Bargaining with History Dependent Preferences

We study perfect information bilateral bargaining game with an infinite alternating-offers procedure, in which we add an assumption of history dependent preference. A player will devalue a share which gives her strictly lower discounted utility than what she was offered in earlier stages of the bargaining, namely, a ``worse off'' outcome. In a strong version of the assumption, each player prefers impasse to any ``worse off'' outcome. We characterize the essentially unique subgame perfect equilibrium path under the assumption. The equilibrium entails considerable delay and efficiency loss. As the players become infinitely patient, the efficiency loss goes to one half, and the equilibrium share goes to Nash solution. The assumption can also be weakened. We provide a sufficient condition on the extent of devaluation under which the feature of the equilibrium from strong assumption remainsBargaining, Delay, History Dependent Preference, Endogenous Commitment

What Effect Does Female Autonomy Have on Child Health? Microeconometric Evidence from Rural India

This study investigates the effects of an improvement in female autonomy on children's welfare in the developing world, taking into consideration intra-household resource allocation through decision-making processes within households. Using a female autonomy index constructed from India's 1998/99 National Family Health Survey, the study tries to capture women's bargaining power and examine the effects on children's health and medical condition. The results of the empirical analysis suggest that often, though not always, children's health and medical condition can be enhanced by improving female autonomy. In addition, the results also imply that fostering female autonomy may play a crucial role in achieving economic development from a long-term perspective.Female Autonomy, Intra-household Resource Allocation, Child Health

FARMERS' PREFERENCES FOR CROP CONTRACTS

An empirical approach combining elements of principal-agent theory and transaction cost economics is used to determine farmers'Â’ preferences for contract terms in crop production. The approach is tested by asking grain farmers to rank contract choices and specify price premiums in simulated case situations. The statistical results indicate that farmers'Â’ preferences for rates of cost sharing, price premiums, and financing arrangements are significantly influenced by asset specialization and uncertainty associated with the case situations, and by selected business and personal characteristics.Farm Management,

Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future

Behavioral economics increases the explanatory power of economics by providing it with more realistic psychological foundations. This book consists of representative recent articles in behavioral economics. This chapter is intended to provide an introduction to the approach and methods of behavioral economics, and to some of its major findings, applications, and promising new directions. It also seeks to fill some unavoidable gaps in the chapters’ coverage of topics

Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?

This paper surveys the contributions of laboratory experiments to labor economics. We begin with a discussion of methodological issues: why (and when) is a lab experiment the best approach; how do laboratory experiments compare to field experiments; and what are the main design issues? We then summarize the substantive contributions of laboratory experiments to our understanding of principal-agent interactions, social preferences, union-firm bargaining, arbitration, gender differentials, discrimination, job search, and labor markets more generally.personnel economics, principal-agent theory, laboratory experiments, labor economics

Bargaining over Fertility in Rural Ethiopia

The results of the Demographic Health Survey (DHS) reveal that women in Ethiopia prefer fewer children than men, which can be explained by the greater costs that women have to incur from pregnancy, delivery and care for children. In view of differing preferences it is yet not clear which factors determine the final decision. The aim of this study is to shed light on the impact of different bargaining weights on family planning within married couples in rural Ethiopia. Bargaining over fertility can be split into two parts: spacing between births and the number of children. Building on the intrahousehold bargaining framework I investigate both aspects. Applying multistate and count data models I test the hypothesis that women?s bargaining power is negatively related to the number of children and positively to the period length between adjacent births using a detailed data set from rural Ethiopia. Both hypotheses find support from the data.Fertility,intrahousehold bargaining,multistate model,Ethiopia

A Behavioral Account of the Labor Market: The Role of Fairness Concerns

In this paper, we argue that important labor market phenomena can be better understood if one takes (i) the inherent incompleteness and relational nature of most employment contracts and (ii) the existence of reference-dependent fairness concerns among a substantial share of the population into account. Theory shows and experiments confirm, that even if fairness concerns were only to exert weak effects in one-shot interactions, repeated interactions greatly magnify the relevance of such concerns on economic outcomes. We also review evidence from laboratory and field experiments examining the role of wages and fairness on effort, derive predictions from our approach for entry-level wages and incumbent workers' wages, confront these predictions with the evidence, and show that reference-dependent fairness concerns may have important consequences for the effects of economic policies such as minimum wage laws.fairness, contracts, wages, effort, experiments

