Relationalism about perceptible properties and the principle of charity

Color relationalism holds that the colors are constituted by relations to subjects. The introspective rejoinder against this view claims that it is opposed to our phenomenally-informed, pre-theoretic intuitions. The rejoinder seems to be correct about how colors appear when looking at how participants respond to an item about the metaphysical nature of color but not when looking at an item about the ascription of colors. The present article expands the properties investigated to sound and taste and inspects the mentioned asymmetry, with a particular focus on the principle of charity. Using a metaphysical item, we find that color and sound are no different from shape, our control for a clearly anti-relational property. Taste, on the other hand, is no different from likability, our control for a clearly relational property. Importantly, we find that the disparity between metaphysical and ascription items is due to participants using a principle of charity to interpret disagreement cases such that both parties can be correct

Folk Intuitions about the Causal Theory of Perception

It is widely held by philosophers not only that there is a causal condition on perception but also that the causal condition is a conceptual truth about perception. One influential line of argument for this claim is based on intuitive responses to a style of thought experiment popularized by Grice. Given the significance of these thought experiments to the literature, it is important to see whether the folk in fact respond to these cases in the way that philosophers assume they should. We test folk intuitions regarding the causal theory of perception by asking our participants to what extent they agree that they would ‘see’ an object in various Gricean scenarios. We find that the intuitions of the folk do not strongly support the causal condition; they at most strongly support a ‘no blocker’ condition. We argue that this is problematic for the claim that the causal condition is a conceptual truth

Experimental Philosophy of Consciousness

Experimental philosophy of consciousness seeks to investigate and explain our thinking about phenomenally conscious states. Based on empirical studies, researchers have argued (a) that there is no folk concept of consciousness, (b) that we do not think Microsoft feels regret, (c) that unfelt pains are widely accepted, and (d) that people do not believe that duplicated hamsters have phenomenally conscious states. In this paper, I review these and other fascinating claims about people’s understanding of phenomenal consciousness. In doing so, I also show why experimental philosophy of consciousness is hard, although perhaps not quite as hard as studying phenomenal consciousness itself

Experimental Philosophy of Consciousness

Experimental philosophy of consciousness aims to investigate and explain our thinking about phenomenally conscious states. Based on empirical studies, researchers have argued (a) that we lack a folk concept of consciousness, (b) that we do not think entities like Microsoft feel regret, (c) that unfelt pains are widely accepted, and (d) that people do not attribute phenomenally conscious states to duplicated hamsters. In this article, I review these and other intriguing claims about people’s understanding of phenomenal consciousness. In doing so, I also show why experimental philosophy of consciousness is challenging, although perhaps not quite as daunting as studying phenomenal consciousness itself

How Beliefs Are Like Colors

Teresa believes in God. Maggie’s wife believes that the Earth is flat, and also that Maggie should be home from work by now. Anouk—a cat—believes it is dinner time. This dissertation is about what believing is: it concerns what, exactly, ordinary people are attributing to Teresa, Maggie’s wife, and Anouk when affirming that they are believers. Part I distinguishes the attitudes of belief that people attribute to each other (and other animals) in ordinary life from the cognitive states of belief theoretically posited by (some) cognitive scientists. Part II defends the view that to have an attitude of belief is to live—to be disposed to act, react, think, and feel—in a pattern that an actual belief attributor identifies with taking the world to be some way. Drawing on scientific, scholarly, and literary sources of evidence, How Beliefs are like Colors provides a framework for research on belief across the humanities and sciences of the mind

A sociological critique of the legacy of the London 2012 Paralympic Games

This thesis presents a sociological critique of the concept of legacy as it surrounded the London 2012 Paralympic Games. A sociological approach was adopted to challenge much of the spontaneous sociology that surrounds the ascendancy of legacy within the Olympic and Paralympic space. Legacy, disability and the Paralympic Games are the predominant structures of the research problem. The literature review attempts to present a sociology of the sociological approaches in these fields. Underpinning the research design is Bourdieu et al. s (1991) epistemological hierarchy which consists of and proceeds from the break , the construction of a conceptual framework to the empirical design. This hierarchy contributed to the repositioning of legacy from the pursuit of cause and effect, or rather away from the pursuit of legitimacy and illegitimacy, of London 2012 to a study of the proposed and imposed causes and effects, legitimations and illegitimations of it. Aligned to this repositioning is the primary collection of data through interviews with five different institutional fields: government, media, corporate sponsors, disability sport and disability institutions. The research findings present a positional analysis of the inter- and intra-relations of these respective fields. In the discussion key symbolic struggles and issues are presented for each field with particular attention given to the development of the positive leaning and legitimising best ever Paralympic narrative and to the commercial and political legitimacy of the London 2012 Paralympic Games. It is concluded that legacy is ultimately a symbolic struggle of different visions of respective agents and institutions that are unable to achieve these absolute visions or ends

How to Think about Perceptual Phenomenal Character

This thesis focuses on how theorists should think about perceptual phenomenal character. For the most part, I think theorists should think of it as nonexistent. But in my work in which I suppose it exists, I explore various puzzles for externalist views of perceptual experience. Because many of those puzzles revolve around uncanny color experiences human subjects can have, I also like to think about the metaphysics of color

Social Robotics and the Good Life: The Normative Side of Forming Emotional Bonds With Robots

Robots as social companions in close proximity to humans have a strong potential of becoming more and more prevalent in the coming years, especially in the realms of elder day care, child rearing, and education. As human beings, we have the fascinating ability to emotionally bond with various counterparts, not exclusively with other human beings, but also with animals, plants, and sometimes even objects. Therefore, we need to answer the fundamental ethical questions that concern human-robot-interactions per se, and we need to address how we conceive of "good lives", as more and more of the aspects of our daily lives will be interwoven with social robots

FAMILY AND OTHER RELATIONS A thesis examining the extent to which family relationships shape the relations of art.

Access to the full-text thesis is no longer available at the author's request, due to 3rd party copyright restrictions. Access removed on 28.11.2016 by CS (TIS).This thesis is sited in contemporary issues concerning gender and identity in relation to the arts. It aims to examine the nature of the family and the extent to which relationships and identities in the family might be analogous to the relations of fine art; these include relations between the artist and the artwork, between what is defined as 'art' and what is not, between the artwork and the viewer. It also touches on some of the other, innumerable relationships encountered in the arts: relations of materials form, feeling, thinking and making. The thesis contains a discussion of the nature of family identities and relationships based on my own experiences in the mid-twentieth century and today. Families are at first divided into two main types, nonnative and ethicaL These types represent the difference between ideal or stereotypical family relations and the way families actually live in practice. Analogies are made between normative families and traditional modes of defining art and ethical family relations and ethical notions of art. In the last chapter I suggest that relations that are core and normative are linked to marginal relations through ethical links made by liminal figures that pass between them. Although issues of identity, patriarchy and binary difference appear in theoretical writings on art criticism and practice, there appears to be little contemporary debate in these issues in relation to the family and its relationships. The thesis begins to map out the terrain of such a field of enquiry