4 research outputs found
General Classification of the Authenticated Encryption Schemes for the CAESAR Competition
An Authenticated encryption scheme is a scheme which provides privacy and integrity by using a secret key. In 2013, CAESAR (the ``Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness\u27\u27) was co-founded by NIST and Dan Bernstein with the aim of finding authenticated encryption schemes
that offer advantages over AES-GCM and are suitable for widespread adoption.
The first round started with 57 candidates in March 2014; and nine of these
first-round candidates where broken and withdrawn from the competition. The
remaining 48 candidates went through an intense process of review, analysis
and comparison. While the cryptographic community benefits greatly from the
manifold different submission designs, their sheer number
implies a challenging amount of study. This paper provides
an easy-to-grasp overview over functional aspects, security parameters, and
robustness offerings by the CAESAR candidates, clustered by their underlying
designs (block-cipher-, stream-cipher-, permutation-/sponge-,
compression-function-based, dedicated). After intensive review and analysis of all 48 candidates by the community, the CAESAR committee selected only 30 candidates for the second round. The announcement for the third round candidates was made on 15th August 2016 and 15 candidates were chosen for the third round
Analyzing the Provable Security Bounds of GIFT-COFB and Photon-Beetle
We study the provable security claims of two NIST Lightweight Cryptography (LwC) finalists, GIFT-COFB and Photon-Beetle, and present several attacks whose complexities contradict their claimed bounds in their final round specification documents.
For GIFT-COFB, we show an attack using encryption queries and no decryption query to break privacy (IND-CPA). The success probability is for -bit block while the claimed bound contains . This positively solves an open question posed in~[Khairallah, ePrint~2021/648 (also accepted at FSE~2022)].
For Photon-Beetle, we show an attack using encryption queries (using a small number of input blocks) followed by a single decryption query and no primitive query to break authenticity (INT-CTXT). The success probability is for a -bit block permutation, and it is significantly larger than what the claimed bound tells,
which is independent of the number of encryption queries.
We also show a simple tag guessing attack that violates the INT-CTXT bound when the rate .
Then, we analyze other (improved/modified) bounds of Photon-Beetle shown in the subsequent papers~[Chakraborty et al., ToSC 2020(2) and Chakraborty et al., ePrint~2019/1475].
As a side result of our security analysis of Photon-Beetle,
we point out that a simple and efficient forgery attack is possible in the related-key setting.
We emphasize that our results do not contradict the claimed ``bit security\u27\u27 in the LwC specification documents for any of the schemes that we studied.
That is, we do not negate the claims that GIFT-COFB is -bit secure for , and Photon-Beetle is -bit secure for and , where is a rate.
We also note that the security against related-key attacks is not included in the security requirements of NIST LwC, and is not claimed by the designers
Provably Secure Authenticated Encryption
Authenticated Encryption (AE) is a symmetric key cryptographic primitive that ensures confidentiality and authenticity of processed messages at the same time. The research
of AE as a primitive in its own right started in 2000.
The security goals of AE were captured in formal definitions in the tradition in the tradition of provable security (such as NAE, MRAE, OAE, RAE or the RUP), where the security of a scheme is formally proven assuming the security of an underlying building block. The prevailing syntax moved to nonce-based AE with associated data (which is an additional input that gets authenticated, but not encrypted). Other types of AE schemes appeared as well, e.g. ones that supported stateful sessions.
Numerous AE schemes were designed; in the early years, these were almost exclusively blockcipher modes of operation, most notably OCB in 2001, CCM in 2003 and GCM in 2004. At the same time, issues were discovered both with the security and applicability of the most popular AE schemes, and other applications of symmetric key cryptography.
As a response, the Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR) was started in 2013. Its goals were to identify a portfolio of new, secure and reliable AE schemes that would satisfy the needs of practical applications, and also to boost the research in the area of AE. Prompted by CAESAR, 57 new schemes were designed, new types of constructions that gained popularity appeared (such as the Sponge-based AE schemes), and new notions of security were proposed (such as RAE). The final portfolio of the CAESAR competition should be announced in 2018.
In this thesis, we push the state of the art in the field of AE in several directions. All of them are related to provable security, in one way, or another.
We propose OMD, the first provably secure dedicated AE scheme that is based on a compression function. We further modify OMD to achieve nonce misuse-resistant security (MRAE). We also propose another provably secure variant of OMD called pure OMD, which enjoys a great improvement of performance over OMD.
Inspired by the modifications that gave rise to pure OMD, we turn to the popular Sponge-based AE schemes and prove that similar measures can also be applied to the keyed Sponge and keyed Duplex (a variant of the Sponge), allowing a substantial increase of performance without an impact on security.
We then address definitional aspects of AE. We critically evaluate the security notion of OAE, whose authors claimed that it provides the best possible security for online schemes under nonce reuse. We challenge these claims, and discuss what are the meaningful requirements for online AE schemes. Based on our findings, we formulate a new definition of online AE security under nonce-reuse, and demonstrate its feasibility.
We next turn our attention to the security of nonce-based AE schemes under stretch misuse; i.e. when a scheme is used with varying ciphertext expansion under the same key, even though it should not be. We argue that varying the stretch is plausible, and formulate several notions that capture security in presence of variable stretch. We establish their relations to previous notions, and demonstrate the feasibility of security in this setting.
We finally depart from provable security, with the intention to complement it. We compose a survey of universal forgeries, decryption attacks and key recovery attacks on 3rd round CAESAR candidates