Reciprocity in free trade agreements

The author uses detailed trade, tariff, and income data for countries involved in 91 trade agreements negotiated since 1980 to test for reciprocity in free trade agreements. The results offer strong evidence of reciprocity in North-North and South-South free trade agreements, but there is little empirical support for reciprocity in North-South trade agreements. In particular, after controlling for other determinants of trade preferences, the results suggest that a one percent increase in preferences offered leads to about a one-half of a percent increase in preferences received in North-North and South-South trade agreements. Freund also finds evidence that large countries extract greater trade concessions from small countries. This leads to a modified form of reciprocity in North-South agreements. A large increase in access to a developing country market leads to only a small increase in access to a rich country market. The results imply that there are incentives for countries to maintain protection in order to extract more concessions from trade partners. But in general, such perverse incentives should be less of a concern in developing countries involved in North-South agreements because the value of a developing country tariff preference in terms of its effect on trade preferences from a rich country is quite small. The gains from unilateral liberalization are likely to far outweigh potential gains from using protection as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations. The evidence is consistent with a repeated game model of trade liberalization. The model presented shows that trade preferences granted are increasing in trade preferences received. This implies that countries can extract greater concessions from trade agreement members if they have higher external trade barriers. However, if a country's trade barriers are very large then the gains from reneging on the agreement in the short run will be high, making the agreement unenforceable despite offering long-term gains. So, there is a reciprocity-credibility tradeoff. High tariffs may allow countries to extract more concessions from potential trade agreement partners, but they also make the country less credible in actually implementing agreed tariff concessions. If a country's external tariff is very high relative to other countries, then it will not be able to commit credibly to any free trade agreement.Rules of Origin,Trade Policy,Common Carriers Industry,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Trade and Regional Integration,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Trade Policy,Rules of Origin,Economic Theory&Research

Union Mediation and Adaptation to Reciprocal Loyalty Arrangements

This study assesses the industrial relations application of the “loyalty-exit-voice” proposition. The loyalty concept is linked to reciprocal employer-employee arrangements and examined as a job attribute in a vignette questionnaire distributed to low and medium-skilled employees. The responses provided by employees in three European countries indicate that reciprocal loyalty arrangements, which involve the exchange of higher effort for job security, are one of the most desirable job attributes. This attribute exerts a higher impact on the job evaluations provided by unionised workers, compared to their non-union counterparts. This pattern is robust to a number of methodological considerations. It appears to be an outcome of adaptation to union mediated cooperation. Overall the evidence suggests that the loyalty-job evaluation profiles of unionised workers are receptive to repeated interaction and negative shocks, such as unemployment experience. This is not the case for the non-union workers. Finally, unionised workers appear to “voice” a lower job satisfaction, but exhibit low “exit” intentions, compared to the non-unionised labour.EPICURUS, a project supported by the European Commission through the 5th Framework Programme “Improving Human Potential” (contract number: HPSE-CT-2002-00143

Unionism and peer-referencing

This study assesses the “fair-wage-effort” hypothesis, by examining (a) the relationship between relative wage comparisons and job satisfaction and quitting intensions, and (b) the relative ranking of stated effort inducing-incentives, in a novel dataset of unionised and non-unionised European employees. By distinguishing between downward and upward-looking wage comparisons, it is shown that wage comparisons to similar workers exert an asymmetric impact on the job satisfaction of union workers, a pattern consistent with inequity-aversion and conformism to the reference point. Moreover, union workers evaluate peer observation and good industrial relations more highly than payment and other incentives. In contrast, non-union workers are found to be more status-seeking in their satisfaction responses and less dependent on their peers in their effort choices The results are robust to endogenous union membership, considerations of generic loss aversion and across different tenure profiles. They are supportive of the individual egalitarian bias of collective wage determination and self-enforcing effort norms.EPICURUS, a project supported by the European Commission through the 5th Framework Programme “Improving Human Potential” (contract number: HPSE-CT-2002-00143