The motives of organizational justice

The article proposes an answer to the question of why people care about justice in the workplace.models of organizational justice; material benefits; relational benefits; the fair process effect; the fair outcome effect; the interactive effect; the fairness preference effect; motives of organizational justice; controlled and cognitively driven justice judgements; automatic and emotionally driven justice judgments.

Intent to Contract

There is a remarkable difference between black-letter contract laws of the United States and England. In England, the existence of a contract is supposedly conditioned on the parties\u27 intent to be legally bound, while section 21 of the Second Restatement of Contracts states that [n]either real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract. There are also differences within U.S. law on the issue. While section 21 describes courts\u27 approach to most contracts, the parties\u27 intent to contact can be a condition of validity of preliminary agreements, domestic agreements and social arrangements, reporters’ promises of confidentiality to sources, and gratuitous promises. This Article develops an analytic framework for evaluating these rules and examines their relationship to the broader principles that animate contract law. Rules that condition contractual liability on proof of contractual intent must include rules for interpreting that intent. Those interpretive rules will include both interpretive defaults and rules for what it takes to opt-out of the default. By adjusting these default and opt-out rules, the law can achieve different balances between the duty-imposing and power-conferring functions of contract law, or among the various reasons for enforcement. This is demonstrated by an analysis of the rules for gratuitous promises, preliminary agreements, spousal agreements and reporters\u27 confidentiality promises. The results of that analysis include a new argument for the Model Written Obligations Act; a critique of Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott\u27s proposal preliminary agreements and a recommended alternative to it; and recommended changes to the rules for agreements between spouses. Attention to intent to contract requirements also indicates an overlooked aspect of how the enforcement of contracts affects extralegal norms and relationships of trust. Interpretive rules that require parties who want, or who do not want, legal liability expressly to say so are particularly likely to interfere with or erode extralegal forms trust that otherwise create value in transactions

Change in background context disrupts performance on visual paired comparison following hippocampal damage

The medial temporal lobe plays a critical role in recognition memory but, within the medial temporal lobe, the precise neural structures underlying recognition memory remain equivocal. in this study, visual paired comparison (VPC) was used to investigate recognition memory in a human patient (YR), who had a discrete lesion of the hippocampus, and a group of monkeys with neonatal hippocampal lesions, which included the dentate gyrus, and a portion of parahippocampal region. Participants were required to view a picture of an object on a coloured background. Immediately afterwards, this familiar object was shown again, this time paired with a novel object. All participants displayed a novelty preference, provided the background on which the objects were shown was the same as the one used during the learning phase. When the background of the familiar object was changed between initial familiarization and test, only the control subjects showed a novelty preference; the hippocampal-lesioned monkeys and patient YR showed null preference. The results are interpreted within Eichenbaum and Bunsey's [Eichenbaum, H., & Bunsey, M. (1995). On the binding of associations in memory: Clues from studies on the role of the hippocampal region in paired-associate learning. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 4, 19-23] proposal that the hippocampus facilitates the formation of a flexible representation of the elements that make up a stimulus whereas the parahippocampal region is involved in the formation of a fused representation. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved

Axiomatic Testing of Structure Metrics

Axiomatic testing of software metrics is described, based on axioms from representational measurement theory. In a case study, the axioms are given for the formal relational structure and the empirical relational structure. Two approaches to axiomatic testing are elaborated: deterministic testing and probabilistic testin

The organization of transactions research with the Trust and Tracing Game

This paper presents empirical results of research on the influence of social aspects on the organization of transactions in the domain of chains and networks. The research method used was a gaming simulation called the Trust and Tracing game in which participants trade commodity goods with a hidden quality attribute. Previous sessions of this gaming simulation identified a list of variables for further investigation (Meijer et al., 2006). The use of gaming simulation as data gathering tool for quantitative research in supply chains and networks is a proof-of-principle. This paper shows results from 27 newly conducted sessions and previously unused data from 3 older sessions. Tests confirmed the use of network and market modes of organization. Pre-existing social relations influenced the course of the action in the sessions. Being socially embedded was not beneficial for the score on the performance indicators money and points. The hypothesized reduction in measurable transaction costs when there was high trust between the participants could not be found. Further analysis revealed that participants are able to suspect cheats in a session based on other factors than tracing. Testing hypotheses with data gathered in a gaming simulation proved feasible. Experiences with the methodology used are discusse

Social Preferences and Relational Contracting: An Experimental Investigation

The form and regulation of contracts is of increasing importance to agricultural economists as farmers and agribusinesses increasing rely on contracts rather than markets to acquire inputs and sell outputs. We focus on the differences between the joint and individual surplus achievable under complete versus incomplete or relational contracts, where the latter are contracts that are not verifiable by a third party and must rely upon threat of termination in order to entice mutually satisfactory performance. Using an experimental market similar to Brown, Falk, and Fehr [Brown, M., A. Falk, and E. Fehr. Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions, Econometrica, 72 (2004):747-780] we replicate the general results found by these authors, including the qualitative findings that complete contracts dominate incomplete contracts in terms of social surplus generated and that incomplete contracts significantly deviate from the minimal levels of social surplus predicted by equilibrium models featuring purely self-interested agents. We extend the Brown, Falk, and Fehr results in a fundamental way: we explicitly link individual outcomes in relational contracts (e.g, surplus, prices, quality) to the nature of subjects' social preferences, which were measured by a separate experimental protocol that was implemented prior to the experimental trading session. We find subjects with other-regarding preferences enter into relational contracts that generate levels of social surplus similar to the surplus generated under complete contracts. Furthermore, subjects with other-regarding preferences tend to locate others with similar preferences and enter into long-term trading relationships that generate these higher surplus levels. We discuss the ramifications of the results for current regulatory efforts aimed at agricultural contracts.Marketing,