Chapter Spectral Efficiency Analysis of Filter Bank Multi‐Carrier (FBMC)‐ Based 5G Networks with Estimated Channel State Information (CSI)

The heterogeneous cellular network (HCN) is most significant as a key technology for future fifth-generation (5G) wireless networks. The heterogeneous network consists of randomly macrocell base stations (MBSs) overlaid with femtocell base stations (FBSs). Stochastic geometry has been shown to be a very powerful tool to model, analyze, and design networks with random topologies such as wireless ad hoc, sensor networks, and multi-tier cellular networks. HCNs can be energy-efficiently designed by deploying various BSs belonging to different networks, which has drawn significant attention to one of the technologies for future 5G wireless networks. In this chapter, we propose switching off/on systems enabling the BSs in the cellular networks to efficiently consume the power by introducing active/sleep modes, which is able to reduce the interference and power consumption in the MBSs and FBSs on an individual basis as well as improve the energy efficiency of the cellular networks. We formulate the minimization of the power consumption for the MBSs and FBSs as well as an optimization problem to maximize the energy efficiency subject to throughput outage constraints, which can be solved by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions according to the femto tier BS density. We also formulate and compare the coverage probability and the energy efficiency in HCN scenarios with and without coordinated multi-point (CoMP) to avoid coverage holes

Spectral Efficiency Analysis of Filter Bank Multi‐Carrier (FBMC)‐ Based 5G Networks with Estimated Channel State Information (CSI)

Filter bank multi‐carrier (FBMC) modulation, as a potential candidate for physical data communication in the fifth generation (5G) wireless networks, has been widely investigated. This chapter focuses on the spectral efficiency analysis of FBMC‐based cognitive radio (CR) systems, and spectral efficiency comparison is conducted with another three types of multi‐carrier modulations: orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM), generalized frequency division multiplexing (GFDM), and universal‐filtered multi‐carrier (UFMC). In order to well evaluate and compare the spectral efficiency, we propose two resource allocation (RA) algorithms for single‐cell and two‐cell CR systems, respectively. In the single‐cell system, the RA algorithm is divided into two sequential steps, which incorporate subcarrier assignment and power allocation. In the two‐cell system, a noncooperative game is formulated and the multiple access channel (MAC) technique assists to solve the RA problem. The channel state information (CSI) between CR users and licensed users cannot be precisely known in practice, and thus, an estimated CSI is considered by defining a prescribed outage probability of licensed systems. Numerical results show that FBMC can achieve the highest channel capacity compared with another three waveforms

Energy-Efficient Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks: An Overview of Game-Theoretic Approaches

An overview of game-theoretic approaches to energy-efficient resource allocation in wireless networks is presented. Focusing on multiple-access networks, it is demonstrated that game theory can be used as an effective tool to study resource allocation in wireless networks with quality-of-service (QoS) constraints. A family of non-cooperative (distributed) games is presented in which each user seeks to choose a strategy that maximizes its own utility while satisfying its QoS requirements. The utility function considered here measures the number of reliable bits that are transmitted per joule of energy consumed and, hence, is particulary suitable for energy-constrained networks. The actions available to each user in trying to maximize its own utility are at least the choice of the transmit power and, depending on the situation, the user may also be able to choose its transmission rate, modulation, packet size, multiuser receiver, multi-antenna processing algorithm, or carrier allocation strategy. The best-response strategy and Nash equilibrium for each game is presented. Using this game-theoretic framework, the effects of power control, rate control, modulation, temporal and spatial signal processing, carrier allocation strategy and delay QoS constraints on energy efficiency and network capacity are quantified.Comment: To appear in the IEEE Signal Processing Magazine: Special Issue on Resource-Constrained Signal Processing, Communications and Networking, May 200

Game Theory and Microeconomic Theory for Beamforming Design in Multiple-Input Single-Output Interference Channels

In interference-limited wireless networks, interference management techniques are important in order to improve the performance of the systems. Given that spectrum and energy are scarce resources in these networks, techniques that exploit the resources efficiently are desired. We consider a set of base stations operating concurrently in the same spectral band. Each base station is equipped with multiple antennas and transmits data to a single-antenna mobile user. This setting corresponds to the multiple-input single-output (MISO) interference channel (IFC). The receivers are assumed to treat interference signals as noise. Moreover, each transmitter is assumed to know the channels between itself and all receivers perfectly. We study the conflict between the transmitter-receiver pairs (links) using models from game theory and microeconomic theory. These models provide solutions to resource allocation problems which in our case correspond to the joint beamforming design at the transmitters. Our interest lies in solutions that are Pareto optimal. Pareto optimality ensures that it is not further possible to improve the performance of any link without reducing the performance of another link. Strategic games in game theory determine the noncooperative choice of strategies of the players. The outcome of a strategic game is a Nash equilibrium. While the Nash equilibrium in the MISO IFC is generally not efficient, we characterize the necessary null-shaping constraints on the strategy space of each transmitter such that the Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto optimal. An arbitrator is involved in this setting which dictates the constraints at each transmitter. In contrast to strategic games, coalitional games provide cooperative solutions between the players. We study cooperation between the links via coalitional games without transferable utility. Cooperative beamforming schemes considered are either zero forcing transmission or Wiener filter precoding. We characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the core of the coalitional game with zero forcing transmission is not empty. The core solution concept specifies the strategies with which all players have the incentive to cooperate jointly in a grand coalition. While the core only considers the formation of the grand coalition, coalition formation games study coalition dynamics. We utilize a coalition formation algorithm, called merge-and-split, to determine stable link grouping. Numerical results show that while in the low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime noncooperation between the links is efficient, at high SNR all links benefit in forming a grand coalition. Coalition formation shows its significance in the mid SNR regime where subset link cooperation provides joint performance gains. We use the models of exchange and competitive market from microeconomic theory to determine Pareto optimal equilibria in the two-user MISO IFC. In the exchange model, the links are represented as consumers that can trade goods within themselves. The goods in our setting correspond to the parameters of the beamforming vectors necessary to achieve all Pareto optimal points in the utility region. We utilize the conflict representation of the consumers in the Edgeworth box, a graphical tool that depicts the allocation of the goods for the two consumers, to provide closed-form solution to all Pareto optimal outcomes. The exchange equilibria are a subset of the points on the Pareto boundary at which both consumers achieve larger utility then at the Nash equilibrium. We propose a decentralized bargaining process between the consumers which starts at the Nash equilibrium and ends at an outcome arbitrarily close to an exchange equilibrium. The design of the bargaining process relies on a systematic study of the allocations in the Edgeworth box. In comparison to the exchange model, a competitive market additionally defines prices for the goods. The equilibrium in this economy is called Walrasian and corresponds to the prices that equate the demand to the supply of goods. We calculate the unique Walrasian equilibrium and propose a coordination process that is realized by the arbitrator which distributes the Walrasian prices to the consumers. The consumers then calculate in a decentralized manner their optimal demand corresponding to beamforming vectors that achieve the Walrasian equilibrium. This outcome is Pareto optimal and lies in the set of exchange equilibria. In this thesis, based on the game theoretic and microeconomic models, efficient beamforming strategies are proposed that jointly improve the performance of the systems. The gained results are applicable in interference-limited wireless networks requiring either coordination from the arbitrator or direct cooperation between the transmitters