22,886 research outputs found
Overview and classification of coordination contracts within forward and reverse supply chains
Among coordination mechanisms, contracts are valuable tools used in both theory and practice to coordinate various supply chains. The focus of this paper is to present an overview of contracts and a classification of coordination contracts and contracting literature in the form of classification schemes. The two criteria used for contract classification, as resulted from contracting literature, are transfer payment contractual incentives and inventory risk sharing. The overview classification of the existing literature has as criteria the level of detail used in designing the coordination models with applicability on the forward and reverse supply chains.Coordination contracts; forward supply chain; reverse supply chain
An Exchange Mechanism to Coordinate Flexibility in Residential Energy Cooperatives
Energy cooperatives (ECs) such as residential and industrial microgrids have
the potential to mitigate increasing fluctuations in renewable electricity
generation, but only if their joint response is coordinated. However, the
coordination and control of independently operated flexible resources (e.g.,
storage, demand response) imposes critical challenges arising from the
heterogeneity of the resources, conflict of interests, and impact on the grid.
Correspondingly, overcoming these challenges with a general and fair yet
efficient exchange mechanism that coordinates these distributed resources will
accommodate renewable fluctuations on a local level, thereby supporting the
energy transition. In this paper, we introduce such an exchange mechanism. It
incorporates a payment structure that encourages prosumers to participate in
the exchange by increasing their utility above baseline alternatives. The
allocation from the proposed mechanism increases the system efficiency
(utilitarian social welfare) and distributes profits more fairly (measured by
Nash social welfare) than individual flexibility activation. A case study
analyzing the mechanism performance and resulting payments in numerical
experiments over real demand and generation profiles of the Pecan Street
dataset elucidates the efficacy to promote cooperation between co-located
flexibilities in residential cooperatives through local exchange.Comment: Accepted in IEEE ICIT 201
Transforming Energy Networks via Peer to Peer Energy Trading: Potential of Game Theoretic Approaches
Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a next-generation energy
management mechanism for the smart grid that enables each prosumer of the
network to participate in energy trading with one another and the grid. This
poses a significant challenge in terms of modeling the decision-making process
of each participant with conflicting interest and motivating prosumers to
participate in energy trading and to cooperate, if necessary, for achieving
different energy management goals. Therefore, such decision-making process
needs to be built on solid mathematical and signal processing tools that can
ensure an efficient operation of the smart grid. This paper provides an
overview of the use of game theoretic approaches for P2P energy trading as a
feasible and effective means of energy management. As such, we discuss various
games and auction theoretic approaches by following a systematic classification
to provide information on the importance of game theory for smart energy
research. Then, the paper focuses on the P2P energy trading describing its key
features and giving an introduction to an existing P2P testbed. Further, the
paper zooms into the detail of some specific game and auction theoretic models
that have recently been used in P2P energy trading and discusses some important
finding of these schemes.Comment: 38 pages, single column, double spac
Linking Farmers to Markets Through Cooperatives Vegetables Supply Chain Redesign Options for Kapatagan, Mindanao, Philippines
The paper looks into the temperate vegetable industry in Kapatagan, an upland community in Mindanao, the Southern part of the Philippines. The intention in general is to identify ways by which smallholder vegetable producers are appropriately linked to markets through cooperatives with the end in view of increasing farmers’ income. Specifically the paper documented existing vegetable supply chains in Kapatagan as well as other relevant chains, assessed the various chains’ gaps and potentials in view of changing concepts and market requirements with supply chain and agro-industrial concepts as bases and identified entry points for chain enhancements.Farm Management, Production Economics,
LAND MARKETS IN AGENT BASED MODELS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE
Replaced with revised version of paper 02/22/08.Land Economics/Use, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods,
Mechanism design for decentralized online machine scheduling
Traditional optimization models assume a central decision maker who optimizes a global system performance measure. However, problem data is often distributed among several agents, and agents take autonomous decisions. This gives incentives for strategic behavior of agents, possibly leading to sub-optimal system performance. Furthermore, in dynamic environments, machines are locally dispersed and administratively independent. Examples are found both in business and engineering applications. We investigate such issues for a parallel machine scheduling model where jobs arrive online over time. Instead of centrally assigning jobs to machines, each machine implements a local sequencing rule and jobs decide for machines themselves. In this context, we introduce the concept of a myopic best response equilibrium, a concept weaker than the classical dominant strategy equilibrium, but appropriate for online problems. Our main result is a polynomial time, online mechanism that |assuming rational behavior of jobs| results in an equilibrium schedule that is 3.281-competitive with respect to the maximal social welfare. This is only lightly worse than state-of-the-art algorithms with central coordination
An exact solution method for binary equilibrium problems with compensation and the power market uplift problem
We propose a novel method to find Nash equilibria in games with binary
decision variables by including compensation payments and
incentive-compatibility constraints from non-cooperative game theory directly
into an optimization framework in lieu of using first order conditions of a
linearization, or relaxation of integrality conditions. The reformulation
offers a new approach to obtain and interpret dual variables to binary
constraints using the benefit or loss from deviation rather than marginal
relaxations. The method endogenizes the trade-off between overall (societal)
efficiency and compensation payments necessary to align incentives of
individual players. We provide existence results and conditions under which
this problem can be solved as a mixed-binary linear program.
We apply the solution approach to a stylized nodal power-market equilibrium
problem with binary on-off decisions. This illustrative example shows that our
approach yields an exact solution to the binary Nash game with compensation. We
compare different implementations of actual market rules within our model, in
particular constraints ensuring non-negative profits (no-loss rule) and
restrictions on the compensation payments to non-dispatched generators. We
discuss the resulting equilibria in terms of overall welfare, efficiency, and
allocational equity
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