Enhancing Irrigation Efficiency but Increasing Water Use: The Jevons' Paradox

In this paper we analyze the conditions under which increasing technical efficiency of water use in the agricultural sector might not reduce water demand and pressures on water ecosystems. Departing from this basic problem we discuss how policy measures performed to enhance water productivity in the agriculture might be transformed into effective alternatives to improve the conservation of water resources and then guarantee the successful implementation of the Water Framework Directive. A preference revelation model is presented in the third section of the paper and one empirical application to an irrigation district in southern Spain is used in the fourth section to discuss the effectiveness of water savings measures.Water Framework Directive, Water Economics, Agricultural Economics, Simulation Models, Preference Revelation., Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Earned Wealth, Engaged Bidders? Evidence from a second price auction

Recent work in experimental economics has explored whether observed behavior depends on whether wealth was windfall or earned. This paper extends this work by considering whether earned wealth ffects bidding behavior in an induced-value second-price auction. We find people bid more sincerely in the auction with earned wealth given monetary incentives; earned wealth did not induce sincere bidding in hypothetical auctions.Auctions; Demand revelation; Experimental valuation; Hypothetical bias; Earned Money

Commodity Tax Structure under Uncertainty in a Perfectly Competitive Market

In a partial equilibrium setting without price uncertainty, the balanced-budget substitution of an ad valorem tax on output for a specific (unit) tax can enhance welfare in imperfectly competitive markets and is without impact in a competitive world. This paper demonstrates that a substitution of this kind can also increase expected output and welfare in a competitive market characterised by uncertainty about the commodity price, if firms can respond to the revelation of demand conditions by altering output.ad valorem tax, commodity taxation, perfect competition, uncertainty, unit tax

Your call: eBay and demand for the iPhone 4

The iPhone 4 was introduced into the UK market on 24th June 2010 to significant consumer interest. This clearly exceeded supply through conventional channels, since there was very extensive activity in terms of bidding on eBay auctions for the product. We monitored all eBay transactions on the iPhone 4 for six weeks from introduction, with total transactions amounting to around £1.5m. We analyse determinants of the winning bid in terms of characteristics of the phone, the seller and the buyer. Our most notable and novel finding relative to previous studies is a very significant premium over list price being paid in almost all cases, with positive uplift factors including whether the phone was unlocked and whether it could be sold overseas. Demand fell over time, as evidenced by lower achieved prices, but the fall in price was relatively modest. A significant premium of 32GB over 16GB versions is revealed.eBay auctions ; demand revelation ; auctions ; bidding ; short supply ; versioning JEL Classification: D44 ; L81 ; D12 ; L63

Incentives-Based Mechanism for Efficient Demand Response Programs

In this work we investigate the inefficiency of the electricity system with strategic agents. Specifically, we prove that without a proper control the total demand of an inefficient system is at most twice the total demand of the optimal outcome. We propose an incentives scheme that promotes optimal outcomes in the inefficient electricity market. The economic incentives can be seen as an indirect revelation mechanism that allocates resources using a one-dimensional message space per resource to be allocated. The mechanism does not request private information from users and is valid for any concave customer's valuation function. We propose a distributed implementation of the mechanism using population games and evaluate the performance of four popular dynamics methods in terms of the cost to implement the mechanism. We find that the achievement of efficiency in strategic environments might be achieved at a cost, which is dependent on both the users' preferences and the dynamic evolution of the system. Some simulation results illustrate the ideas presented throughout the paper.Comment: 38 pages, 9 figures, submitted to journa

Do people always pay less than they say? Testbed laboratory experiments with IV and HG values

