisms to the double auction setting defined by a set of multiple i.i.d. unit demand buyers, and i.i.d. unit supply sellers. We present a fixed price mechanism that achieves a gain from trade that achieves for all epsilon > 0 a gain from trade of at least (1-epsilon) times the expected optimal gain from trade with probability 1 - 2/e^{#T epsilon^2 /2}, where #T is the expected number of trades resulting from the double auction

Multi-unit Bilateral Trade

We characterise the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), strongly budget balanced (SBB), and ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for the multi-unit bilateral trade setting. In such a setting there is a single buyer and a single seller who holds a finite number k of identical items. The mechanism has to decide how many units of the item are transferred from the seller to the buyer and how much money is transferred from the buyer to the seller. We consider two classes of valuation functions for the buyer and seller: Valuations that are increasing in the number of units in possession, and the more specific class of valuations that are increasing and submodular. Furthermore, we present some approximation results about the performance of certain such mechanisms, in terms of social welfare: For increasing submodular valuation functions, we show the existence of a deterministic 2-approximation mechanism and a randomised e/(1-e) approximation mechanism, matching the best known bounds for the single-item setting

Competition and Contestability in Transition Banking: An Empirical Analysis

In this paper we focus on the market structure of the banking system in a set of Transition countries. In particular, by employing reduced-form revenue equations in a panel framework we are able to estimate the Panzar-Rosse h-statistic. We mainly control for heterogeneity by conditioning our estimation on bank-specific characteristics so as to account for differences in financial risk, size and finance mix. Our empirical results indicate that for the vast majority of cases banking systems operate under Monopolistic Competition

Monetary Rules for Small, Open, Emerging Economies

This paper develops a variant of the IMF's Global Economic Model (GEM) suitable to analyze macroeconomic dynamics in open economies, and uses it to assess the effectiveness of Taylor rules and Inflation-Forecast-Based (IFB) rules in stabilizing variability in output and inflation. Our findings suggest that a simple IFB rule that does not rely upon any direct estimates of the equilibrium real interest rate and places a relatively high weight on the inflation forecast may perform better in small open economies than conventional Taylor rules.

Determinants of Bank Efficiency: the case of Brazil

This paper analyzes the efficiency of the Brazilian banking sector over the post-privatization period of 2000-2007. We employ a Bayesian stochastic frontier approach, which provides exact efficiency estimates and confidence intervals and thus, allows an accurate comparison across institutions and bank groups. The results suggest that large banks are the most cost and profit efficient, supporting the concentration process observed in recent years. Foreign banks have achieved a good performance through either the establishment of new affiliates and the acquisition of local banks. The remaining public banks have had improvements in cost efficiency, but are relatively profit inefficient. Finally, we observe a positive impact of capitalization on efficiency.

The implications of latent technology regimes for competition and efficiency in banking

Banks continue to differ in many ways, for instance with respect to business models, growth strategies, or financial health. Neglecting these differences confuses inefficiency with heterogeneity while sub-sample estimation prohibits efficiency comparisons across different samples. We use a latent class stochastic frontier model to estimate simultaneously multiple technology regimes and group membership probabilities. The latter are conditioned on six bank traits of German banks and we identify four signifficantly different technology regimes. Only small, retail focused banks exhibit cost inefficiencies, which are 5.4% on average and thus substantially lower compared to previous studies. We use technology regime specific cost parameters to measure competition with Lerner indices. Large, national universal banks and the smallest, most specialized banks exhibit the lowest level of competition. In turn, medium sized universal banks are both efficient and exhibit the lowest Lerner margins between 1994 and 2004. -- Das deutsche Bankwesen wird oft als Drei-Säulen-System bezeichnet, welches aus Sparkassen, Geschäfts-, und Genossenschaftsbanken besteht. Diese Systematik wird oft als geradezu natürliche Marktsegmentierung verstanden. Banken können sich jedoch auch zwischen und innerhalb der drei Säulen hinsichtlich anderer Kriterien unterscheiden, zum BeispielWachstumsstrategien, Stabilitätseigenschaften oder Geschäftsmodellen. Viele vergleichenden Studien definieren oftmals vorab Teilstichproben, um diese Unterschiede zu berücksichtigen. Jede Bildung von Bankengruppen beinhaltet jedoch unweigerlich eine zum Teil willkürliche Komponente und verhindert außerdem den Vergleich relativer Effizienzmaße zwischen Teilstichproben. In dieser Studie benutzen wir ein latent class frontier model (LCFM), um unterschiedliche Technologiegruppen empirisch zu schätzen anstatt sie zu definieren. Wir ermitteln die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Gruppenzugehörigkeit (GZW) je Bank in Abhängigkeit von sechs individuellen Charakteristika. Für jede Technologiegruppe leiten wir Wettbewerbsma?e ab und untersuchen deren Entwicklung zwischen 1994 und 2004.Banks,competition,efficiency,latent class frontier,strategy

Are Foreign Banks Bad for Development Even If They Are Efficient? Evidence from the Indian Banking Industry

Most papers on banking focus on profitability and cost efficiency as measures of performance. In doing so, these papers ignore the fact that, unlike in the manufacturing and services sector industries, the long term viability of a bank depends more on its ability to assess credit worthiness of potential borrowers and provide credit, than on static measures of financial performance. At the same time, the political economy of economic growth and economic reforms cannot overlook the impact of ownership and reforms on credit infusion, which is a major determinant of economic growth. Specifically, there is widespread belief that while foreign banks are perhaps more efficient and profitable than domestic banks in emerging markets, these banks are content to ‘cherry pick’ and limit disbursal of loans. Using bank-level data from India, for six years (1995-96 to 2000-01), we show that given a favourable atmosphere involving economic reforms and banking sector liberalisation, as well as time needed to overcome the informational disadvantages vis a vis the domestic banks, foreign banks are willing to be aggressive in credit markets of emerging economies. The policy implication of our paper is that it provides a strong rationale for policy initiatives that encourages entry of foreign banks into emerging markets and the expansion of their activities in these economies.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40005/3/wp619.pd

Measuring the Stance of Monetary Policy in a Closed Economy: A Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Approach

This paper develops and estimates a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a closed economy which provides a quantitative description of the monetary transmission mechanism, yields a mutually consistent set of indicators of inflationary pressure together with confidence intervals, and facilitates the generation of relatively accurate forecasts. The model features short run nominal price and wage rigidities generated by monopolistic competition and staggered reoptimization in output and labour markets. The resultant inertia in inflation and persistence in output is enhanced with other features such as habit persistence in consumption and labour supply, adjustment costs in housing and capital investment, and variable capital utilization. Cyclical components are modeled by linearizing equilibrium conditions around a stationary deterministic steady state equilibrium which abstracts from long run balanced growth, while trend components are modeled as random walks while ensuring the existence of a well defined balanced growth path. Parameters and unobserved components are jointly estimated with a novel Bayesian full information maximum likelihood procedure, conditional on prior information concerning the values of parameters and trend components.Stance of monetary policy; Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model; Monetary transmission mechanism; Forecast performance evaluation