Hypothetical bias is a long-standing issue in stated preference and contingent valuation studies – people generally overstate their preferences when they do not experience the real monetary consequences of their decision. This view, however, has been challenged by recent evidence based on the elicitation of induced values (IV) in the lab and homegrown (HG) demand function from different countries. This paper uses a two experiments design to assess the extent and relevance of hypothetical bias in demand elicitation exercises for both IV and HG values. For testbed purpose, we use a classic second-price auction to elicit preferences. Comparing the demand curve we elicit in both, hypothetical bias unambiguously (i) vanishes in an induced-value, private good context, and (ii) persists in homegrown values elicitation context. This suggests hypothetical bias in preference elicitation appears to be driven by “preference formation” rather than “preference elicitation”. In addition, companion treatments highlight two sources of the discrepancy observed in the HG setting: the hypothetical context leads bidders to underestimate the constraints imposed by their budget limitations, whereas the real context creates pressure leading them to bid “zero” to opt out from the elicitation mechanism. As a result, there is a need for a demand elicitation procedure that helps subjects take the valuation exercise sincerely, but without putting extra pressure on them.Auctions; Demand revelation; Experimental valuation; Hypothetical bias

Do people always pay less than they say? Testbed laboratory experiments with IV and HG values

Hypothetical bias is a long-standing issue in stated preference and contingent valuation studies - people tend to overstate their preferences when they do not experience the real monetary consequences of their decision. This view, however, has been challenged by recent evidence based on the elicitation of induced values (IV) in the lab and homegrown (HG) demand function from different countries. This paper uses an experimental design to assess the extent and relevance of hypothetical bias in demand elicitation exercises for both IV and HG values. For testbed purpose, we use a classic second-price auction to elicit preferences. Comparing the demand curve we elicit in both, hypothetical bias unambiguously (i) vanishes in an induced-value, private good context, and (ii) persists in homegrown values elicitation context. This suggests hypothetical bias in preference elicitation appears to be driven by "preference formation" rather than "preference elicitation". In addition, companion treatments highlight two sources of the discrepancy observed in the HG setting: the hypothetical context leads bidders to underestimate the constraints imposed by their budget limitations, whereas the real context creates pressure leading them to bid "zero" to opt out from the elicitation mechanism. As a result, there is a need for a demand elicitation procedure that helps subjects take the valuation exercise sincerely, but without putting extra pressure on them.Auctions; Demand revelation; Experimental valuation; Hypothetical bias

Optimal Information Revelation by Informed Investors

This paper studies the structure of optimal finance contracts in an agency model of outside finance, when investors possess private information. We show that, depending on the intensity of the entrepreneur’s moral hazard problem, optimal contracts induce full, partial, or no revelation of the investor’s private information. A partial or nonrevelation of information is optimal, when it mitigates an undersupply of effort by the entrepreneur due to moral hazard

PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT OF AL-KINDI AND AL-FARABI

This study has two purposes, both are: 1) To describe Al-Kindi's thoughts about the harmony between philosophy and religion, and the theory of divine philosophy. 2) To describe Al-Farabi's thoughts about the theory of emanation, and the theory of divinity. This research is using a qualitative method which its study focused on library research. Data sources used in this research are the works related to the two figures as well as other philosophical thought books. The results obtained from this study are; First, according to Al-Kindi, philosophy and religion make no difference because both are equally knowledgeable about truth. The function of philosophy is not to sue the truth of revelation, to demand superiority or to demand equality with revelation. Philosophy does not make a claim as the highest way to reach the truth and want to humble itself as a support for revelation. God theory according to him God is a form that actually does not come from nothing into existence, not preceded by other forms, could not be divided and there are no other substances that equal Him. Secondly, Al-Farabi about the emanations theory explained that God exists for the sake of His self. Through this research, it is expected to provide an understanding of the community about Muslim philosophy and its thoughts

Open barings historiese aksente: owerheidstaak en godsdiens

This article highlights some revelation-historical accents of Scripture which provide a background for understanding the task of public authority concerning religion. These accents concern the demand of Scripture that the sovereignty of God should be acknowledged and, simultaneously, the opposition of Scripture against formalism, and its emphasis on personal conviction, responsibility and engagement. Only when this demand and the Scriptural accent are taken into account the handling of the matter (inter alia as formulated in article 36 of the Belgic Confession) can be accompanied by freedom, responsibility and vitality, else with repression and stagnation